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Essays on Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information
Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays that study the dynamic games with incomplete information. In the
first chapter, I study a dynamic trading game where a seller and potential buyers start out symmetrically
uninformed about the quality of a good, but the seller becomes informed about the quality, so that the
asymmetric information between the agents increases over time. The introduction of a widening information
gap results in several new phenomena. In particular, the interaction between screening and learning generates
nonmonotonic price and trading patterns, contrary to the standard models in which asymmetric information
is initially given. If the seller's effective learning speed is high, the equilibrium features "collapse-and-recovery"
behavior: Both the equilibrium price and the probability of a trade drop at a threshold time and then increase
later. The seller's payoff is nonmonotonic in his learning speed, as a slower learning speed can lead to higher
payoff for the seller.
In the second chapter, I study a dynamic one-sided-offer bargaining model between a seller and a buyer under
incomplete information. The seller knows the quality of his product while the buyer does not. During
bargaining, the seller randomly receives an outside option, the value of which depends on the hidden quality.
If the outside option is sufficiently important, there is an equilibrium in which the uninformed buyer fails to
learn the quality and continues to make the same randomized offer throughout the bargaining process. As a
result, the equilibrium behavior produces an outcome path that resembles the outcome of a bargaining
deadlock and its resolution. The equilibrium with deadlock has inefficient outcomes such as a delay in
reaching an agreement and a breakdown in negotiations. Bargaining inefficiencies do not vanish even with
frequent offers, and they may exist when there is no static adverse selection problem.
In the third chapter, I address the following question: when does an incumbent party have an incentive to
experiment with a risky reform policy in the presence of future elections? I study a continuous-time game
between two political parties with heterogeneous preferences and a median voter. I show that while infrequent
elections are surely bad for the median voter, too frequent elections can also make him strictly worse off.
When the election frequency is low, a standard agency problem arises and the incumbent party experiments
with its preferred reform policy even if its outlook is not promising. On the other hand, when the election
frequency is too high, in equilibrium the incumbent stops experimentation too early because the imminent
election increases the incumbent's potential loss of power if it undertakes risky reform. The degree of
inefficiency is large enough that too frequent elections are worse for the median voter than a dictatorship.
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON DYNAMIC GAMES OF INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
Ilwoo Hwang
George J. Mailath
This dissertation consists of three essays that study the dynamic games with incomplete
information. In the first chapter, I study a dynamic trading game where a seller and poten-
tial buyers start out symmetrically uninformed about the quality of a good, but the seller
becomes informed about the quality, so that the asymmetric information between the agents
increases over time. The introduction of a widening information gap results in several new
phenomena. In particular, the interaction between screening and learning generates non-
monotonic price and trading patterns, contrary to the standard models in which asymmetric
information is initially given. If the seller’s eﬀective learning speed is high, the equilibrium
features “collapse-and-recovery” behavior: Both the equilibrium price and the probability of
a trade drop at a threshold time and then increase later. The seller’s payoﬀ is nonmonotonic
in his learning speed, as a slower learning speed can lead to higher payoﬀ for the seller.
In the second chapter, I study a dynamic one-sided-oﬀer bargaining model between a
seller and a buyer under incomplete information. The seller knows the quality of his prod-
uct while the buyer does not. During bargaining, the seller randomly receives an outside
option, the value of which depends on the hidden quality. If the outside option is suﬃciently
important, there is an equilibrium in which the uninformed buyer fails to learn the quality
vi
and continues to make the same randomized oﬀer throughout the bargaining process. As
a result, the equilibrium behavior produces an outcome path that resembles the outcome
of a bargaining deadlock and its resolution. The equilibrium with deadlock has ineﬃcient
outcomes such as a delay in reaching an agreement and a breakdown in negotiations. Bar-
gaining ineﬃciencies do not vanish even with frequent oﬀers, and they may exist when there
is no static adverse selection problem.
In the third chapter, I address the following question: when does an incumbent party
have an incentive to experiment with a risky reform policy in the presence of future elec-
tions? I study a continuous-time game between two political parties with heterogeneous
preferences and a median voter. I show that while infrequent elections are surely bad for the
median voter, too frequent elections can also make him strictly worse oﬀ. When the election
frequency is low, a standard agency problem arises and the incumbent party experiments
with its preferred reform policy even if its outlook is not promising. On the other hand,
when the election frequency is too high, in equilibrium the incumbent stops experimentation
too early because the imminent election increases the incumbent’s potential loss of power
if it undertakes risky reform. The degree of ineﬃciency is large enough that too frequent
elections are worse for the median voter than a dictatorship.
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Chapter I
Dynamic Trading with Increasing
Asymmetric Information
1 Introduction
Akerlof’s seminal 1970 paper on asymmetric information shows that its existence can lead
to ineﬃcient trade outcomes. In the literature following Akerlof’s work, many researchers
have investigated the dynamic impact of the adverse selection problem. Yet despite this
focus, most existing models assume that the asymmetric information exists initially, in the
sense that one side of transaction starts with superior information than the other. However,
there are many economic environments in which neither agent is perfectly informed in the
beginning and one side gradually obtains information, so that the information gap between
the agents grows over time. This observation relates to the main innovation of this paper: I
consider a dynamic trading situation where the degree of asymmetric information between
agents increases over time, and analyze its eﬀects on trading patterns and eﬃciency.
Increasing asymmetric information is a general phenomenon that arises in many envi-
ronments. Consider, for instance, an entrepreneur who wants to sell his start-up firm. When
the entrepreneur starts the company, he is not sure about the prospects of his firm or the
technology that his firm creates, but over time, he learns about the firm’s viability. Trading
of a securitized asset (where asset holders are gradually informed about the quality of com-
plex assets, such as collateralized mortgage obligations) and a market for “talent” (where a
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manager gains an informational advantage regarding the potential of his talent agents) are
other environments with increasing asymmetric information. The common theme underly-
ing these examples is the feature of “learning-by-holding.” As people hold or use a good,
they observe more signals and thereby gain an informational advantage. If an economic en-
vironment has the feature of learning-by-holding, the degree of the asymmetric information
may increase over time.
To investigate the impact of increasing asymmetric information, I study a stylized model
of a dynamic trading game between a single seller and a sequence of potential buyers.
The seller holds an indivisible unit of a good, the quality of which is either high or low.
The potential buyers randomly arrive to be matched with the seller. Upon arrival, the
buyer observes how long the good has been up for sale (time-on-the-market) and makes a
take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the seller. In contrast to existing models, all agents are initially
uninformed about the quality of the good and have a common prior belief. Over time,
the seller exogenously learns the quality of the good by observing the arrival of a perfectly
informative signal. The buyers remain uninformed about the quality of the good; they also
do not know whether the seller is informed about it.
The introduction of increasing asymmetric information results in several new phenom-
ena. In particular, the interaction between the seller’s learning and the buyers’ equilibrium
behavior generates nonmonotonic price and trading patterns, contrary to the standard mod-
els in which asymmetric information is initially given. Equilibrium dynamics depend on the
eﬀective speed of learning of the seller, which is the ratio of the seller’s speed of learning to
the arrival rate of the buyers.
In this model, the buyers form two layers of beliefs, the evolution of which works as one
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of the main driving forces of nonmonotonic equilibrium dynamics. Since the buyers observe
neither the quality nor the seller’s learning, they form beliefs about the quality of the good
and about the seller’s belief about the quality of the good. This belief structure is diﬀerent
from the one in the existing models of dynamic adverse selection in which it is common
knowledge that the seller is informed. Specifically, in this model the buyers form beliefs
about the seller’s status, which fall into one of the following three types: (1), the seller is
informed that his good is of high quality; (2), he is informed that his good is of low quality
(a “lemon”); or (3), that he is uninformed about the quality of the good.
In the early stage of the game, the buyers believe that the seller is highly likely to be
uninformed and that the degree of asymmetric information is small. Therefore, if the buyer
arrives early, he targets the uninformed seller by oﬀering a middle-range price. Over time,
the seller becomes more informed. If the seller finds that his good is of high quality, then he
rejects the middle-range price in hopes of selling at a higher price. But the informed seller
with a lemon accepts the middle-range price as waiting is more costly for him. As a result,
if the buyer who arrives late targets an uninformed seller by a middle-range price oﬀer, the
probability of getting a low-quality good is higher.
If the eﬀective learning speed of the seller is suﬃciently high (a fast-learning case), the
equilibrium features a “collapse-and-recovery” pattern. If the learning speed is high, the
probability that the seller is uninformed rapidly decreases, so buyers become increasingly
worried about the quality of the good when targeting an uninformed seller. Therefore, there
is a threshold time after which it is no longer optimal for buyers to target an uninformed
seller. Therefore, after the threshold time buyers target only the informed seller of a lemon.
As a result, both the equilibrium price and the probability of a trade drop at the threshold
3
time. On the other hand, an informed seller with a high-quality good rejects both a middle-
range price and a low price, so the overall expected quality of the good increases over time.
Therefore, there exists a second threshold time at which the expected quality is high enough
that the buyers begin to oﬀer a high price to target all types of sellers. The equilibrium
trading price thus jumps at the second threshold time.
If the seller’s eﬀective speed of learning is low (a slow-learning case), then the probability
that the seller is uninformed remains suﬃciently high for a long period, and it is optimal for
buyers to oﬀer a middle-range price for that period. Thus the overall expected quality of
the good increases over time, because the informed seller with a high-quality good does not
trade. Therefore, similar to the fast-learning case, there exists a threshold time at which
the buyers begin to oﬀer a high price to target all types of sellers.
On the other hand, the equilibrium price before the threshold time may also be non-
monotonic, because of the seller’s value of information. In the early stage of the game,
buyers target an uninformed seller. This behavior generates a positive value of information
for the seller, since the informed seller can adjust his oﬀer acceptance behavior depending
on the information received, and achieve a strictly higher payoﬀ. So the uninformed seller,
who expects to be informed later, factors the value of the future information into his current
reservation price. I show that the change in the value of information may lead to a non-
monotonic reservation price for the seller, leading to a nonmonotonic equilibrium trading
price.
After analyzing the equilibrium behavior, I conduct some comparative statics. I show
that the threshold time decreases as the learning speed of the seller increases. If the learning
speed is arbitrarily small, then the equilibrium of this model converges toward the equilib-
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rium in the model with symmetrically uninformed agents. On the other hand, as the learning
speed increases to infinity, the model converges toward the model with initial asymmetric
information, and hence the collapse occurs almost immediately after the beginning of the
game.
Lastly, I show that the seller’s payoﬀ is nonmonotonic with regard to his own learning
speed. It is well known that in a situation with initial asymmetric information, the trade
surplus is lower (because of the adverse selection problem) and the seller’s payoﬀ is higher
(because of information rent) compared to an environment with symmetric information. In
my model, while the trade surplus decreases as the learning speed increases, the seller may
achieve a higher payoﬀ in a case with increasing asymmetric information than in a case
where he is initially informed. The higher the seller’s learning speed is, the greater division
of the surplus the seller obtains. However, if the learning speed is too high, ineﬃciency
caused by asymmetric information becomes too large, leading to a smaller payoﬀ for the
seller.
1.1 Related Literature
This paper contributes to the rich literature of dynamic adverse selection. These papers
investigate the dynamic impact of asymmetric information in various contexts, such as
a dynamic bargaining game with interdependent values (Evans, 1989; Vincent, 1989; De-
neckere and Liang, 2006; and Fuchs and Skrzypacz, 2010), a sequential search model (Hörner
and Vieille, 2009; Zhu, 2012; Kaya and Kim, 2013; and Lauermann and Wolinsky, 2013),
an equilibrium search framework (Moreno and Wooders, 2010; Kim, 2011; Camargo and
Lester, 2011; and Guerrieri and Shimer, 2013), and a dynamic signaling model (Janssen and
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Roy, 2002; Daley and Green, 2012; and Fuchs and Skrzypacz, 2013). All of these papers
assume that asymmetric information is initially given, so that from the beginning one side
of transaction is perfectly informed about the quality of the good. On the other hand, the
present paper considers an environment where asymmetric information increases. Moreover,
the richer equilibrium trading dynamics of this paper contribute to the applicability of the
literature.
Daley and Green (2012) consider a dynamic setting in which stochastic information
(news) about the value of a privately-informed seller’s asset is gradually revealed to a market
of buyers. So in their model, asymmetric information is initially given and exogenously
dissolves over time. In contrast, the present paper considers a case in which agents are
initially symmetrically uninformed, and then asymmetric information exogenously increases.
Both papers show trading patterns that diﬀer from those in the standard model, but the
trading dynamics are diﬀerent, as is the intuition behind the results.
Plantin (2009) and Bolton, Santos, and Scheinkman (2011) consider finite-horizon models
in which the seller learns the quality of his asset. In their models, the learning of the seller
occurs in a single period. On the other hand, the present paper models the learning process
in a full dynamic setting, and finds various equilibrium trading dynamics and underlying
belief evolutions. Moreover, the dynamic model in the paper make it possible to conduct
comparative statics.
Choi (2013) studies a stationary dynamic equilibrium model of a resale market with
adverse selection in which new owners are uninformed and slowly learn the quality of their
acquisitions. He characterizes steady-state equilibria of the model and shows that trade
eﬃciency increases as the learning speed of the seller increases. In this paper, I consider a
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nonstationary environment and analyze the dynamics of trading patterns.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the model and shows some
preliminary observations. Section 3 presents equilibria under the slow- and fast-learning
cases and describes the equilibrium dynamics with the underlying belief evolution. Section
4 presents comparative statics of some important equilibrium values as well as the trade
surplus and its division. Section 5 discusses the implications of the results for the recent
financial crisis and the role of assumptions of the model. Section 6 concludes. Some of the
proofs are presented in the Appendix.
2 Model
Time t   0 is continuous. There is a long-lived seller with a countably infinite number of
potential buyers. The seller holds an indivisible unit of a good. Buyers arrive at random
times which correspond to the jumping times of a Poisson process with constant rate  .
Upon arriving, the buyer observes only how long the the seller has stayed in the game, that
is, the calendar time t. In particular, the buyer does not observe the history of past oﬀers.1
Then the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer p. If the seller accepts the oﬀer, then the
game ends. Otherwise, the buyer leaves and the seller waits for subsequent buyers.2 The
seller discounts future payoﬀs at a rate r > 0.
The quality ✓ of the good is determined by Nature and is either high (H) or low (L).
At time zero, all agents of the game are uninformed, and they form a common prior belief
1So the model considers a case in which previous oﬀers are kept hidden to future buyers. To read about
the eﬀect of the information available to potential buyers on trading dynamics and eﬃciency, see Noldeke
and van Damme (1990); Swinkels (1999); Hörner and Vieille (2009); Kim (2011); Fuchs, Öry, and Skrzypacz
(2012); and Kaya and Liu (2013).
2The assumptions on the arrival process and on the information of the buyers are similar to those of Kim
(2011) and Kaya and Kim (2013).
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q0 that the quality of the good is high. Over time, the seller privately receives a series of
perfectly informative signals which arrive according to a Poisson process of constant rate ⇢.
The processes of the arrival of signals and the arrival of the buyers are independent. Since
each signal is perfectly informative, upon the first arrival of the signal the seller is perfectly
informed about the quality of the good.3
The valuation of the good to the buyers is common to all of them and is denoted by v✓,
where vH > vL. The seller values the good at a discounted proportion of ↵ < 1. Therefore,
the trading of a quality-✓ good yields (1  ↵)v✓ of trade surplus.4
An outcome of the game is a triple (✓, t, p), with the interpretation that the realized
type is ✓ and that the trade occurs at time t with price p. The case t = 1 (with p = 0)
corresponds to the outcome in which the trade does not occur. The payoﬀ of the buyer at
time t is v✓ p if the outcome is (✓, t, p), and zero otherwise. There are two ways to represent
the seller’s payoﬀ. The first interpretation, which I adopt in the following analysis, assumes
that each signal carries a dividend of size x✓ = r⇢v✓. The size of each dividend is precisely
determined to ensure that the present expected value of the dividend from quality-✓ good
is v✓. Then it is assumed that the seller values each dividend at a rate ↵ < 1.5 Alternate
interpretation is that the seller incurs a production cost ↵v✓ at the time of trade, so the
payoﬀ is realized after the trade occurs. It is immediate to verify that this interpretation
yields the same incentives of the agents.
The paper analyzes the environment where there is a suﬃciently high probability of a
3Models with diﬀerent information processes are discussed in Section 5.
4The fact that the trade surplus increases in the quality of the good is not crucial in deriving the
equilibrium of the model. Indeed, the result is robust under cases in which the trade surplus is independent
or decreasing in the quality of the good, as long as the parameter values satisfy a relevant assumption
(counterpart to Assumption 1).
5One interpretation is that the seller is more impatient than the buyers.
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low-quality good (lemon). Consider a static bargaining game where the seller knows the
quality of his good. In order to attract all types of sellers, the buyer must oﬀer no less than
↵vH , the minimum reservation price of the seller with the high-quality good. So the trade
outcome is not eﬃcient if oﬀering such a price yields negative payoﬀs to the buyer, that is,
v(q0) < ↵vH ,
where v(q0) = q0vH + (1   q0)vL is the ex ante value of the good to the buyers. I call the
above inequality the static lemons condition. Note that the condition holds if the prior q0
is suﬃciently small. In fact, define q⇤ such that q⇤vH + (1  q⇤)vL = ↵vH . Then the static
lemons condition can be equivalently written as
q0 < q
⇤.
I am particularly interested in the case where the seller is suﬃciently patient. Specifically,
I make the following parametric assumption:
Assumption 1.
v(q0) <
r
r +  
↵v(q0) +
 
r +  
↵vH .
Assumption 1 ensures that the seller has non-trivial intertemporal incentives. It implies
that the buyer’s oﬀer targeted to the uninformed seller (which is at most v(q0)) is rejected
if the uninformed seller expects that he will receive a non-screening oﬀer (at least ↵vH) at
the next match. Note that static lemons condition is a necessary condition for Assumption
1. Given the static lemons condition, the assumption is satisfied when the value of r/ 
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is suﬃciently small. Although Assumption 1 is not a necessary condition for the basic
economic mechanism I highlight in this paper, it contributes to the analytical tractability
of the model.6
The information process implies that, at any time t > 0 the seller is one of the following
three types: 1) one who has received a lump-sum payoﬀ xH , and so is informed that his
good is of high quality; 2) one who is informed that his good is of low quality; and 3) one
who has not received a payoﬀ and so is uninformed about the good’s quality. I will denote g
(good type) for the informed seller with the high-quality good, b (bad type) for the informed
seller with the low-quality good, and u (uninformed) for the uninformed seller.
Since the signal is perfectly informative, the good-type (bad-type) seller believes that
the quality is high (low) with probability one. The uninformed seller’s belief stays the same
at the prior q0. Because the arrival rate of the information is the same for all ✓, not receiving
any signal does not provide additional information.
The buyers’ beliefs are represented by a function   : R+ !  {g, u, b}. Let  z(t) =
 (t)(z)(z = g, u, b) be the belief of the buyer at time t that the seller is type z. Then it is
straightforward that  u(0) = 1, and that  g(t) +  u(t) +  b(t) = 1 for any t   0. Let q(t)
be the buyer’s (unconditional) belief at time t that the quality of the good is high. Then
q(0) = q0, and q(t) can be expressed as a function of  z(t):
q(t) =  g(t) +  u(t)q0.
6If the static lemons condition is not satisfied, then there exists an equilibrium where the first buyer oﬀers
a trade-ending price to end the game. If the static lemons condition is satisfied, for a range of parameters that
does not satisfy the assumption, there exists an equilibrium whose structure is similar to the one described
in the paper. However, in this case it is diﬃcult to get a clear equilibrium characterization result, such as a
payoﬀ equivalence result within the set of equilibria of the model.
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The oﬀer strategies of the buyers are represented as a mapping  B from R+ to a set of
probability distributions over R, where  B(t) denotes a probability distribution of the buyer’s
oﬀer at time t. I denote  B(t) = p0 when  B(t) is a degenerate distribution at price p0. The
acceptance strategy of the seller is represented by a function  S : {g, u, b}⇥R+⇥R+ ! [0, 1]
where  S(z, t, p) denotes the probability that a type-z seller accepts price p at time t.
I use the perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept throughout this paper.
Definition 1. A tuple ( S , B, ) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) if (1) given  S
and  , for any t,  B(t) assigns a positive probability to a price p only if p maximizes the
expected payoﬀ of the buyer at time t, (2) given  S , for any z and t,  S(z, t, p) > 0 only if
p is weakly greater than the type-z seller’s continuation payoﬀ at time t, and (3) given  S
and  B,   is derived through Bayesian updating.
2.1 Preliminary Observations
I begin by presenting lemmas that help in characterizing the equilibrium structure. The
proofs of the lemmas are straightforward, so are omitted. The following lemma states that
in any equilibrium of the model, there exists a reservation price function Rz(t) for each type
of the seller such that the type-z seller at t accepts p > Rz(t) and rejects p < Rz(t) with
probability one.
Lemma 1. (Reservation Price Strategy) In equilibrium, there exists a function Rz : R+ ! R
for each z = g, u, b such that  S(z, t, p) = 1 for any p > Rz(t) and  S(z, t, p) = 0 for any
p < Rz(t).
It is easy to show that Rz(t) equals the type-z seller’s continuation payoﬀ if he rejects
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the buyer’s oﬀer at t. This is due to the information structure of the game whereby the
current oﬀer is not revealed to future buyers. Note that Rz(t) is continuous in t because
the probability that either the buyer or the lump-sum payoﬀ arrives at a given time interval
vanishes as the length of the interval shrinks to zero. Moreover, Rg(t) > Ru(t) > Rb(t) for
all t because of the heterogeneous expected value of lump-sum payoﬀs.
Given the seller’s reservation price strategy, the buyer’s equilibrium oﬀer satisfies the
following lemma:
Lemma 2. In equilibrium, if the buyer’s equilibrium oﬀer is accepted with nonzero proba-
bility, then it is equal to Rz(t) for some z = g, u, b.
The intuition of the lemma is straightforward: If the oﬀer is above the reservation price
of some type of seller, then the buyer can lower his oﬀer slightly and still trade with the
same probability. Note that the above lemma does not rule out the case where the buyer’s
equilibrium oﬀer is rejected with probability one at some t. In that case, the buyer’s oﬀer p
must be a price between zero and Rb(t).
The seller always has an option to hold the good, which gives lower bounds on the
reservation price functions. They are given by
Rg(t)   ↵vH ,
Ru(t)   ↵v(q0),
Rb(t)   ↵vL.
The following lemma places an upper bound on the buyer’s equilibrium oﬀer, and hence
provides an upper bound on the reservation price of the good-type seller:
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Lemma 3. In equilibrium, the buyers never oﬀer a price strictly more than ↵vH . Therefore,
Rg(t) = ↵vH for any t.
The intuition for this lemma is as follows. Suppose not, and let p¯ > ↵vH be the supremum
of the buyer’s equilibrium oﬀer. Then there exists t¯ such that the buyer at time t¯ oﬀers a
price arbitrarily close to p¯. Then all types of sellers strictly prefer to accept the oﬀer because
the seller discount the future payoﬀs. Now consider a deviation of the buyer at time t¯ to
lower his oﬀer by suﬃciently small ✏ > 0. Then all types of sellers would still accept the
oﬀer as long as the expected cost from discounting is greater than ✏. But then oﬀering such
price is a profitable deviation of the buyer, leading to a contradiction.
Note that Lemma 3 implies that if the buyer oﬀers ↵vH , then the oﬀer is accepted by
all types of sellers, so the game ends with probability one. Therefore ↵vH serves as the
trade-ending oﬀer in this model.
3 Equilibrium
In this section I construct an equilibrium of the model, and present a full characterization
result of the equilibria for a range of parameters.
Because of the static lemons condition, oﬀering the trade-ending price ↵vH in the early
stage yields a negative payoﬀ to the buyer. Then one might expect that the buyer who
arrives in the early stage submits a screening oﬀer and targets either the uninformed seller
or the bad-type seller. In this case, the expected quality of the good increases gradually
over time.
On the other hand, the buyers’ beliefs about the seller’s type also evolve over time
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because of the seller’s learning. The buyer who arrives in the early stage believes that the
seller is likely to be uninformed. So the buyer targets the uninformed seller by oﬀering a
middle-range price, which equals to the reservation price of the uninformed seller. But the
seller is getting informed over time, hence there is a growing probability that the seller is the
bad type. The bad-type seller accepts the middle-range price oﬀer, since it is strictly higher
than his reservation price. In this case, the buyer becomes increasingly worried about the
possibility of getting a lemon.
It turns out that the seller’s speed of learning determines the rate of increase of the prob-
ability that the seller is bad type, which in turn aﬀects the equilibrium behavior. Specifically,
the equilibrium behavior is qualitatively diﬀerent depending on the seller’s eﬀective speed
of learning (⇢/ ).
In the following analysis, I first present the equilibrium when the eﬀective speed of
learning is low (the slow-learning case) with the characterization results. After that I turn
to the case when the eﬀective speed of learning is high (the fast-learning case).
3.1 Slow-learning Case
In this subsection I consider the case where the seller’s eﬀective speed of learning is low. I
begin by defining a class of candidate equilibrium strategy profiles.
Definition 2. A strategy profile ( S , B) is called a two-phase strategy profile if there exists
t⇤ > 0 and  ˆ 2 [0, 1] such that the profile satisfies the following:
1. Phase I: for any t < t⇤,
.  B(t) = Ru(t);
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.  S(g, t, Ru(t)) = 0;  S(z, t, Ru(t)) = 1 for z = u, b.
2. Phase II: for any t   t⇤,
.  B(t) assigns a probability  ˆ to Rg(t) = ↵vH and a probability 1  ˆ to pl  Rb(t);
.  S(z, t,↵vH) = 1 and  S(z, t, pl) = 0 for z = g, u, b.
In the two-phase strategy profile, the agents’ behavior is divided into two phases by
a threshold time t⇤ > 0. In the first phase, the buyer targets the uninformed seller by
oﬀering a middle-range price which equals to the reservation price of the uninformed. The
uninformed and the bad-type seller accept the oﬀer for sure, while the good-type seller
rejects the oﬀer. In the second phase, the buyer randomizes between submitting the trade-
ending oﬀer Rg(t) = ↵vH and the “losing oﬀer” pl. The losing oﬀer is any price below or
equal to Rb(t) and all types of sellers reject it with probability one. Note that the buyer’s
randomization probability in the second phase is restricted to be constant over time.
A tuple ( S , B, ) is called a two-phase equilibrium if it is PBE and ( S , B) is a two-
phase strategy profile. An outcome of the game is called a two-phase equilibrium outcome as
an equilibrium outcome induced by a two-phase equilibrium strategy profile. The following
proposition (whose proof is presented in the Appendix) states that if the seller’s eﬀective
learning speed is smaller than a threshold, then there exists a unique two-phase equilibrium
outcome.
Proposition 1. There exists ⌘ > 0 such that for 0 < ⇢/  < ⌘, there exists a unique
two-phase equilibrium outcome.
The uniqueness result in Proposition 1 depends on the stationary restriction imposed on
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the buyer’s randomization probability in the second phase. Indeed, one can construct an
equilibrium where the randomization probability of the buyers in the second phase follows
non-stationary path. However, the threshold time t⇤ in any such non-stationary equilibrium
is the same as one in the two-phase equilibrium, as well as the equilibrium behavior of the
agents at any time before t⇤. Moreover, the payoﬀ of the buyer at any t and the payoﬀ
of each type of seller at any time t  t⇤ is identical. I provide the intuition for the payoﬀ
equivalence after I describe the two-phase equilibrium.
The remainder of this subsection is organized as follows. First, I describe the price
and belief evolution of the two-phase equilibrium and underlying incentives of the agents. I
begin with the equilibrium behavior in the first phase then discuss the behavior in the second
phase. Then I present an outline of the proof of the equilibrium construction. Finally, I
discuss the multiplicity of the equilibria of the model and present a full characterization
result.
First Phase: Price Evolution The upper panel of Figure 1 shows the evolution of the
reservation price and equilibrium oﬀer in a two-phase equilibrium in which the price of the
losing oﬀer is vL. The blue lines represent the reservation price of each type of the seller.
Note that the reservation price of the good type seller is constant and equals to ↵vH . The
dark red line represents the equilibrium price oﬀer.
In the first phase, the reservation price of the uninformed seller Ru(t), which is the
equilibrium price, must satisfy the recursion
Ru(t) = rdt↵v(q0) + (1  rdt) [⇢dt(q0↵vH + (1  q0)Rb(t+ dt)) + (1  ⇢dt)Ru(t+ dt)] .
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Letting dt! 0 and rearranging yield
R0u(t) = r (Ru(t)  ↵v(q0))| {z }
discounting
 ⇢ BI(t)| {z }
learning
, (1)
where
BI(t) ⌘ q0↵vH + (1  q0)Rb(t) Ru(t).
The first term on the right-hand side of (1) captures the eﬀect of discounting. Note that its
eﬀect on the equilibrium price Ru(t) is nonnegative. In the first phase, the uninformed seller
is indiﬀerent between acceptance and rejection, and he discounts future payoﬀs. Therefore,
absent other eﬀects, the buyers who arrive in the future must oﬀer a higher price to attract
the uninformed. The term ↵v(q0) in the first term captures the eﬀect of the expected
dividend until the next buyer arrives.
The second term, however, has a negative eﬀect on the equilibrium price. It captures the
eﬀect of the uninformed seller’s learning. I define BI(t) as the value of information for the
uninformed seller, since it measures the diﬀerence in the payoﬀ between the informed seller
(q0Rg(t) + (1  q0)Rb(t)) and the uninformed seller (Ru(t)). Under the given profile, BI(t)
is strictly positive in the first phase. The intuition is as follows. Consider the uninformed
seller who becomes informed at time t. Then the seller chooses diﬀerent behavior according
to the information: If the information is good (✓ = H), the seller rejects the oﬀer Ru(t)
in the first period. If the information is bad (✓ = L), he takes the oﬀer Ru(t), since it is
strictly higher than his reservation price. This adjusted behavior gives the seller a strictly
higher expected payoﬀ when he is informed.
Equation (1) implies that the positive value of information has a negative eﬀect on the
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slope of Ru(t). Since the uninformed seller expects the possibility of future learning in the
case of rejection, his current reservation price must take into account the value of informa-
tion. Furthermore, when the seller is suﬃciently patient (more precisely, if r/⇢ is suﬃciently
small), the eﬀect of learning on R0u(t) may be greater than the eﬀect of discounting, so that
Ru(t) may decrease over time.
On the other hand, a similar recursive argument for the bad-type seller yields another
diﬀerential equation for Rb(t) and Ru(t) in the first phase, which is
R0b(t) = r (Rb(t)  ↵vL)| {z }
discounting
+  (Rb(t) Ru(t))| {z }
buyer’s oﬀer
. (2)
Similar to (1), the first term on the right-hand side captures the eﬀect of discounting. The
second term represents the eﬀect of the buyer’s oﬀer of Ru(t), which the bad-type seller
accepts for sure. Note that the second term is negative and is proportional to the arrival
rate of the buyer. Therefore, similar to Ru(t), Rb(t) may decrease over time in the first
phase. Equations (1) and (2) form a system of ordinary diﬀerential equations for Ru(t) and
Rb(t) in the first phase.
First Phase: Belief Evolution How do the buyers’ beliefs evolve over time? Recall that
q(t) represents the buyers’ beliefs about the quality of the good. But in this paper, the
buyers also form beliefs about the seller’s belief about the quality. To capture the second-
order beliefs of the buyers, define  (t) =  u(t) u(t)+ b(t) as the buyers’ confidence at time t. Note
that  (t) is the probability of buying the uninformed seller’s good when the buyer targets
the uninformed seller. The buyer’s confidence, together with beliefs about quality q(t), plays
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an important role in determining the equilibrium price.
To understand the role of the buyers’ confidence, note that the buyer at time t is better
oﬀ when he oﬀers Ru(t) than when he oﬀers Rb(t) if and only if
 (t)(v(q0) Ru(t)) + (1   (t))(vL  Ru(t)) > (1   (t))(vL  Rb(t)),
which is equivalent to
 (t) >
Ru(t) Rb(t)
v(q0) Rb(t) ⌘ B(t). (3)
Therefore, the buyer targets the uninformed seller only if his confidence is higher than a
threshold B(t). Note that B(t) is a function of reservation prices and hence is determined
by the equilibrium price evolution.
The lower panel of Figure 1 describes the belief evolution in the two-phase equilibrium.
In the first phase, the buyer’s belief about quality q(t) increases over time. The intuition
is straightforward: Suppose the buyer submits a losing oﬀer, so there is no trade. Then
q(t) does not change as the seller’s learning process is a martingale. Then oﬀering Ru(t)
increases q(t), since all but the good-type seller accept the oﬀer and leave. However, q(t) is
less than the threshold belief q⇤ throughout the first phase, which makes it suboptimal to
make a trade-ending oﬀer.
On the other hand, the buyer’s confidence  (t) is decreasing over time in the first phase.
The buyer’s oﬀer Ru(t) does not aﬀect  (t), since both the uninformed seller and the low-
type seller leave the game at the same rate. But the seller’s learning decreases the buyers’
confidence, since there is a growing probability that the seller is informed.
However, if the seller’s eﬀective speed of learning is slow, the rate of decrease of the
20
buyers’ confidence is low. Therefore the buyers remain confident until the expected quality
of the good becomes suﬃciently high so that submitting the trade-ending oﬀer does not
yield negative payoﬀ.
Second Phase The second phase begins as the belief about quality q(t) reaches q⇤ for
the first time. In the second phase, the buyer randomizes between a trade-ending oﬀer
Rg(t) = ↵vH and a losing oﬀer pl. The losing oﬀer pl can be any price below or equal to the
bad type’s reservation price. Since the all types of sellers reject pl, the trade occurs only at
↵vH . In the upper panel of Figure 1, ↵vH is represented as a solid line while the losing oﬀer
pl is represented as a dashed line, illustrating that no trade occurs at pl.7
Since the buyer in the second phase purchases a good from all types of sellers or does not
buy the good at all, (conditional on the game continues) the buyer’s beliefs about quality
q(t) is constant and equals q⇤ in the second phase. Therefore, oﬀering ↵vH yields zero payoﬀ,
so the buyer in the second phase is indiﬀerent between submitting the trade-ending oﬀer
and the losing oﬀer.
The buyers in the second phase randomize their oﬀers in order to satisfy the uninformed
seller’s intertemporal incentives. Suppose that the buyer in the second phase oﬀers ↵vH
with probability one. Then the uninformed seller in the first phase would reject the oﬀer in
favor of future high oﬀers, leading to the breakdown of the equilibrium structure.
The reservation prices of the bad-type seller and the uninformed seller in the second
phase are, respectively,
7In Figure 1, losing oﬀer is equal to vL, but the oﬀer price can be any price less than or equal to Rb(t).
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Rb(t) = R
⇤
b =
r
r +   ˆ
↵vL| {z }
dividend
+
  ˆ
r +   ˆ
↵vH| {z }
buyer’s oﬀer
, (4)
Ru(t) = R
⇤
u = q0↵vH + (1  q0)R⇤b , (5)
where  ˆ is the probability that the buyer oﬀers the trade-ending oﬀer. The bad-type seller’s
reservation price represented in (4) is a weighted average of the value of holding the asset
(↵vL) and the trade-ending oﬀer (↵vH). The reservation price of the uninformed seller (5)
is a simple expectation of reservation prices of the good type and the bad type. This is
because the value of the seller’s information is zero in the second phase. Since the buyers
target either all types of the seller or none, becoming informed does not change the seller’s
strategy, so the information does not provide any value.
The randomization probability  ˆ is uniquely determined by the indiﬀerence condition
of the buyer at the threshold time t⇤: Targeting the uninformed seller at time t⇤ must
yield zero payoﬀ. The intuition is as follows. Suppose that targeting the uninformed seller
at time t⇤ yields a positive payoﬀ. Then since both Ru(t) and the confidence  (t) are
continuous over time, there exists ✏ > 0 such that targeting the uninformed at t 2 (t⇤, t⇤+ ✏)
yields a positive payoﬀ, violating the optimality condition. Now suppose that targeting
the uninformed yields a negative payoﬀ at time t⇤. Again the continuity of Ru(t) and  (t)
implies that for suﬃciently small ✏0 > 0 targeting the uninformed at t 2 (t⇤   ✏0, t⇤) is
suboptimal, leading to a contradiction. Using the buyer’s indiﬀerence condition at time t⇤,
22
R⇤u is uniquely determined and is given by
R⇤u =  (t
⇤)v(q0) + (1   (t⇤))vL. (6)
One can then determine the value of R⇤b from (5). Finally, the randomization probability  ˆ
is determined by (4).
Is the randomizing behavior optimal for the buyers? First, recall that q(t) = q⇤ implies
that the buyer is indiﬀerent between submitting the trade-ending oﬀer and the losing oﬀer.
Second, given that the indiﬀerence condition (6) is satisfied, then targeting the uninformed
seller at any t > t⇤ yields a strictly negative payoﬀ to the buyer. This is because while
Ru(t) = R⇤u is constant, the buyer’s confidence  (t) decreases because of the seller’s learning.
Finally, targeting the bad-type seller must yield a nonpositive payoﬀ, so the probability of
the trade-ending oﬀer must satisfy
R⇤b   vL. (7)
Construction Given the above analysis, the two-phase equilibrium is constructed by the
following steps:8
1. Determine t⇤ from the condition t⇤ = inf{t : q(t⇤) = q⇤}.
2. Determine  (t⇤) from the evolution of the buyer’s confidence.
3. Determine  ˆ by conditions (4)-(6).
4. Check if  ˆ satisfies (7).
8The formal proof of the construction result is given in the Appendix (Subsection A.3.1).
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5. Determine Ru(t) and Rb(t) in the first phase, by diﬀerential equations (1) and (2) with
the boundary conditions at t = t⇤.
I show in the Appendix that step 4 is satisfied if the seller’s learning speed is slow enough
relative to the arrival rate of the buyers. Intuitively, a higher learning speed leads to a rapid
decrease in the buyer’s confidence, which in turn results in lower R⇤u (equation (6)). But if
R⇤u is too low, then the correspondingly small  ˆ may violate the incentive condition (7).
Characterization The two-phase equilibrium described above has a special characteristic:
The randomization probability of the buyers in the second phase is constant over time. But
there are other equilibria where the probability of the trade-ending price changes over time.
In these equilibria, the corresponding Ru(t) and Rb(t) in the second phase are also non-
stationary, but they must satisfy the incentive conditions
Ru(t)    (t)v(q0) + (1   (t))vL,
Rb(t)   vL,
for any t   t⇤. The above incentive conditions imply that there is a continuum of equilibria
in this model.
The above argument of equilibrium construction implies that any such non-stationary
equilibrium share the main qualitative features with the two-phase equilibrium. As long
as the buyers in the first phase target the uninformed seller, the evolution of the belief is
identical, hence the value of t⇤ is the same. Then the indiﬀerence condition of the buyer
at t⇤ (equation 6) implies that the boundary of Ru(t) and Rb(t) at t⇤ is the same, hence it
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must be that equilibrium behavior before t⇤ is identical. The only diﬀerence between any
non-stationary equilibrium and the two-phase equilibrium is the randomization probability
of the buyers and the reservation price of the uninformed and the bad-type seller in the
second phase.
Moreover, the payoﬀ of the buyer at any t and the payoﬀ of the seller at any t  t⇤ in any
non-stationary equilibrium is same as those in the two-phase equilibrium. The discussion
in the last paragraph clearly implies that the payoﬀ of all agents in the first phase is the
same. In the second phase, while the payoﬀ of the uninformed and the bad-type seller is
diﬀerent, the payoﬀ of the buyers (equals to zero) and the good-type seller (equals to ↵vH)
is identical across equilibria.
The following proposition (whose proof is presented in the Appendix) states that if the
seller is suﬃciently patient, there exists no equilibrium of the model other than the class of
equilibria discussed above. Since all equilibria are payoﬀ-equivalent, one can conduct the
comparative statics in the slow-learning case using the two-phase equilibrium.
Proposition 2. There exists r¯ > 0 such that for r < r¯ and 0 < ⇢/  < ⌘ (where ⌘ > 0 is the
bound from Proposition 1), the equilibrium of the model satisfies the following properties:
. in any equilibrium, behavior is divided into two phases, divided by the same threshold
time t⇤;
. the equilibrium behavior of every agent in the first phase is identical across all equilib-
ria;
. the payoﬀ of the buyer at each t and the ex ante payoﬀ of the seller is the same across
all equilibria.
25
3.2 Fast-learning Case
The strategy profile in the previous subsection cannot be supported as an equilibrium when
the seller’s eﬀective speed of learning (⇢/ ) is high. High learning speed leads to a rapid
decrease in the buyer’s confidence. Therefore there is a threshold time where the buyers find
it suboptimal to target the uninformed seller while the expected quality of the good is still
low.
In this case, the equilibrium consists of three phases, divided by two threshold times t⇤1
and t⇤2. Similar to the slow-learning case, I define the following class of candidate equilibria:
Definition 3. A strategy profile ( S , B) is called a three-phase strategy profile if there exist
t⇤1 and t⇤2 (0 < t⇤1 < t⇤2) and  ˆ 2 [0, 1] such that the profile satisfies the following:
1. Phase I: for any t < t⇤1,
.  B(t) = Ru(t);
.  S(g, t, Ru(t)) = 0;  S(z, t, Ru(t)) = 1 for z = u, b.
2. Phase II: for any t 2 [t⇤1, t⇤2),
.  B(t) = Rb(t);
.  S(z, t, Ru(t)) = 0 for z = g, u;  S(b, t, Ru(t)) = 1.
3. Phase III: for any t   t⇤2,
.  B(t) assigns a probability  ˆ to Rg(t) = ↵vH and a probability 1  ˆ to pl  Rb(t);
.  S(z, t,↵vH) = 1 and  S(z, t, pl) = 0 for z = g, u, b.
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The agents’ behavior is divided into three phases by two threshold times t⇤1 and t⇤2.
Same as the two-phase strategy profile, the buyer in the first phase targets the uninformed
seller by oﬀering the reservation price of the uninformed. The uninformed and the bad-type
seller accept the oﬀer for sure, while the good-type seller rejects the oﬀer. At time t⇤1, the
second phase begins where the buyer targets the bad-type seller by oﬀering his reservation
price, and only the bad-type seller accepts the oﬀer. Behavior in the third and final phase
is similar to that in the second phase of the two-phase strategy profile, where the buyer
randomizes between submitting the trade-ending oﬀer and the losing oﬀer. Again, the
stationary restriction is imposed on the randomization probability of the buyers.
A tuple ( S , B, ) is called a three-phase equilibrium if it is PBE and ( S , B) is a
three-phase strategy profile. A three-phase equilibrium outcome is defined similar to one
of the two-phase equilibrium. The following proposition (whose proof is presented in the
Appendix) states that if the seller’s eﬀective learning speed is larger than a threshold, then
there exists a unique three-phase equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 3. There exists ⌘¯ > 0 such that for ⇢/  > ⌘¯, there exists a unique three-phase
equilibrium outcome.
The upper panel of Figure 2 shows the evolution of the equilibrium price in the three-
phase equilibrium. Same as Figure 1 the blue lines represent the reservation price of each
type of the seller, and the dark red line represents the equilibrium price oﬀer. In the first
phase, the buyers target the uninformed seller by oﬀering his reservation price. Similar to
the two-phase equilibrium, if the seller’s eﬀective discount rate (r/⇢) is small, the equilibrium
price decreases in the first phase because the seller takes into account the value of future
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Equilibrium behavior of the three-phase equilibrium
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information.
However, the buyers’ confidence rapidly decreases in the first phase because the seller’s
learning speed is high. The evolution of the buyers’ beliefs described in the lower panel
of Figure 2 shows how the equilibrium behavior is aﬀected by the interaction between the
buyers’ beliefs about quality and the confidence. Contrary to the two-phase equilibrium in
the slow-learning case, the buyers’ confidence hits the threshold B(t) before the belief about
quality q(t) reaches q⇤.
So there is a threshold time t⇤1 such that the buyers find it no longer optimal to target
the uninformed seller, and submitting a trade-ending oﬀer still yields a negative payoﬀ.
Therefore, the second phase begins at time t⇤1 where the buyers only target the bad-type
seller. Therefore, at time t⇤1 the equilibrium trading price drops from the reservation price
of the uninformed seller to that of the bad-type seller. Moreover, the probability of trade
also drops because the uninformed seller begins to reject the buyer’s oﬀer.
In the second phase, trade only occurs with the bad-type seller at a price Rb(t). Both
Rb(t) and Ru(t) increase in the second phase. Since the bad-type seller receives an oﬀer
which is equal to his reservation price, getting an oﬀer does not aﬀect his reservation price.
So contrary to Rb(t) in the first phase (2), Rb(t) in the second phase is aﬀected only by the
eﬀect of the seller’s discounting, and it satisfies the following diﬀerential equation:
R0b(t) = r (Rb(t)  ↵vL)| {z }
discount
> 0. (8)
On the other hand, the uninformed seller’s reservation value satisfies Ru(t) = q0↵vH + (1 
q0)Rb(t). Note that the value of information to the uninformed seller is zero in the second
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phase. While the seller also has zero value of information in the final phase (as I discussed in
the previous subsection), the underlying intuition is diﬀerent. Contrary to the final phase,
the informed seller in the second phase behaves diﬀerently according to the quality of his
good. But he does not gain higher payoﬀ because the oﬀer the bad-type seller accepts is
precisely equal to his reservation value.
The buyers’ confidence  (t) in the second phase stays below the threshold B(t) so that
the buyers find it optimal to target the bad-type seller9. On the other hand, throughout the
first and second phase the belief about quality q(t) increases over time because the expected
quality of the good that is traded is lower than the quality of the remaining good. Therefore
there exists a second threshold time, t⇤2, where the belief about the quality q(t) reaches q⇤.
The third and final phase begins at t⇤2, and the equilibrium behavior is similar to the final
phase of the two-phase equilibrium. The buyers randomize between a trade-ending oﬀer, at
which the trade occurs, and a losing oﬀer. Therefore, the equilibrium price at which a trade
occurs jumps at t⇤2 from the bad type’s reservation price to a trade-ending oﬀer. Moreover,
trade of the high-quality good resumes at t⇤2 as all types of sellers trade.
Figure 3 describes the probability of trade in the three-phase equilibrium. The solid red
(dashed blue) line depicts the distribution of the timing of a trade conditional on the good
being low- (high-) quality. Note that the probability of trade of the high-quality good is
zero in the second phase, because the trade occurs only with the bad-type seller.
In the three-phase equilibrium, the equilibrium behavior is uniquely determined given
the threshold times t⇤1 and t⇤2. There are two indiﬀerence conditions of the buyers which
jointly determines two thresholds times: 1) indiﬀerence condition between targeting the
9In Section 5, I discuss the case of intermediate learning speed where fast screening behavior may lead
to increase in the buyers’ confidence more than the threshold.
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Probability of trade in the three-phase equilibrium
uninformed and the bad type at t⇤1 ( (t⇤1) = B(t⇤1)), and 2) indiﬀerence condition between
a trade-ending oﬀer and a losing oﬀer at t⇤2 (q(t⇤2) = q⇤). The following proposition states
that if the eﬀective learning speed of the seller is large enough, then there exists a unique
pair of threshold times.
Similar to the slow-learning case, the model has multiplicity of equilibrium in the fast-
learning case. The following proposition (whose proof is presented in the Appendix) states
that every equilibrium of the model diﬀers only in the randomization probability of the buy-
ers in the final phase, and all equilibria are payoﬀ-equivalent. Note that the characterization
result in the fast-learning case does not need additional restriction on the seller’s discount
rate.
Proposition 4. Suppose that ⇢/  > ⌘¯ (where ⌘¯ > 0 is the bound from Proposition 3). Then
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the equilibrium of the model satisfies the following properties:
. in any equilibrium, behavior is divided into three phases, divided by the same threshold
times t⇤1 and t⇤2;
. the equilibrium behavior of every agent in the first two phases is identical across all
equilibria;
. the payoﬀ of the buyer at each t and the ex ante payoﬀ of the seller is the same across
all equilibria.
When the seller’s eﬀective learning speed is between ⌘ (the upper bound of the slow-
learning case) and ⌘¯ (the lower bound of the fast-learning case), then there exists an equilib-
rium where the buyers use a mixed strategy even before the belief about quality q(t) reaches
q⇤. In Section 5 I discuss the equilibria of the model in this case. The following proposition
(whose proof is presented in the Appendix) shows that when the prior q0 is not too small,
there is no such range of parameter.
Proposition 5. There exists q < q⇤ such that if q0 2 (q, q⇤), then ⌘¯ = ⌘.
In the following section, I present the results of comparative statics when q0 2 (q, q⇤).
4 Comparative Statics
In this section, I present several comparative statics results with respect to the seller’s
learning speed.
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4.1 Threshold Time
As shown in the previous section, the threshold times (t⇤ in the slow-learning case; t⇤1 and t⇤2
in the fast-learning case) are important equilibrium values that determine other equilibrium
behavior. The following proposition (whose proof is presented in the Appendix) presents
comparative statics results of the threshold times with respect to the learning speed of the
seller:
Proposition 6.
. In the two-phase equilibrium, t⇤ is decreasing in ⇢;
. In the three-phase equilibrium, t⇤1 is decreasing in ⇢;
. lim⇢!0 t⇤ =1; lim⇢!1 t⇤ = 0.
Figure 4 depicts how the threshold times change with the seller’s learning speed. In the
slow-learning case, there is one threshold time t⇤ which decreases in ⇢. Note that t⇤ diverges
to infinity as ⇢ goes to zero. When ⇢ is arbitrarily close to zero, the environment is close
to the one having symmetrically uninformed agents, so the trade occurs at the reservation
price of the uninformed seller for an arbitrarily long horizon.
In the fast-learning case there are two threshold times t⇤1 and t⇤2. Proposition 6 states that
t⇤1 decreases in ⇢ and converges to zero as ⇢ goes to infinity. The intuition is straightforward,
since as ⇢ goes to infinity the environment converges to one that has initial asymmetric
information, so the buyers target the bad type immediately after the beginning of the game.
On the other hand, both t⇤2 and t⇤2   t⇤1 are nonmonotonic under some parameter value.
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4.2 Trade Surplus and Division of the Surplus
How do the trade surplus and the division of the surplus change as the learning speed
changes? Standard models of adverse selection show that in the presence of initial asym-
metric information, 1) the trade surplus is lower because the adverse selection problem leads
to ineﬃcient trade outcomes, and 2) the payoﬀ of the informed agent is higher because he has
a positive information rent. In this subsection I change the learning speed of the seller from
zero (symmetrically uninformed agents) to infinity (initially informed seller) and simulate
the value of the trade surplus and its division.
Let S✓ be the trade surplus when the quality of the good is ✓. Let f✓(t) be the probability
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Trade surplus and the seller’s division of the surplus
distribution of trade of the quality-✓ good at time t. Then we have
S✓ = (1  ↵)v✓
ˆ 1
0
e rtf✓(t)dt.
Then the ex ante trade surplus S is given by
S = q0SH + (1  q0)SL.
The ex ante payoﬀ of the seller is Ru(0), because the seller is uninformed at t = 0 and
his reservation price equals the continuation payoﬀ. From the seller’s ex ante payoﬀ, his
division of trade surplus is calculated.10
10Details of the calculation are in the Appendix (Subsection A.4).
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The solid red line in Figure 5 is the trade surplus as a function of the seller’s learning
speed ⇢. Note that the trade surplus is decreasing in the seller’s learning speed. This result
is related to one in Dang, Gorton, and Holmström (2012), who argue that trade is most
eﬃcient when the agents are symmetrically uninformed.11
On the other hand, the seller’s ex ante payoﬀ is nonmonotonic in the seller’s speed of
learning. The dashed blue line in Figure 5 is the seller’s division of the surplus as a function
of ⇢. Note that the seller’s surplus (hence his ex ante payoﬀ) increases when ⇢ is small,
but decreases when ⇢ is high. This is because there is a trade-oﬀ between the value of
information and the adverse selection problem. If the degree of asymmetric information is
small, then the seller’s value of information increases in his learning speed. But if ⇢ is large,
then the buyers’ equilibrium behaviors takes into account the eﬀect of seller’s asymmetric
information. Therefore, the ineﬃciency caused by severe adverse selection decreases the
seller’s payoﬀ.
5 Discussion
Implication for the Financial Crisis An important feature of the equilibrium in the
fast-learning case is the impact of the buyers’ second-order beliefs on the equilibrium dynam-
ics. Before the first threshold time t⇤1, trade occurs at a middle-range price Ru(t) and the
trading patterns are relatively stable. However, the buyers’ confidence  (t) rapidly decreases,
and eventually hits the threshold level at time t⇤1, leading to drops in both equilibrium price
11Levin (2001) shows in a static lemon market model that as the quality of seller information increases,
trade may decrease or increase depending on the information structure. His result implies that the trade
surplus in this model can be nonmonotonic in the seller’s learning speed under a diﬀerent learning process
of the seller.
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and the probability of a trade.
The results may help to understand what was observed at the beginning of the recent
financial crisis. One of the main narratives of the crisis was the collapse of confidence in the
market. For example, regarding the timing of the run on the sale and repurchase market
(the “repo market”) in August 2007, Gorton and Metrick (2012) argue the following:
...One large area of securitized banking, the securitization of subprime home mort-
gages, began to weaken in early 2007 and continued to decline throughout 2007 and
2008 ...The first systemic event occurs in August 2007 ...The reason that this shock oc-
curred in August 2007, as opposed to any other month of 2007, is perhaps unknowable.
We hypothesize that the market slowly became aware of the risks associated with the
subprime market, which then led to doubts about repo collateral and bank solvency.
At some point (August 2007 in this telling) a critical mass of such fears led to the first
run on repo, with lenders no longer willing to provide short-term finance at historical
spreads and haircuts. [Italics added]
Morris and Shin (2012) set up a static model of the adverse selection problem and show
that a small amount of adverse selection can lead to the breakdown of “market confidence,”
defined as the approximate common knowledge of an upper bound on expected losses. In
this paper, the dynamic structure of the model can illustrate the evolution of the beliefs and
their eﬀect on equilibrium behavior. Investigating the eﬀect of the evolution of the higher-
order beliefs in various trading institutions in financial markets is an interesting topic for
future potential research.
Intermediate Speed of Learning If the seller’s eﬀective learning speed is between ⌘
(upper bound in the slow-learning case) and ⌘¯ (lower bound in the fast-learning case), then
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the buyers may not use a pure strategy even before the belief about quality q(t) reaches q⇤.
Since ⇢/  > ⌘, there exists a threshold time where targeting the uninformed is no longer
optimal. On the other hand, if ⇢/  < ⌘¯, targeting the bad type increases buyers’ confidence
so that the buyers’ confidence becomes greater than the threshold B(t), so it is suboptimal
to target the bad type. In this case, the buyer in the second phase uses a mixed strategy,
randomizing between targeting the uninformed and targeting the bad type. Constructing
and characterizing the equilibrium in this parameter range is another area of future research.
Pure Good News and Pure Bad News Case One of the assumptions of the model
is that the arrival rate of information is same regardless of the quality of the good. If the
information arrival rate is quality-dependent, then not receiving a signal would also provide
information about the item’s quality. An environment with pure good news (bad news) is
an example of a quality-dependent arrival rate, where the arrival rate of the information
is zero for the low- (high-) quality good. Preliminary results show that for both cases, the
equilibrium dynamics are similar to those of either the slow- or fast-learning cases examined
in this paper.12
6 Conclusion
This paper has introduced a framework with which to study the trading patterns in an
environment in which asymmetric information increases over time. In this framework, the
interaction between the buyers’ screening and the seller’s learning generates nonmonotonic
pricing and trading patterns, contrary to standard models in which asymmetric information
12A partial result for the equilibrium construction and characterization is available upon request.
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is initially given. If the seller’s eﬀective learning speed is high, a rapid decrease of the
buyers’ confidence leads to drop in the equilibrium price and the probability of a trade.
While the trade surplus decreases as the seller’s learning speed increases, the seller’s payoﬀ
is nonmonotonic in his learning speed, as a slower learning speed can lead to higher payoﬀ
for the seller.
The findings in this paper have implications for the process of designing optimal inter-
ventions for environments with increasing asymmetric information. The nonstationarity of
the equilibrium trading pattern implies that the timing of an intervention would be crucial
for its eﬀectiveness. Suppose, for instance, that an asset market is hit by a shock which
creates symmetric uncertainty about the value of an asset. It may then be the case that
the government should not intervene immediately, because at the moment incomplete but
symmetric information is not overly harmful to eﬃciency and only later becomes harmful
as the asymmetric information grows worse. Investigating dynamic eﬀects of an interven-
tion and the design of optimal intervention in an environment with increasing asymmetric
information are interesting topics for future research.
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Chapter II
A Theory of Bargaining Deadlock
7 Introduction
There are many bargaining processes in which a bargainer may receive an outside oﬀer
during the process. Moreover, preferability of the outside oﬀer often depends on the private
information of the informed party. For example, consider an entrepreneur who negotiates to
sell his company to an equity fund. The entrepreneur knows a company’s fundamentals but
is not able to verify them. During the bargaining process, a competitor might arrive and
make an oﬀer to buy the firm. The competitor is better informed about the fundamentals
than the equity fund, so his oﬀer is high if the fundamentals are good. For our purposes,
the competitor’s oﬀer serves as an attractive outside option for the entrepreneur.13
In this example, when a bargainer is deciding whether or not to take the outside option,
he must take into account the fact that choosing not to opt out may signal his private infor-
mation. This paper analyzes the interplay of outside options and incomplete information in
bargaining. Specifically, this paper analyzes the equilibrium eﬀects of additional information
provided by how bargainers respond to the outside option.
I study a model of an infinite-horizon bargaining game between a seller and a buyer. The
seller privately knows the quality of his product. In each period, the buyer oﬀers a price
and the seller decides whether or not to accept the oﬀer. After rejection, the seller’s outside
13In corporate finance, buyers of businesses are generally classified into two diﬀerent categories: financial
buyers and strategic buyers. Financial buyers are mostly equity funds interested in the return they can
achieve by buying a business. Strategic buyers are typically a competitor or a company in the same industry,
and they look for companies that will create a synergy with their existing businesses.
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option randomly arrives. The value of the outside option is increasing in the product quality.
If the seller does not receive an outside option or he chooses not to opt out, bargaining
continues into the next period.
There are two sources of information which the buyer uses to update his belief about
quality: the seller’s decision to accept/reject the buyer’s oﬀer (acceptance behavior) and his
decision about whether to take the outside option (opting-out behavior). Suppose the buyer
proposes an oﬀer that is rejected. Then the buyer believes that the quality is more likely to be
high, since the high-quality seller has a higher reservation value. This informational eﬀect
of the acceptance behavior is common in the standard models of incomplete-information
bargaining (Fudenberg, Levine, and Tirole (1985); Deneckere and Liang (2006)). There is
no outside option in their models, and so they only consider the eﬀect of the acceptance
behavior. As a result, the buyer’s equilibrium belief moves only in one direction as the buyer
becomes more confident that he is facing the high-quality seller.14 This equilibrium dynamic
of belief is known as the skimming property (Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson (1986)).
However, additional information is provided by the seller’s opting-out behavior in this
model and it has an opposite aﬀect on belief updating. The buyer infers that the seller has
not opted out by observing him still at the negotiation table. It might be that the seller has
yet to receive an outside option, or he has received an outside option that he did not take.
Since the value of the outside option is greater for the high-quality seller, he is more likely
to opt out when the option arrives. Therefore, after observing that the seller has not opted
out, the buyer adjusts his belief in the direction of low quality.
I show that when the outside option is suﬃciently important, there is an equilibrium in
14Similarly, in the context of a durable goods monopoly, the uninformed seller becomes more confident
that the remaining buyers have low valuation.
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which the two countervailing forces in belief updating exactly oﬀset one another. As a result,
the buyer’s belief does not change over time and he continues to make the same randomized
oﬀer throughout the bargaining process. Since the buyer does not make more generous
oﬀers in response to continued rejections, and the seller’s behavior does not change, the
equilibrium behavior produces an outcome path that resembles an outcome of a bargaining
deadlock. For simplicity, I refer to such an equilibrium as a deadlock equilibrium.
In the deadlock equilibrium, there is a threshold belief such that once the buyer’s pos-
terior belief reaches that point, it does not change until the bargaining ends. If the buyer is
more confident that he faces a high-quality seller than the threshold, he oﬀers a suﬃciently
high price that bargaining ends. If the buyer is less confident, he makes an agreement only
with the low-quality seller by oﬀering no more than the value of his outside option. In this
case, in each period the buyer adjusts his belief in the direction of high quality. This equi-
librium behavior lasts for a finite number of periods until the posterior reaches the threshold
point.
If the buyer’s posterior is equal to the threshold, the buyer uses a mixed strategy between
oﬀering the bargaining-ending price and the low-quality seller’s outside option value. The
mixing probability is determined to satisfy the low-quality seller’s indiﬀerence condition, and
as the time between periods becomes vanishingly small, the buyer oﬀers the low price with
a probability close to one. In response to the buyer’s low price oﬀer, only the low-quality
seller accepts it with a probability equal to the arrival probability of the outside option. The
high-quality seller takes the outside option for sure if it arrives, while the low-quality seller
does not. Since both types of sellers exit the game with the same probability, the posterior
belief of the buyer remains the same in the next period, and the players continue to play in
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the same way.
If the buyer’s prior expected quality is lower than the threshold belief, in equilibrium
there is positive probability that an apparent bargaining deadlock arises: a sequence of the
same low price oﬀer is rejected by the seller, followed by a sudden resolution by either the
buyer’s high bargaining-ending oﬀer, the low-quality seller’s agreement on the low price, or
the high-quality seller’s opting out. Note that although the realization of the equilibrium
outcome resembles a bargaining deadlock, the bargainers are not that uncompromising.
Instead, the buyer and the low-quality seller are indiﬀerent between a full compromise,
and the bargaining ends with positive probability in each period. In this sense, the model
provides an explanation of situations that look like bargaining deadlocks without the need
to appeal to behavioral types.
I show that as the time between periods becomes vanishingly small, and if the buyer
forms a prior belief such that the expected quality is lower than the threshold belief, then
the bargaining reaches a deadlock phase almost immediately. Hence an outcome path of
the equilibrium under frequent oﬀers exhibits one of the following: either the bargaining
ends immediately, or the aforementioned deadlock phase lasts for positive real time before
a sudden resolution.
In the deadlock equilibrium, there are non-trivial bargaining ineﬃciencies. There is a
bargaining delay in the deadlock equilibrium, and the expected length of delay is positive in
the limit case of frequent oﬀers. While the bargaining terminates (either by an agreement or
an opt-out) incrementally over time, the failure of learning keeps the parties from reaching
an agreement with certainty at any point in the bargaining process. Indeed, for any finite
time, the bargaining continues beyond that point with positive probability. Moreover, the
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equilibrium exhibits the possibility of bargaining breakdown.
The ineﬃciencies found in the deadlock equilibrium have distinctive features compared
to the ones in the standard model of incomplete-information bargaining. The standard
model explains delay as a device by which the parties can credibly convey their genuine
bargaining positions. Therefore, the adverse selection problem is alleviated over time as the
uninformed party gradually learns private information. In this model, however, the adverse
selection problem does not disappear because the buyer fails to learn the quality; hence the
bargaining ineﬃciencies remain strong as long as the bargaining continues. Furthermore,
a bargaining deadlock and real-time delay may exist even when there is no static adverse
selection problem,15 which contrasts with the result in the standard model (Deneckere and
Liang (2006)).
In general, the model has multiple equilibria. There may exist an equilibrium where the
informational eﬀect of the acceptance behavior dominates that of the opting-out behavior,
so that the equilibrium exhibits Coasian dynamics and so is approximately eﬃcient when
oﬀers are frequent. But I show that under stronger parametric assumptions, the deadlock
equilibrium is the only equilibrium that satisfies a natural monotonicity criterion that re-
quires that the buyer’s equilibrium oﬀer be nondecreasing in the posterior belief of expected
quality. Moreover, I show that under the same condition, all equilibria exhibit similar char-
acteristics, specifically the partial failure of learning and the ineﬃciency in the bargaining
outcome, so neither source of information dominates each other.
The paper contributes to a rich literature on dynamic bargaining with incomplete in-
formation. Standard models of incomplete-information bargaining do not model outside
15A static adverse selection problem arises when the average value of the product is lower than the highest
possible reservation value of the seller (Akerlof (1970)).
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options (See Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson (1986) and Ausubel and Deneckere (1989) for
a durable goods monopoly; Deneckere and Liang (2006) for bargaining with interdependent
values; Cho (1990) for two-sided private information; Abreu and Gul (2000) for reputational
bargaining), or they model them as an exogenous breakdown (See Sobel and Takahashi
(1983); Spier (1992); Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2012) for breakdown after a finite-horizon bar-
gaining; Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2010) for stochastic breakdown). Since the players do not
have an opting-out decision, information is revealed only through the oﬀer/response behav-
ior. In the present paper, information is revealed via both the acceptance and opting-out
behaviors, which is the main driving force of the bargaining deadlock.
A few papers have an equilibrium structure similar to the one studied here, although the
underlying mechanism is diﬀerent. Evans (1989) and Hörner and Vieille (2009) (public oﬀer
case) consider bargaining with interdependent values and show that the bargaining may
result in an impasse when the buyer is too impatient (or short-lived) relative to the seller.
On the other hand, the present paper assumes a common discount factor, and a bargaining
deadlock may exist even in the private value case. Abreu and Gul (2000) study a reputational
bargaining game where each agent may be a behavioral type who demands a certain share of
the pie and show that the equilibrium has a war of attrition structure exhibiting a deadlock.
Even though each bargainer becomes less confident that the opponent is a normal type,
they stick to imitating the behavioral type’s behavior until a bargainer finally gives up.
Compared to Abreu and Gul (2000), the present model does not assume behavioral types
and a bargaining deadlock is associated with the uninformed buyer’s failure of learning. Also
it is known that introducing an outside option into their model may completely cancel out
the deadlock and delay (explained in the next paragraph), while deadlock in this paper is a
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result of an interplay between the outside options and incomplete information.
There are papers in which some or all players can take an outside option that is available
in every period. Compte and Jehiel (2002) (in the context of reputational bargaining) and
? (in a durable goods monopoly) show that the introduction of an outside option may
completely cancel out the impact of asymmetric information. In these papers, the players
either agree with each other or opt out at the beginning of the game, so the equilibrium is
eﬃcient and information is revealed immediately. On the other hand, the stochastic arrival
of outside options in this paper leads to non-trivial equilibrium dynamics.
Lee and Liu (2013) study a repeated bargaining game between a long-run player and a
sequence of short-run players, where a stochastic disagreement outcome in each bargaining
partially reveals private information of the long-run player. They focus on the incentive of
the long-run player to build a reputation by choosing to gamble with the outside option,
while the present paper analyzes the bargaining ineﬃciency caused by the informational
eﬀect of the outside options.16,17
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 8 describes the model. Section 9
constructs the deadlock equilibrium and describes the equilibrium dynamics and the outcome
path. In Section 10 I analyze the equilibrium behavior under the limit case of frequent
oﬀers and discuss real-time delay as well as other equilibrium characteristics. Section 11
finds suﬃcient conditions under which the deadlock equilibrium is the only equilibrium
that satisfies a natural monotonicity criterion, and under which all equilibria have similar
16Compte and Jehiel (2004) raise an opposite question about bargaining dynamics and identify a source
of gradualism in bargaining and contribution games.
17For other models that explain delay, Merlo andWilson (1995) consider a complete information bargaining
game where the bargaining surplus stochastically changes over time and derive an equilibrium delay. Yildiz
(2004) considers a sequential bargaining model in which players are optimistic about their bargaining power
and shows that there exists a uniquely predetermined settlement date as players learn over time.
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characteristics. Section 12 discusses the role of assumptions and the robustness of the result
under several extensions. Section 13 concludes. Some of the proofs are relegated to the
Appendix.
8 Model
Consider an infinite-horizon, discrete-time bargaining game between a seller and a buyer.
Periods are indexed by n = 0, 1, 2, . . .. Let   be the length of the time interval between two
successive periods, so period k occurs at time k .18 Let   = e r  be a common discount
factor, where r > 0 is a discount rate. Note that the discount factor becomes arbitrarily
close to one as   converges to zero.
The seller holds an indivisible product that can be either high type (H) or low type (L).
The type of the product is the seller’s private information, and the buyer forms a prior belief
⇡0 2 (0, 1) that ✓ = H. The buyer’s value of the type-✓ product is u✓ > 0(uH   uL). For
simplicity, assume that the seller has zero production cost.19
Each period consists of an oﬀer stage and an outside option stage. In the oﬀer stage, the
buyer oﬀers a price p to the seller. Then the seller decides either to accept or reject the oﬀer.
If he accepts the oﬀer, the game ends, and the seller and the buyer obtain payoﬀs p and
u✓   p, respectively. In the case of rejection, the game continues to the outside option stage
where the outside option arrives to the seller with probability ⇠ = 1   e   .20 I assume
that the arrival of the outside option is private information to the seller. If the seller opts
18This is a common modeling scheme in the literature on bargaining theory. The literature mainly considers
the case where   is arbitrarily small, so that the commitment power of the uninformed player disappears.
19The robustness of the result to the case of a positive production cost is discussed in Section 12.
20Note that   > 0 represents a Poisson arrival rate of the outside options.
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Timeline
out, the game ends, and the seller and the buyer obtain payoﬀs of v✓ and zero, respectively.
Assume that vH > vL > 0 and that the buyer’s value of the product is no less than the
seller’s value from the outside option (u✓   v✓). If either no outside option arrives or the
option is rejected by the seller, the game continues into the next period. Figure 6 describes
the timeline of the game.
Consider a seller’s strategy in which he rejects any oﬀer and opts out whenever the
outside option arrives. Then the type-✓ seller’s expected payoﬀ is
v⇤✓ ⌘ ⇠v✓ +  (1  ⇠)⇠v✓ + · · · =
⇠
1   (1  ⇠)v✓.
Note that v⇤✓ < v✓, since the arrival of the outside option is delayed with positive probability.
It is clear that in any equilibrium of the game, the ex ante payoﬀ of the type-✓ seller
must be no less than v⇤✓ , and that the seller always rejects any oﬀer below v
⇤
✓ . Hereafter I call
v⇤✓ the reservation price of the type-✓ seller. The following proposition says that in the case
of complete information, v⇤✓ is not only a lower bound but also the unique equilibrium payoﬀ
of the seller. The main intuition behind the proposition is similar to Diamond’s paradox.
Proposition 7. (Complete information) Suppose that the seller is type ✓ with probability
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one. Then there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which the buyer always oﬀers
v⇤✓ , and the seller accepts any oﬀer no less than v
⇤
✓ .
Proof. See the Appendix.
A public history hn 2 Hn is a sequence of rejected oﬀers {pk}n 1k=0 from period 0 to
n   1. In addition to that, the seller privately knows the availability of outside options
in the past. Let ok 2 {Y,N} denote the availability of an outside option for the seller in
period k. Then the seller’s private history hnS 2 HnS at the oﬀer stage is hnS = (hn, {ok}n 1k=0).
I also define a public interim history hˆn = (hn, pn) 2 Hˆn and private interim history
hˆnS = (h
n, pn, {ok}n 1k=0) 2 HˆnS at the outside option stage.
The buyer’s strategy is his oﬀer pn : Hn !  (R+) at the oﬀer stage. The type-✓ seller’s
strategy consists of the acceptance probability  ✓n : HnS ⇥ R+ ! [0, 1] at the oﬀer stage,
and the opting-out probability c✓n : HˆnS ⇥ {Y }! [0, 1] at the outside option stage. Finally,
define ⇡n = Pr(✓ = H|hn) and ⇡ˆn = Pr(✓ = H|hˆn) as a posterior belief and an interim belief
of the buyer in period n, respectively.
We use the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) concept as defined in Fudenberg and
Tirole (1991, Definition 8.2).21 PBE implies that upon receiving an out-of-equilibrium oﬀer,
the continuation strategy of the seller is optimal.
As   goes to zero, the type-✓ seller’s reservation value converges to  r+ v✓. Define
⌘ =  r+  as the seller’s eﬀective discount rate. Note that ⌘ can be any number between
zero and one, depending on the ratio of the discount rate and the arrival rate of the outside
option.
21Formally speaking, Fudenberg and Tirole defined perfect Bayesian equilibria for finite games of incom-
plete information. The suitable generalization of their definition to infinite games is straightforward and is
omitted.
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In this paper, I consider the case where outside options arrive frequently enough (rela-
tive to the discount rate), so that the outside options generate a suﬃciently heterogeneous
bargaining position of the seller according to his type. Specifically, I assume that the high
type’s reservation value is greater than the low type’s payoﬀ from the outside option.
Assumption. (A1)
 v⇤H > vL +
(1   )(1  ⇠)
⇠
uL.
Assumption 1 holds if (1)   = e r  is suﬃciently large so that the interval between the
periods is small enough, and (2) ⌘ =  r+  is suﬃciently large so that the outside options
arrive frequently enough that v⇤H is close to vH . Note that Assumption 1 encompasses a
case with private value (uH = uL).
The following lemma shows that in any (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium, the buyer’s equi-
librium oﬀer is bounded above by the high type’s reservation value. The intuition is similar
to Proposition 7. This lemma and the following corollary helps in understanding the equi-
librium structure of the game.
Lemma 4. Suppose (A1) holds. Then in equilibrium, after any history hn, the buyer never
oﬀers pn > v⇤H .
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 4 implies the following corollary:
Corollary 1. Suppose (A1) holds. Then in equilibrium,
(1) The high type accepts any p   v⇤H , rejects any p < v⇤H , and takes the outside option
whenever the option arrives.
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(2) The low type accepts any p    v⇤H .
Note that the first part of Corollary 1 completely specifies the high type’s equilibrium
behavior after any history. So the equilibrium profile only needs to specify the behaviors of
the low type and the buyer. Lemma 4 and Corollary 1 describe how the bargaining ends in
any equilibrium. After any history, the buyer oﬀers either pn = v⇤H or pn < v⇤H . If he oﬀers
v⇤H , then both types of sellers accept it for sure, and the bargaining ends in period n with
probability one. If pn < v⇤H , then the high type rejects it for sure and takes the outside
option if the option arrives. Therefore, the bargaining continues into the next period with
positive probability, as the outside option does not arrive with probability one.
9 Deadlock Equilibrium
In this section I construct an equilibrium of interest. A heuristic argument for the equilibrium
construction is provided here, while the complete description of the equilibrium (including
behavior oﬀ the equilibrium path) is provided in the Appendix.
Definition. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium is called a deadlock equilibrium if the equi-
librium behavior satisfies the following properties: there exists pˆ < v⇤H , ⇡⇤ 2 (0, 1) and
q 2 (0, 1) such that
1. If ⇡n > ⇡⇤,
. the buyer oﬀers v⇤H for sure; bargaining ends immediately.
2. If ⇡n = ⇡⇤,
. the buyer oﬀers either v⇤H or pˆ, or uses a mixed strategy between the two;
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. if pn 1 = pˆ, he oﬀers v⇤H or pˆ with probability q and 1  q, respectively;
. only the low type accepts pˆ with probability ⇠;
. only the high type opts out for sure;
. ⇡n+1 = ⇡⇤.
3. If ⇡n < ⇡⇤,
. the buyer oﬀers some p  pˆ;
. only the low type accepts p with positive probability;
. ⇡n+1 2 (⇡n,⇡⇤].
In the deadlock equilibrium, there exists a cutoﬀ belief ⇡⇤ where the posterior, given
that the bargaining continues, does not change once it reaches ⇡⇤. I call ⇡⇤ a deadlock belief
since the bargaining parties’ behaviors do not change once the posterior reaches ⇡⇤; hence,
the equilibrium behavior produces an outcome that resembles a bargaining deadlock.
The buyer’s equilibrium oﬀer sharply changes at the deadlock belief. If the posterior
is greater than the deadlock belief, then the buyer oﬀers v⇤H to end the bargaining process
with both types of sellers. On the other hand, when the posterior is lower than ⇡⇤ the buyer
oﬀers a much lower price and targets only the low type. Note that if the prior is less than
⇡⇤, the posterior is always less than or equal to ⇡⇤ (unless bargaining ends) and the buyer
never buys a high-type product.
I claim that the above profile is an equilibrium only if pˆ = vL. Recall that by Corollary
1, if the buyer oﬀers any price less than v⇤H the high type rejects the oﬀer and opts out if
the option is available, so he exits the game with probability ⇠.
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. Since the low-type seller accepts any p 2 [ v⇤H , v⇤H) with probability one (Corollary 1),
pˆ must be less than  v⇤H .
. Suppose that pˆ 2 (vL,  v⇤H). Fix a history hn with ⇡n = ⇡⇤. Let ✏ > 0 be small that
pˆ  ✏ > max{vL,  pˆ}. Consider the buyer’s deviation at hn to oﬀer pˆ  ✏.
– I claim that in response to pˆ   ✏, the low type exits the game with probability
⇠. If he exits with probability greater than ⇠, the buyer’s posterior becomes
⇡n+1 > ⇡⇤. Hence the buyer oﬀers v⇤H in period n + 1. But then it is strictly
optimal for the low type not to exit in period n, so his behavior is inconsistent
with the belief. If he exits with probability less than ⇠, then ⇡n+1 < ⇡⇤, so the
buyer oﬀers pn+1  pˆ in period n+ 1. But then it is strictly optimal for the low
type to accept pn at period n.
– Then the low type must accept pˆ  ✏ with probability ⇠ and not take the outside
option because pˆ   ✏ > vL. Hence oﬀering pˆ   ✏ is a profitable deviation for the
buyer, contradiction.
. Suppose that pˆ < vL. Then it is suboptimal for the low type not to opt out when the
posterior is ⇡⇤ and the buyer oﬀers pˆ, because the outside option’s value is more than
the buyer’s oﬀer.
Given that pˆ = vL, the value of ⇡⇤ and q is uniquely determined by the indiﬀerence conditions
of the players at the deadlock belief. At ⇡n = ⇡⇤ the buyer must be indiﬀerent between
oﬀering v⇤H and vL. If the buyer oﬀers v⇤H , then both types of sellers accept it for sure and
the buyer obtains
U⇤F ⌘ (1  ⇡⇤)(uL   v⇤H) + ⇡⇤(uH   v⇤H). (9)
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On the other hand, if pn = vL, the low type’s response is ( Ln, cLn) = (⇠, 0) and the
buyer obtains
(1  ⇡⇤)⇠(uL   vL) +  (1  ⇠)U⇤F . (10)
Combining the above two formulas pins down the unique deadlock belief
⇡⇤ =
(v⇤H   uL) + ⇠1  (1 ⇠)(uL   vL)
(uH   uL) + ⇠1  (1 ⇠)(uL   vL)
.
Now consider the seller’s indiﬀerence condition. At the deadlock belief, the low type uses
a mixed strategy between acceptance and rejection when the buyer oﬀers vL. So it must be
the case that
vL =  (qv
⇤
H + (1  q)vL), (11)
which uniquely determines q.
But then why is the above profile an equilibrium? Can the buyer induce a higher ac-
ceptance probability by oﬀering a higher price? For any p < v⇤H , if the low type accepts p
with probability greater than ⇠, then in the next period, the posterior becomes greater than
⇡⇤ and the buyer oﬀers v⇤H . So as long as the price is less than  v⇤H , the acceptance proba-
bility must be no greater than ⇠. Therefore, if the buyer wants to increase the acceptance
probability, he needs to raise the price at least to  v⇤H .
What if the buyer oﬀers  v⇤H? If the seller is the low type, he accepts the oﬀer with
probability one. However, if the seller is the high type, he rejects the oﬀer and opts out if
the option is available, and in that case, the buyer receives zero payoﬀ. So if the outside
54
p⇡
1⇡⇤
v⇤H
vL
Figure 7
Buyer’s equilibrium offer
option arrives with a high probability, the cost from the high type’s opting out is greater
than the benefit from trading with the low type. Assumption 1 necessitates such a high
arrival rate of the outside option to guarantee the existence of the deadlock equilibrium.
The following proposition summarizes the argument:
Proposition 8. Suppose (A1) holds. Then the model generically has a unique deadlock
equilibrium.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Figure 7 describes the buyer’s equilibrium oﬀer of the buyer as a function of the posterior
belief. If the buyer’s belief is greater than the cutoﬀ belief ⇡⇤, he oﬀers v⇤H and both types
of sellers accept the oﬀer for sure; hence the game ends immediately. When the belief is less
than ⇡⇤, his oﬀer is no more than the low type’s value of the outside option (vL), and the
oﬀer is nondecreasing in the belief. Later in this subsection I describe more details of the
equilibrium oﬀer when the belief is less than ⇡⇤.
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Equilibrium behavior at the cutoﬀ belief ⇡⇤ is depicted in Figure 8. At the oﬀer stage
(described in the left panel), the buyer oﬀers either v⇤H or vL. If the buyer had oﬀered
vL in the previous period, then he plays a mixed strategy between oﬀering v⇤H and vL,
which satisfies the low type’s indiﬀerent condition (11). If the buyer oﬀers v⇤H , then both
types of sellers accept it and hence the game ends. If the buyer oﬀers vL, then the high
type rejects it, since it is lower than his reservation value. The low type accepts the oﬀer
with probability ⇠. Therefore after the oﬀer stage ends, the buyer’s interim belief becomes
⇡ˆn = ⇡ˆ⇤ ⌘ ⇡n⇡n+(1 ⇡n)(1 ⇠) > ⇡⇤. At the outside option stage (right panel), only the high type
exercises the outside option when it is available. Since the high type exits with probability ⇠,
the posterior belief ⇡n+1 decreases back to ⇡⇤. From then on, the bargaining parties repeat
the same behavior in each period: the buyer mixes between oﬀering v⇤H and vL; the low type
accepts vL with probability ⇠ while the high type rejects it; only the high type opts out.
Note that the buyer’s belief does not change unless bargaining ends, since the information
from the seller’s acceptance behavior and his opting-out behavior exactly oﬀset one another.
What happens if the prior is lower than the deadlock belief? In the Appendix, I construct
a sequence of prices {p†k}(p†0 = vL, p†k 2 (v⇤L, vL) for k   1) and a sequence of cutoﬀ beliefs
{⇡†k}(⇡†0 = ⇡⇤,⇡†k 2 (0,⇡⇤) for k   1) that describe the equilibrium behavior when the belief
is smaller than ⇡⇤. It is shown in the Appendix that both {p†k} and {⇡†k} are decreasing,
and that for any prior ⇡0 < ⇡⇤, there exists N 2 N [ {0} such that ⇡†N+1  ⇡0 < ⇡†N . Here
I consider the generic case that ⇡†N+1 < ⇡0.
In the equilibrium, the buyer oﬀers p†N in the first period. Then the low type accepts with
positive probability such that the interim belief becomes ⇡†N 1. In the outside option stage,
both types of sellers opt out if the outside option arrives, so the belief does not change at
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Equilibrium behavior at ⇡ = ⇡⇤
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⇡†N 1. In the second period, the buyer increases his oﬀer to p
†
N 1 which will induce another
mixed acceptance by the low type, and both types opt out when possible, and the posterior
becomes ⇡†N 2. This behavior continues until the posterior reaches ⇡
†
0 = ⇡
⇤. Hence, it takes
max{N, 1} periods for the posterior to reach the deadlock belief. Note that information
about the seller’s type comes only from his acceptance behavior, and the posterior strictly
increases in each period. Figure 9 describes the dynamics of belief on the equilibrium path
when N = 2.
So if the prior is less than the deadlock belief, the equilibrium behavior produces an
outcome path with the following characteristics:
. Bargaining starts with a pre-deadlock phase. In this phase the buyer plays a pure
oﬀer strategy, and his oﬀer is increasing over time so that the low type is indiﬀerent
between acceptance and rejection. Only the low type accepts the oﬀer with positive
probability, and both types of sellers opt out if possible. So an observed outcome in
this phase has the following characteristics: the buyer oﬀers a price less than vL; the
buyer’s oﬀer increases over time; bargaining might end with either acceptance of the
buyer’s oﬀer (by the low type) or opting out (by both types).
. A deadlock phase begins once the buyer oﬀers vL. In this phase, the buyer continues
to make the same randomized oﬀer throughout the bargaining process. Only the low
type accepts vL with positive probability, and only the high type opts out if possible.
Therefore, an outcome path features a sequence of the same oﬀer of vL being rejected
repeatedly before bargaining ends.
. Bargaining ends with a sudden resolving behavior that is either 1) the buyer’s bargaining-
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Equilibrium behavior when ⇡0 < ⇡⇤
ending oﬀer (v⇤H), 2) the low type’s acceptance of vL, or 3) the high type’s opting out.
Note that bargaining ends (either by an acceptance or an opt-out) in a finite number
of periods with probability one.
10 Frequent Oﬀers
Consider the limit case of frequent oﬀers by letting the time between periods (denoted by
 ) converge to zero. Recall that ⌘ =  r+  is the eﬀective discount factor.
Proposition 9. Suppose ⌘vH > vL + 1 ⌘⌘ uL. Then,
1. The deadlock equilibrium exists for suﬃciently small  .
2. In the deadlock equilibrium, as   converges to zero, the buyer’s equilibrium oﬀer when
⇡ < ⇡⇤ converges to vL; the length of the pre-deadlock phase (measured in real time)
shrinks to zero; the expected length of the deadlock phase does not shrink to zero.
Proof.
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Offer function when   is small
1. (A1) is satisfied if ⌘vH > vL + 1 ⌘⌘ uL and   is suﬃciently small.
2. The proof is based on the construction of the deadlock equilibrium and is relegated to
the Appendix.
As mentioned before, the deadlock equilibrium exists when the outside options are suf-
ficiently important. In the limit case of frequent oﬀers, this condition is represented by the
eﬀective discount factor being suﬃciently high.
In the pre-deadlock phase, the equilibrium exhibits Coasian dynamics at a price vL.
Since the discount factor goes to one as   converges to zero, the diﬀerence between the
buyer’s successive oﬀers vanishes as the buyer makes the low-type seller indiﬀerent between
acceptance and rejection. Moreover, the same force behind the Coase conjecture results in
the pre-deadlock phase shrinking to zero. Figure 10 describes the limit equilibrium oﬀer by
the buyer when   is close to zero.
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Figure 11
Limit distribution of the equilibrium outcome
However, the deadlock phase does not shrink in the limit case of frequent oﬀers. More
specifically, each resolution behavior of the deadlock phase (the buyer’s bargaining-ending
oﬀer, the low type’s acceptance of the low oﬀer, and the high type’s opt-out) converges to
a Poisson arrival process. The indiﬀerence condition (11) implies that, as   converges to
zero the probability of the buyer oﬀering v⇤H converges to zero at the same rate. As a result,
the buyer’s equilibrium oﬀer path (in real time) converges to the base oﬀer of vL with the
endogenous Poisson arrival of v⇤H .22 The low type’s acceptance of oﬀer vL and the high type’s
opt-out occurs with probability ⇠ = 1   e   ; hence, they converge to Poisson processes
with parameter  . Note that the Poisson arrivals of resolution behaviors are independent of
each other.
22To see this, note that
q =
vL/    vL
v⇤H   vL
=
vL
v⇤H   vL
(er    1) = vLr
v⇤H   vL
 + o( ),
so as  ! 0, the arrival of the buyer’s oﬀer p = v⇤H converges to a Poisson process of rate vLrv⇤H vL .
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Figure 11 summarizes the discussion above by depicting the limit distribution of the
equilibrium outcome as   ! 0. At any real time t0, the height in the blue (red) area
indicates the probability that the agreement (breakdown) happens anytime before t0. The
height in the grey area is the probability that the bargaining continues beyond time t0. Note
that for any finite t, bargaining will continue beyond time t with positive probability.
10.1 Real-Time Delay and Breakdown
The outcome of the deadlock equilibrium exhibits various bargaining ineﬃciencies. Several
key values, such as the expected length of delay and the probability of a breakdown, are
derived in closed form.
The equilibrium behavior described in Section 9 implies that in the deadlock equilibrium,
the bargaining is delayed with positive probability before it ends either in an agreement or
in a breakdown. The following corollary states that the expected length of delay in real
time is positive even when the time between periods becomes arbitrarily small. So in the
deadlock equilibrium, ineﬃciency does not disappear when oﬀers are frequent. Let Td be
the (unconditional) expected length of delay, and let Tˆd be the expected length of delay
conditional on deadlock.
Corollary 2. In the deadlock equilibrium, the expected length of delay is positive if the prior
is less than ⇡⇤. Moreover, as   converges to zero,
Tˆd ! ZZ + µ ·
1
 
,
Td ! ⇡0⇡⇤ Tˆd,
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where Z = v
⇤
H vL
vL
and µ = r  .
Proof. See the Appendix.
Recall that Assumption 1 encompasses both the private and correlated value case, so
that the real-time delay associated with the deadlock equilibrium can be found in both cases.
Another source of ineﬃciency in the deadlock equilibrium is the possibility of a break-
down resulting from the high type’s opt-out. Let Pb be the ex ante probability of a break-
down, and Pˆb be the breakdown probability conditional on deadlock.
Corollary 3. In the deadlock equilibrium, as   converges to zero,
Pˆb ! ⇡⇤ ZZ + µ,
Pb ! ⇡0 ZZ + µ.
Proof. See the Appendix.
10.2 High Arrival Rate of the Outside Option
The assumption in Proposition 9 implies that when the eﬀective discount rate ⌘ =  r+  is
arbitrarily close to one, the deadlock equilibrium exists in the limit of frequent oﬀers. On
the other hand, Corollary 2 implies that the expected length of the delay converges to zero
as   becomes arbitrarily high. So it is of interest to analyze the equilibrium behavior under
suﬃciently high  .
Recall that at the deadlock belief, the low type accepts vL with probability ⇠. If ⇠ is
close to one, almost every low-type seller accepts vL and the interim belief after the oﬀer
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stage becomes close to one. Then the high type exits the game with probability ⇠ and the
posterior becomes ⇡⇤. Therefore, even though the equilibrium structure is preserved, the
bargaining ends with a probability close to one.
Similar intuition can be applied to the limit case of frequent oﬀers. Recall that as  
goes to zero, each type of resolution behavior in the deadlock phase converges to a Poisson
arrival process. As   becomes arbitrarily high, the arrival rates of resolution behaviors also
become arbitrarily high, and the (expected) length of the deadlock phase shrinks to zero.
What is the limit of ⇡⇤ when   becomes arbitrarily high? Fixing the discount rate r, as
  goes to infinity, the indiﬀerence condition of the buyer at ⇡⇤ (from (9) and (10)) becomes
(1  ⇡⇤)(uL   vL) = ⇡⇤(uH   vH) + (1  ⇡⇤)(uL   vH).
Consider a static bargaining game where the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the
seller and the seller has an outside option of v✓. Then the left-hand side (right-hand side)
of the above equation is the payoﬀ to the buyer when he oﬀers vL(vH) to target low-type
seller (both types of sellers). In other words, the buyer’s optimal oﬀer under arbitrarily high
  converges to one of static bargaining.
Interestingly, the limit distribution of the equilibrium outcome under high   converges
to the monopoly pricing equilibrium in ?, with the role of seller and buyer reversed. They
consider a model of a seller-oﬀer bargaining game where the buyer has private information
about his valuation of the seller’s good, and they assume that the buyer has an outside
option available at any period. They show that there is a unique sequential equilibrium
where the seller always oﬀers an optimal monopoly price, and the buyer either accepts the
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oﬀer or opts out immediately. So there is no bargaining delay in the equilibrium. If I switch
the role of the seller and the buyer in ?, their equilibrium coincides to the limit distribution
of the deadlock equilibrium with  ! 0 and  !1.
11 Uniqueness
In general, there are multiple equilibria of this model. In particular, there may exist an equi-
librium where the buyer uses an oﬀer strategy similar to the ‘Coasian’ pricing (Fudenberg,
Levine, and Tirole (1985); Gul, Sonnenschein, andWilson (1986)). In this equilibrium, as the
time between the periods becomes vanishingly small, the buyer’s oﬀer converges to v⇤H and
the expected delay converges to zero, so the equilibrium outcome is approximately eﬃcient.
In the equilibrium with Coasian dynamics, although there are two sources of information, the
information revealed by the seller’s acceptance behavior dominates the information revealed
by his opting-out behavior.23
Then the question is whether the deadlock equilibrium is one equilibrium of the model
where two sources of information happen to oﬀset one another. In this section, I show that
under a stronger parametric assumption, the oﬀsetting eﬀect can be found in all PBE of the
model. First, I present the parametric assumption stronger than (A1).
Assumption. (A2) ⇠1  (1 ⇠) v
⇤
H > uL.
A necessary condition for (A2) is v⇤H > uL. Since uH   vH , the private value case
(uH = uL) does not satisfy (A2). More important, v⇤H > uL is a necessary condition for the
existence of the static adverse selection problem. Suppose there is a static market where
23More discussion about Coasian equilibrium is in Section 12.
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the buyer’s value is u✓ and the seller’s reservation value is v⇤✓ . Then adverse selection in the
trade exists if and only if E[u✓] < v⇤✓ . Therefore, if v
⇤
H > uL, the adverse selection problem
arises for suﬃciently low ⇡0.
Since (A2) implies (A1), (A2) guarantees the existence of the deadlock equilibrium. The
following proposition shows that under (A2), the deadlock equilibrium is the only PBE
satisfying a monotonicity property. The property, called nondecreasing oﬀers, requires that
when the buyer’s expected quality is higher, he tends to oﬀer a higher price to the seller.
Definition. A strategy profile satisfies nondecreasing oﬀers if for any history hn, h0n0 with
⇡n < ⇡n0 , if the buyer oﬀers p at hn and p0 at h0n
0 , then p  p0.
Proposition 10. Suppose (A2) holds. Then the deadlock equilibrium is the unique perfect
Bayesian equilibrium that satisfies nondecreasing oﬀers.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The following proposition states that under (A2), in every equilibrium neither source of
information dominates the other, so the equilibrium has characteristics similar to those of
the deadlock equilibrium.
Proposition 11. Suppose (A2) holds. Then in every perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the
game, if prior is low enough,
(1) the posterior belief ⇡n never exceeds the deadlock belief ⇡⇤ (defined in Section 9)
conditional on the bargaining continues, and
(2) for any finite n, bargaining continues beyond period n with positive probability.
Proof. See the Appendix.
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12 Discussions
Random Arrival of Outside Options The random arrival of outside options assumed in
this paper is a simple way of modeling a stochastic payoﬀ of opt-out behavior. In principle,
the bargaining parties can break the negotiation process at any point in time. However, the
value of opting out typically changes over time. First, the value of the best available outside
option may change over time. As in the example given in the introduction, a satisfactory
outside oﬀer often does not exist. Second, the cost of opting out may also change over
time. Several external factors, such as the bargaining party’s decision-making procedure
and time-varying external environment, can aﬀect the cost of taking the outside option. 24
Theoretically, the random arrival of outside options provides an alternative perspective
on bargaining dynamics. Standard models of bargaining with an outside option assume
that the option is available in every period to some or all of the bargaining parties. In
bargaining with complete information, the outside option is either completely ineﬀective
(when the value is low) or crucially eﬀective (when the value is high) in determining an
equilibrium behavior. In bargaining with incomplete information, an outside option may
almost completely cancel out the impact of incomplete information, and the equilibrium
features immediate termination of bargaining when the bargaining party either agrees or
opts out depending on his private type.25 In this paper the outside option is not available
with positive probability. As a result, the bargaining continues into the next period with
positive probability unless the buyer oﬀers v⇤H ; hence, the equilibrium shows non-trivial
dynamics.
24In Section 13, I discuss a possible extension of the random value of the outside option.
25See Compte and Jehiel (2002) for the eﬀect of outside options on reputational bargaining, and ? for the
eﬀect on a dynamic durable goods monopoly.
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Production Cost and Heterogeneous Arrival Rate The result of this paper extends
to the case where the seller has a positive cost of production. Suppose the type-✓ seller has
a production cost of c✓ > 0. Recall that the seller’s payoﬀ is v✓ when he takes an outside
option. Then the type-✓ seller never accepts an oﬀer if
p  c✓ < ⇠1   (1  ⇠)v✓ = v
⇤
✓ ,
or p < c✓ + v⇤✓ . To guarantee the existence of the deadlock equilibrium, a modified version
of (A1) needs to be imposed:
Assumption. (A1’)  (cH + v⇤H) > vL +
(1  )(1 ⇠)
⇠ uL + (1  1  ⇠ )cL.
Note that if cH = cL = 0, (A1) and (A1’) are equivalent.
Proposition 12. Suppose (A1’) holds. Then there exists a deadlock equilibrium of the
model.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that (A1’) encompasses a case where the value of the outside option is the same
for both types (vH = vL). As long as the model’s parameters induce the high type to have
a stronger incentive to opt out, the deadlock equilibrium exists.
Similar intuition can be applied to check the robustness of the deadlock equilibrium when
the arrival rate of the outside option is diﬀerent across types. For example, the deadlock
equilibrium may exist in the model where the outside option arrives only to the high-type
seller.
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Existence of Coasian Equilibrium When (A2) is not satisfied, the model has an equi-
librium where Coasian dynamics lead to an approximately eﬃcient outcome. In the Coasian
equilibrium, the buyer plays a pure strategy at any history on the equilibrium path. The
buyer gradually increases his oﬀer over time. On the equilibrium path, the high type rejects
the buyer’s oﬀer in all but the final period, and the low type uses a mixed acceptance strat-
egy. If the initial oﬀer is high enough, only the high type opts out in every period before
the game ends. If the initial oﬀer is low, then both types take the outside option until the
oﬀer exceeds some cutoﬀ where it becomes suboptimal for the low type to opt out. As the
time between periods becomes arbitrarily small, the initial oﬀer converges to v⇤H and the
equilibrium yields an approximately immediate trade.26
If the parameters satisfy (A2), then because of the static adverse selection problem,
playing a Coasian strategy yields a negative payoﬀ to the buyer. So the Coasian strategy
profile does not hold as an equilibrium, and the deadlock equilibrium becomes a unique
equilibrium under the monotonicity condition.
Permanent Outside Option Consider the case where the outside option does not disap-
pear once it arrives. In the model of the permanent outside option, there exists a deadlock
equilibrium that has the same equilibrium outcome as the one in the original model. The key
reason is that both types of sellers have no incentive to keep the outside option. For the high
type, since the buyer’s maximum oﬀer is strictly smaller than the payoﬀ from the outside
option (v⇤H < vH), he opts out once the option is available. The low type cannot signal that
he has an outside option, since he always uses a mixed strategy on the equilibrium path.
26A detailed description of the Coasian equilibrium in the presence of a stochastic outside option is available
upon request. Hwang and Li (2013) construct a Coasian equilibrium in a model similar to the present paper,
where the roles of the seller and the buyer are reversed.
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So he cannot use the outside option as a threat in future periods. Since the buyer’s oﬀer is
increasing over time, the low type has no incentive to keep the outside option.
Change in Timeline How robust is the deadlock equilibrium under diﬀerent timelines
of the game? Consider the case where the seller receives an outside option before the buyer
oﬀers a price. First, suppose that the seller’s opting-out decision comes before the buyer
oﬀers a price, so the oﬀer stage comes later than the outside option stage. Then a simple
calculation shows that the equilibrium structure is unchanged. It is not surprising since the
eﬀect of switching the two stages only accounts for the discount factor.
What happens if the outside option arrives before the buyer makes an oﬀer? In this case,
there may exist multiple equilibria even if there is complete information about the quality.
Under some range of parameters, the buyer’s oﬀer and the seller’s opting-out decision have a
self-fulfilling eﬀect on each other. If the arrival rate of the outside option is low, there exists
an equilibrium where the buyer makes an oﬀer that is accepted only by the seller without
the outside option, and the seller with the outside option rejects the oﬀer and opts out. If
the arrival rate of the outside option is high, there exists another type of equilibrium where
the buyer makes an oﬀer high enough so that the seller accepts it. And for the intermediate
arrival rate, both equilibria may exist.
Two-Sided Incomplete Information It is generally known that in the model of a two-
sided incomplete information bargaining game, severe multiplicity arises. The attempt to
narrow down the equilibrium set results in either implausibility of the criterion or the non-
existence of the equilibrium under certain parameters. I expect that in the model with the
stochastic outside option, a similar multiplicity would arise.
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Continuum of Types If the model assumes a continuum of seller’s types, the main
diﬃculty in the analysis is tracking the belief. Since the outside option does not arrive
with probability one, the belief after an outside option stage has the same support as the
one before the stage, but the belief about the high quality would decrease. Therefore, the
posterior belief is not a truncation of the prior and therefore cannot be simplified to a state
variable. So the equilibrium profile must describe the bargainer’s behavior for any possible
posterior belief.27
I conjecture that as in the two-types case, there are two countervailing forces in belief
updating: the lower types tend to accept the buyer’s oﬀer and the higher types tend to opt
out. However, it is unclear whether these countervailing forces would lead to a bargaining
deadlock or to another equilibrium dynamic.
13 Concluding Remarks
One interesting extension is to assume a random value of the outside options instead of
random availability. Consider the model where the type-✓ seller receives an outside option
in each period, and the value of the outside option is randomly drawn from distributions F✓.
Assume that FH is first-order stochastic dominant over FL. I conjecture that under some
conditions on the distributions, there exists a deadlock equilibrium. In this case, neither type
of seller plays a mixed strategy towards the outside option. Moreover, the low type would
also opt out if he received a good enough outside option. But similar to the benchmark
27Fuchs, Öry, and Skrzypacz (2012) analyzed an equilibrium where the posterior belief is an addition of
multiple truncated beliefs. In their paper, such beliefs are formed when the future buyer cannot observe past
oﬀers, so the price history does not aﬀect future buyers’ beliefs and hence it does not aﬀect their strategies.
In this paper, there is a single buyer and he observes history of past oﬀers. So an out-of-equilibrium oﬀer
aﬀects the future belief of the buyer, which makes the analysis diﬃcult.
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model, not taking the outside option conveys a bad signal about the quality of the product.
It would be interesting to investigate whether and how a bargaining deadlock occurs in this
extension.
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Chapter III
Experimentation with Repeated Elections
14 Introduction
The peaceful transition of power marks a well-functioning democratic system. When an
incumbent party decides whether to undertake a reform, the possibility of losing its current
power aﬀects its policy decision. In particular, if the consequences of the reform are unknown
until after the reform has been implemented, then the incumbent has to consider the eﬀects
of the reform’s outcomes on future elections and the action of the opposing party, which
may have diﬀerent preferences over policy alternatives.
For example, suppose that an incumbent party decides to implement health care reform.
The diverse eﬀects of the reform cannot be fully anticipated. Suppose also that the incum-
bent prefers to extend health care, while the opposing party prefers the opposite. Then
the incumbent takes into account the fact that it might lose its control and the opposing
party would reverse the policy. In this case, the presence of a change in power aﬀects the
incumbent’s incentive to experiment with policy. Other examples of reforms whose outcome
is uncertain and for which political parties have heterogeneous preferences include hawkish
and dovish approaches to foreign policy, legalization of drugs, and social insurance.
In this paper, I study the incumbent party’s incentives to experiment in the presence
of elections, when the political parties have heterogeneous preferences over the outcomes. I
address the following questions: How do repeated elections aﬀect incentives to experiment?
What is the equilibrium level of experimentation, and how does it depend on the frequency
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of elections? What is the socially eﬃcient level, and is it achievable?
To address these questions, I analyze a continuous-time three-player game with two
political parties and a voter. The policy experimentation process is modeled by a three-
armed bandit model in which a safe policy yields a constant payoﬀ, and two risky policies
yield outcomes whose distribution, or type, is unknown. The safe policy is interpreted as
a status-quo policy, while the risky policies are reform policies in diﬀerent directions. At
each instant, the incumbent party chooses one of the three alternatives. The parties and the
voter learn the types of risky policies only through experimentation. Each risky policy is
either productive or unproductive, and it is commonly known that exactly one alternative
is productive while the other is unproductive. This means that one of the two mutually
exclusive reform policies will turn out to be good if explored long enough. Moreover, any
news shock fully reveals that the risky policy under experimentation is productive (and the
other is unproductive), so all uncertainty is resolved.
Each party is biased toward a diﬀerent risky alternative. This means that each reform
policy has an ideological characteristic that is in accordance with one party’s value. Each
party gets the greatest value from its preferred risky alternative if it is productive. Further-
more, the party does not value the opposite risky alternative regardless of its types, so even
if it is known that its preferred risky policy is unproductive, it prefers to choose the safe
one. This payoﬀ structure captures the loss of enthusiasm or support among the party’s
partisans when the opposing risky alternative is implemented.
I model elections as a Poisson arrival process. This stationarity assumption enhances
the tractability of the model, while it is still enough to analyze the paper’s main question:
the incumbent’s incentive to experiment. At each election, the voter chooses the party that
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will have power until the next election. The voter has unbiased preferences and prefers any
productive risky alternative to the safe one. There exists a political agency problem in the
sense that the voter cannot control the incumbent party while there is no election, and it
is the incumbent party that chooses the policy alternatives. For the voter, the only way to
control the party is to replace it with the other at the next election.
I restrict players to stationary Markov strategies with the common posterior belief as
the state variable. I characterize a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) in which the voter
elects the party whose preferred risky alternative oﬀers a more promising belief about its
productivity type. I show that there exists a unique equilibrium for a broad range of param-
eters. Then I analyze the eﬃciency of policy experimentation from the voter’s perspective
and conduct comparative statics with respect to the parameters such as election frequency,
speed of learning and the value of a productive risky alternative.
The equilibrium shows an interesting implication in regard to the optimal frequency of
elections. A common intuition is that the voter would be better oﬀ under more frequent
elections, since he would have more control over the political parties. However, I show that
while infrequent elections are surely bad for the voter, too frequent elections can also make
him strictly worse oﬀ.
It is not surprising that if elections are infrequent, then the equilibrium exhibits inef-
ficiency caused by political agency. If the next election is far away from now, then the
incumbent party will not worry much about the future loss of power, and so its behavior is
similar to that of a dictator. So the incumbent keeps experimenting with its preferred risky
alternative even when the belief about its productivity type is pessimistic. The voter knows
that it is better to experiment with the opposite risky policy, but he cannot control the
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incumbent’s behavior. In this case, ineﬃciency decreases as election frequency increases.
A more surprising result is that there exists a diﬀerent type of ineﬃciency under high
frequency of elections. If the election frequency is greater than a certain threshold, in
equilibrium the incumbent ceases to experiment at a certain point of belief. Instead, the
incumbent party chooses the safe alternative and the learning stops. If elections occur too
frequently, then each party would have to give up its power right after it generates the
negative information. Therefore, the value of experimentation to the incumbent becomes
small enough to avoid risky policy. This shows that there is another source of ineﬃciency
from political agency: potential loss of power prevents the incumbent from conducting risky
policy. I show that the degree of this ineﬃciency is so large that the voter is worse oﬀ under
too frequent elections than under a dictatorship.
The above argument implies that there exists an optimal election frequency under which
ineﬃciency is minimized. The frequency of elections must be high enough so that the
ineﬃciency from a standard political agency problem is small. On the other hand, it must
not be too high; otherwise it triggers a cessation of experimentation. I show that there exists
a unique frequency of elections where the voter’s expected payoﬀ is maximized. Moreover, I
show that the optimal frequency of elections is increasing in the value of the productive risky
alternative. When the risky policy has a high value, the incumbent has enough incentive to
explore the risky policy even under frequent elections.
The paper contributes to a developing literature on experimentation with multiple agents.
Bolton and Harris (1999) and Keller, Rady, and Cripps (2005) study a two-armed bandit
problem in which diﬀerent agents may choose diﬀerent arms. Klein and Rady (2011) consider
a similar case but assume that the expected payoﬀs of risky arms are negatively correlated
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across players, and this information structure is applied in the present paper. Bonatti and
Hörner (2011) consider the case in which each agent’s action is unobservable and find that
the moral hazard problem leads not only to a reduction in eﬀort but also to procrastina-
tion. In all of these papers, an informational free-riding problem leads to underinvestment
in the acquisition of information. On the other hand, in the present paper the driving force
for ceasing experimentation is the presence of a potential loss of control, which is crucially
related to the political agency problem.28
The paper also contributes to the literature on political agency (Ferejohn (1986); Banks
and Sundaram (1998); Besley (2004); Maskin and Tirole (2004)). These papers consider a
potential moral hazard problem of elected politicians, so their results imply that it is always
better for the voter to have more frequent elections. In contrast, the present paper shows
that if we consider the uncertainty of policy implementation, there exists another type of
political agency problem that occurs when election frequency is too high.
The paper is also related to the literature of alternating political power. Dixit and
Gul (2000) use a repeated game argument to show that the presence of alternating power
enables two parties to make political compromises. Aragones, Palfrey, and Postlewaite
(2007) develop a model of repeated elections and analyze conditions under which candidates’
reputations may aﬀect voters’ beliefs over what policy will be implemented by the winning
candidate of an election.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
28Some papers apply a model of strategic learning in the context of political economy. Strulovici (2010)
considers the case in which a number of agents collectively decide which of two alternatives to choose
according to some voting rule. He finds that the control-sharing eﬀect leads to an ineﬃciently low level
of experimentation in equilibrium. Callander (2011) considers a two-period model to show that alternating
political power can benefit voters when the policy outcome is unknown. Gul and Pesendorfer (2012) consider
a model of a political campaign in which two parties of opposing interests provide costly information to voters.
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derives the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for a party’s best response. Section 4 char-
acterizes the Markov perfect equilibria of the non-cooperative game and derives the optimal
election frequency. Section 5 argues how the voter’s payoﬀ improves in the incumbency
advantage equilibrium and discusses several extensions of the model. Section 6 concludes.
Some of the proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
15 Model
Time t 2 [0,1) is continuous. There are two political parties (i = 1, 2) and a median
voter (m). Both parties and the median voter are forward-looking and they have a common
discount rate r > 0. At each instant, one of two political parties is determined to be an
active party and chooses a policy Xt 2 {S,R1, R2}. The other party, a passive party, cannot
aﬀect the active party’s decision.
The first policy S is a safe policy and generates a deterministic flow payoﬀ. There are
two risky policies Ri (i = 1, 2), which can be either a productive type or an unproductive
type. The types of risky policies are unknown at the beginning. We will further assume a
perfect negative correlation between two risky policies: it is common knowledge that exactly
one risky policy is productive, while the other one is unproductive.
Payoﬀs for each political party are as follows. If the active party chooses to play S, then
it yields a flow payoﬀ of s > 0 to both parties. If the active party plays Ri and if it is
unproductive, it generates zero payoﬀ. If Ri is productive, then it pays a lump-sum payoﬀ
h at random times only to party i. Party j gets zero payoﬀ from Ri regardless of its type.
These heterogeneous preferences can be interpreted such that the party j is biased toward
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the risky action Rj , so that party j does not value the outcomes from Ri. Assume that
the lump-sum arrival times correspond to jumping times of a Poisson process with intensity
  > 0. Then g = h  is the expected payoﬀ to party i per unit of time, conditional on Ri
being productive. We assume g > s > 0, so party i strictly prefers Ri to S and S to Rj if
Ri is productive, and strictly prefers S, if it is unproductive, to Ri and Rj .
While each political party is biased toward the outcomes of one risky policy, the median
voter is unbiased toward both risky policies and hence prefers any productive risky policy.
That is, he gets the expected payoﬀ of g from any productive risky policy and the flow payoﬀ
of s from a safe policy.
I model elections as Poisson arrivals. At random time, which corresponds to jumping
times of a Poisson process with arrival rate ⇠ > 0, the median voter chooses one of the two
parties to be the active party. Once a party is chosen, then it is guaranteed to have control
over the action choices until the next election. The election process and the lump-sum payoﬀ
process of a productive risky policy are independent. The types of the risky policies stay
the same at every regime change, that is, Nature conducts a random draw only once at the
beginning of the game. Finally, we assume no private information: both parties can observe
the active party’s choice of action and the resulting outcome.
Let { i,t}t 0(i = 1, 2) and { M,t}t 0 be the actions of the parties and the median voter,
where  i,t 2 {S,R1, R2} and  M.t 2 [0, 1] (probability of choosing party 1) is measurable
with respect to the information available at time t. Let {◆t}t 0 (◆t 2 {1, 2}) be a stochastic
process of the active party, which is determined by Poisson arrivals of the elections and
{ M,t}t 0. Then a policy decision rule is a stochastic process {Xt}t 0, where Xt =  ◆t,t is
an action taken by the active party at time t.
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Let pt be the common posterior belief at time t that R1 is productive. Let {Ft}t 0 be a
filtration generated by {Xt}t 0 and the corresponding outcome process, then the stochastic
process {pt}t 0 is adapted to {Ft}t 0, and pt evolves according to Bayes’ rule. The posterior
belief jumps up to one once there is a breakthrough on R1, and jumps down to zero if a
breakthrough on R2 is observed. In either case, learning is complete and pt stays the same.
If there has been no breakthrough until t, then pt obeys the following diﬀerential equation:
p˙t = pt(1  pt) (1Xt=R2   1Xt=R1).
Note that p˙t < 0(> 0) when the active party playsR1(R2) and no breakthrough is discovered.
Party 1’s total discounted expected payoﬀ, expressed in per-period units, can be written
as
E0
ˆ 1
0
re rt[1Xt=R1 · ptg + 1Xt=S · s]dt
 
where the expectation is taken over the stochastic processes {Xt}t 0 and {pt}t 0. Similarly,
the payoﬀ for party 2 is
E0
ˆ 1
0
re rt[1Xt=R2 · (1  pt)g + 1Xt=S · s]dt
 
,
and
E0
ˆ 1
0
re rt[1Xt=R1 · ptg + 1Xt=R2 · (1  pt)g + 1Xt=S · s]dt
 
for the median voter.
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A sequential equilibrium is called a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) if the agents of
the game play stationary Markov strategies with the common posterior belief pt 2 [0, 1] as
a state variable. Party i’s strategy is then given by a function  i : [0, 1]! {S,R1, R2}, and
the voter’s strategy is given by  M : [0, 1]! [0, 1].
Let ⌃⇤ be the set of strategy profiles where the median voter chooses the candidate
whose preferred reform policy has a more optimistic belief. In other words, the median
voter’s strategy is  M (p) = 1 whenever p > 1/2 and  M (p) = 0 whenever p < 1/2. In this
paper, I focus on Markov perfect equilibria in ⌃⇤.
Observe that in any equilibrium in ⌃⇤, each party never plays the reform policy that the
opposite party prefers, that is, party i always chooses either S or Ri. This is because for
party i, playing Rj gives the same amount of information as Ri while generating a zero flow
payoﬀ. In the rest of the paper, I will define ki(p) 2 {0, 1} as the probability that party i
chooses its preferred reform policy.
16 Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
16.1 Single party’s problem
Before I analyze the model, consider a benchmark case where there is no election, that
is, ⇠ = 0. In this case, only one party is active for all t 2 [0,1) and it faces the single
decision-maker problem described in Keller, Rady, and Cripps (2005). Suppose party 1 is
always active, and let V1(p) be its value as a function of posterior belief p. Then it solves
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the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation:
V1(p) = s+ max
k12{0,1}
k1
⇢
 s+ pg + p 
r
{g   V1(p)  (1  p)V 01(p)}
 
. (12)
The first part of the maximand corresponds to action S, and the second corresponds to
R1. The eﬀect of R1 on the value of party 1 can be decomposed into three elements: (i) an
expected flow payoﬀ pg, (ii) a jump in value function when party 1 discovers a breakthrough
on R1, captured by p r (g V1(p)), and (iii) a decrease in value function when no breakthrough
is observed, captured by   r p(1 p)V 01(p). The diﬀerence between expected flow payoﬀs from
S and R1, which is
c1(p) ⌘ s  pg,
is called the opportunity cost of experimentation for party 1. The sum of the second and
third elements,
b1(p) ⌘ p 
r
{g   V1(p)  (1  p)V 01(p)},
is called the value of experimentation of party 1. Then party 1 experiments if and only if
b1(p) > c1(p). The value of information b1(p) is nonnegative in the single party problem.
However, I show that if ⇠ > 0, it can be negative for a range of p under some equilibria.
If party 1 were myopic, i.e., merely maximizing current flow payoﬀs, then it plays the
risky action if and only if c1(p) is negative. So party 1 plays the cutoﬀ strategy with cutoﬀ
pm = sg . If it were forward-looking, then it values the information from a risky action to use
it for future decisions. In this case, the optimal decision rule is to play a risky action if and
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only if b1(p) > c1(p), so it uses the optimal single party cutoﬀ
p0 =
µs
µg + (g   s) < p
m, (13)
where µ = r  .
16.2 Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
Now I introduce elections by assuming ⇠ > 0. Let V1(p)(W1(p)) be the value function of
party 1 when it is active (passive). Then for any open interval of beliefs where the actions
of party 2 and the median voter are constant, party 1’s payoﬀ function is diﬀerentiable and
solves the following set of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations:29
V1(p) = s  (1   M (p)) · ⇠
r
(W1(p)  V1(p)) + max
k12{0,1}
k1
⇢
 s+ pg + p 
r
{g   V1(p)  (1  p)V 01 (p)}
 
,(14)
W1(p) =
8>><>>:
 M (p) · ⇠r (V1(p) W1(p)) + s if  2(p) = S,
 M (p) · ⇠r (V1(p) W1(p)) + (1 p) r {W1(0) W1(p) + pW 01(p)} if  2(p) = R2.
Similar to the single decision-maker problem, party 1, when active, faces the trade-oﬀ
between the opportunity cost and the value of experimentation. However, there exists an
election after which party 1 can lose its power and become a passive player if the median
voter chooses party 2. The first term of the equation for V1(p) represents such a possible
29Similarly, for any open interval of beliefs where party 1’s action is constant, V2(p) and W2(p) are
diﬀerentiable and they solve
V2(p) = 1{ m(p)=1} ·
⇠
r
(W2(p)  V2(p)) + max
⇢
s , (1  p)g + (1  p) 
r
{V2(0)  V2(p) + pV 02 (p)}
 
,
W2(p) =
(
1{ m(p)=2} · ⇠r (V2(p) W2(p)) + s if  1(p) = S,
1{ m(p)=2} · ⇠r (V2(p) W2(p)) + p r {W2(1) W2(p)  (1  p)W 02(p)} if  1(p) = R1.
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regime change. Note that party 1’s problem is essentially the same as that of the single
decision-maker for the range of beliefs where the median voter chooses party 1. Since it
cannot aﬀect the action choice when it is passive, there is no maximization problem in the
formula of W1(p), and W1(p) depends on the opponents’ strategy. The first term of W1(p)
disappears when the median voter chooses party 2.
For the median voter, let Zm(p, i) be the value function of the median voter when there
is no election and when party i is active, and Vm(p) be the value function at the time of
election. Then the HJB equations are given by
ZM (p, i) =
⇠
r
(VM (p)  ZM (p, i))
+1{ i(p)=S} · s
+1{ i(p)=R1} · {pg +
p 
r
 
ZM (1, i)  ZM (p, i)  (1  p)Z0M (p, i)}
 
+1{ i(p)=R2} · {(1  p)g +
(1  p) 
r
 
ZM (0, i)  ZM (p, i) + pZ0M (p, i)}
 
,
VM (p) = max
 M2[0,1]
ZM (p, 2) +  M [ZM (p, 1)  ZM (p, 2)].
Note that there is no maximization problem in the expression for ZM (p, i). This is
because the median voter does not take any action between elections, so only the active
party’s policy choice aﬀects the value of ZM (p, i). When the election comes, the median
voter chooses the party that gives him higher ZM (p, i).
When the uncertainty is resolved, i.e., when p = 0 or 1, there exists a dominant strategy
for each player. Since there is no uncertainty at those beliefs, both parties choose the
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myopically optimal action. Therefore, ( 1(0), 2(0)) = (S,R2), and ( 1(1), 2(1)) = (R1, S).
Moreover, the median voter chooses the party that is biased toward the productive risky
arm, so  M (0) = 0 and  M (1) = 1. Using this, the values of V1 and W1 in the certainty
case are calculated and given by
V1(1) = g, V1(0) = (1   )s
W1(1) =  g + (1   )s, W1(0) = 0.
where   = ⇠⇠+r .
17 Equilibrium
In this section, I fully characterize the Markov perfect equilibria in ⌃⇤. There are three
classes of MPEs for which the equilibrium outcome is qualitatively diﬀerent. I show that
each class of MPE appears in a diﬀerent range of parameters.
17.1 Low stake
The following theorem (whose proof is in the appendix) states that in the case of a small
stake (low value of g/s), the there exists a unique MPE which generates an eﬃcient outcome
from the voter’s perspective. Recall that p0 is an optimal cutoﬀ of the single decision-maker
problem.
Proposition 13. If gs < ↵0 ⌘ 1+2µ1+µ , then a strategy profile in ⌃⇤ is an MPE if and only if
  11 (R1) = (p0, 1] and  
 1
2 (R2) = [0, 1  p0).
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From (13) it is easy to see that p0 > 12 if and only if
g
s < ↵0. Therefore, in the above
equilibrium, once the belief falls in the range [1  p0, p0], both parties choose the safe policy
and the reform policy is never explored.
In this equilibrium, each party’s equilibrium strategy is the same as the that of the
single decision-maker’s problem in Section 16.1. This is because given the median voter’s
strategy, there is essentially no strategic interaction between the two parties. Note that the
incumbent is in the “safe region” if its preferred reform policy has a more optimistic belief,
because the voter would reelect the incumbent if there was an election at that instant. Then
the incumbent in its safe region chooses the policy as if it is a single decision-maker. Here,
each party stops experimentation in the safe region; hence, its optimal strategy does not
depend on the opponent party’s strategy. The similar intuition explains the fact that the
upper bound ↵0 on the size of the stake does not depend on the election frequency (⇠).
Figure 12 describes party 1’s payoﬀ functions V1(p) (dark red line) and W1(p) (bright
blue line) in the equilibrium in the low-stake case. Note that W1(p) is less than or equal to
V1(p) for any belief point, and the diﬀerence between the two functions captures the cost of
losing control. Both V1(p) and W1(p) are equal to s in the middle range of the belief space,
since both parties choose the safe policy.
In the low-stake case, the unique equilibrium outcome is optimal for the median voter,
and there is no ineﬃciency from the political agency problem.
17.2 High stake case: Infrequent elections
Now consider the high-stake case where gs   ↵0. In this case, the optimal cutoﬀ p0 of
the single decision-maker problem becomes strictly less than 1/2. So playing p0 induces a
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Figure 12
Party 1’s payoff function in the MPE of the low-stake case
(parameter values: g/s = 1.2, r = 0.05,  = 0.1, ⇠ = 0.05)
nontrivial strategic interaction between the parties, so the equilibrium strategy profile would
diﬀer from that of the single decision-maker’s problem. There are two types of equilibria
in the high-stake case: one emerges in the case where the election frequency is low and
the other emerges in the frequent elections case. Both types of equilibria show ineﬃcient
outcomes (from the voter’s perspective), but the underlying forces for the ineﬃciency is
diﬀerent in each type of equilibrium.
Proposition 14. There exists ↵3( ) such that if gs > ↵3, there exists a unique p
⇤ < 12 such
that a strategy profile in ⌃⇤ is an MPE if and only if   11 (R1) = (p⇤, 1] and  
 1
2 (R2) =
[0, 1  p⇤). Moreover, ↵3( ) is increasing in  .
In this equilibrium, each party chooses the reform policy even when the belief is unfa-
vorable to its preferred reform policy. Hence failure to find a breakthrough eventually leads
87
0 p⇤ 1  p⇤1/2 1
(S,R2) (R1, R2) (R1, S)
Figure 13
An equilibrium outcome path in the infrequent election case
to political turnover. Since the voter always elects the party that would conduct one of the
reform policies, (with probability one) there is a breakthrough in the reform policy in finite
time; hence, the uncertainty is resolved.
Figure 13 describes an equilibrium outcome path of the infrequent election case in terms
of belief dynamics. The dark red line (bright blue line) represents the belief dynamic when
party 1 (party 2) is a ruling party, and a circle represents an election. In this case, the prior
belief p0 is less than a half, so initially the median voter elects party 2, which chooses its
preferred reform policy (R2). Once the belief goes above a half, the voter chooses party 1
at the election. There will be successive political turnovers until one of the parties receives
a breakthrough from its preferred reform policy.
Figure 14 describes party 1’s payoﬀ functions (upper panel) and the median voter’s payoﬀ
function (lower panel) in the equilibrium in Theorem 14. In the lower panel, the green line
represents the median voter’s expected payoﬀ function VM (p). The dashed yellow line is
the median voter’s payoﬀ under no political agency problem, that is, the payoﬀ when he
could choose the policy by himself. It turns out that for any p 2 (0, 1), the voter’s expected
payoﬀ is strictly less than the payoﬀ with no agency problem. In the equilibrium of the
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(a) party 1’s payoff function
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(b) median voter’s payoff function
Figure 14
Equilibrium behavior of the MPE in the infrequent election case
(parameter values: g/s = 2.2, r = 0.05,  = 0.1, ⇠ = 0.02)
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Figure 15
An equilibrium outcome path in the frequent election case
infrequent election case, the ineﬃciency comes from the suboptimal choice of a risky policy
by the ruling party.
17.3 High stake case: Frequent elections
If the election is frequent, there exists another type of ineﬃciency. In the equilibrium of the
frequent election case, the incumbent stops experimentation too early because the imminent
election increases the incumbent’s potential loss of power if it undertakes risky reform. The
degree of ineﬃciency is large enough that too frequent elections are worse for the median
voter than a dictatorship.
In the frequent election case, there exist three types of equilibria that appear in the
diﬀerent range of parameters. However, all types of equilibria share the common feature that
the expected length of experimentation is shorter than the eﬃcient level, and uncertainty is
not resolved with positive probability.
Proposition 15. There exists ↵1( ) such that for gs 2 [↵0,↵1], a strategy profile in ⌃⇤ is
an MPE if and only if   11 (R1) = (
1
2 , 1] and  
 1
2 (R2) = [0,
1
2). Furthermore, ↵1( ) is
increasing in  .
Figure 15 describes a possible belief path in the equilibrium of Theorem 15. In this equi-
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librium, each incumbent initially chooses its preferred reform policy. But if a breakthrough
has not been discovered until the belief reaches 1/2, then the incumbent stops experimen-
tation and switches to the safe policy. Since the opponent party would also choose the safe
policy at p = 1/2, replacing the incumbent does not help in terms of more reform policy.
This implies that for any p 2 (0, 1), the uncertainty is not resolved with positive probability.
Figure 16 describes party 1’s payoﬀ function (upper panel) and the median voter’s payoﬀ
function (lower panel) in the equilibrium in Theorem 15. Note that in the upper panel, V1(p)
and W1(p) have the same value at p = 1/2 as both parties play a safe policy at that point.
In the lower panel, the median voter’s expected payoﬀ function VM (p) (green line) hits the
value s at the belief 1/2 as there is no experimentation at that point. Similar to Figure
14, the degree of ineﬃciency is captured as the distance between the dashed yellow line
and the green line. In the equilibrium of the frequent election case, the ineﬃciency comes
from underinvestment in the reform policy. Note that all parameter values used for Figures
14 and 16 are the same except the election frequency, and that the voter’s expected payoﬀ
function is lower in the frequent election case (Figure 16). In the next subsection, I will
discuss more about the relationship with the election frequency and the voter’s welfare.
There are other types of equilibria in the frequent election case depending on the pa-
rameter values. But all share the same feature that the experimentation stops at p = 1/2.
Proposition 16. There exists ↵2( ) such that for gs 2 (↵1,↵2], and there exists a unique
pair pa, pb(pa < pb  12) such that a strategy profile in ⌃⇤ is anMPE if and only if   11 (R1) =
(pa, pb][ (12 , 1] ,   12 (R2) = [0, 12)[ [1  pb, 1  pa). Moreover, ↵2( ) < ↵0(1+ ) and ↵2( )
is increasing in  .
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Figure 16
Equilibrium behavior of the MPE in the frequent election case
(parameter values: g/s = 2.2, r = 0.05,  = 0.1, ⇠ = 0.2)
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In this type of equilibrium, the belief dynamic is the same as that of the equilibrium in
Theorem 3 (except that it can be diﬀerent until the first election). Moreover, the median
voter’s value function VM (p) is the same.
Finally, there exists an asymmetric equilibrium of the model:
Proposition 17. For gs 2 (↵2,↵3), there exists an asymmetric equilibrium where
k 11 (1) =(pˆ1,
1
2
) [ (1
2
, 1],
k 12 (1) =[0, p
⇤
2),
 M (p, i) =
8>>>><>>>>:
1 if p > 12 or {p = 12} \ {i = 1},
0 otherwise.
17.4 Median voter’s welfare and optimal election frequency
The equilibrium analysis in the previous subsection suggests that there is an optimal fre-
quency of elections (from the voter’s perspective) that trades oﬀ the two types of ineﬃcien-
cies.
Proposition 18. Suppose g/s > ↵0. Then for any p 2 (0, 1),
1. if the parameter values are in the ’infrequent elections’ range, VM (p; ⇠) is increasing
in the election frequency (⇠);
2. VM (p) in the MPE of the frequent election case is smaller than the one in the MPE of
the infrequent election case;
3. VM (p) in the MPE of the frequent election case is smaller than the one in the dicta-
torship case (⇠ = 0).
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If the parameter values are in the infrequent elections range, the degree of ineﬃciency
decreases as election frequency increases. However, too frequent elections would result in the
worst outcome from the perspective of the median voter, as the parties stop experimentation
in the equilibrium of the frequent election case. In fact, the median voter’s expected payoﬀ
in the frequent election case is lower than the one where there is no election, as the length
of experimentation is shorter.
18 Discussions
18.1 Incumbency advantage
For the frequent election case, I conjecture that that eﬃciency can be restored by giving an
advantage to the incumbent in the election.
Conjecture 1. Suppose gs 2 [↵0,↵1]. Then there exists ✏1, ✏2 > 0 such that the following
strategy profile is an MPE:
1. On the equilibrium path, party i plays cutoﬀ strategy with cutoﬀ 12 + ✏1 · ( 1)i, and
the median voter plays
 M (p, i) =
8>>>><>>>>:
1 if i = 1, p   12   ✏1or i = 2, p > 12 + ✏1
0 otherwise.
2. If the median voter deviates, then the agents play a Markovian profile with   11 (R1) =
(12 , 1] and  
 1
2 (R2) = [0,
1
2).
3. If the party i deviates, then the agents play agents play a Markovian profile with
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  11 (R1) = (
1
2 + ✏2 · ( 1)i 1, 1],   12 (R2) = [0, 12 + ✏2 · ( 1)i 1), and   1M (1) = (12 + ✏2 ·
( 1)i 1, 1].
The above equilibrium is non-Markovian where the voter chooses the incumbent at the
neighbor of p = 1/2. By giving advantage to the incumbent, the voter can induce each party
to experiment and induce endogenous political turnover. I conjecture that the above profile
is still an equilibrium even if the election frequency is arbitrarily high, so the median voter
can approximately achieve first-best.
In the incumbency advantage equilibrium, the voter is more generous to the incumbent in
the sense that he may reelect the incumbent even when its preferred risky alternative is less
promising than the opposite one. Knowing that, the incumbent experiments aggressively
with its preferred risky policy even under frequent elections. Therefore, the incumbency
advantage strategy can introduce frequent switches of power without causing the cessation
of the experimentation with the risky alternatives, which is optimal from the voter’s per-
spective. This result provides a normative argument for the incumbency advantage and
contributes to previous positive arguments about the incumbency advantage.30
18.2 Time in power and electability
The equilibrium outcome in the infrequent election case in Figure 13 suggests that there
is a correlation between the time in power and the electability of the incumbent. More
formally, let T0 be the length of time in which the current ruling party has been in power,
and let T k be the length of time in which the kth previous ruling party had been in power.
Furthermore, let ⇡˜ be the probability that the current ruling party will be reelected. Then
30For the positive argument of incumbency advantage, see Samuelson (1987) and Ashworth and
de Mesquita (2008).
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I conjecture that under the equilibrium in the infrequent election case, if there has been no
breakthrough, ⇡˜ is decreasing (increasing) in T k for k even (odd).
19 Conclusion
In this paper, I study a continuous-time game between two political parties with heteroge-
neous preferences and a median voter. At each election, the voter chooses a party to which
he gives power until the next election. Then the incumbent chooses a policy from among
a safe alternative with known payoﬀs or two risky ones with initially unknown expected
payoﬀs. I show that while infrequent elections are surely bad for the median voter, too
frequent elections can also make him strictly worse oﬀ. When the election frequency is low,
a standard agency problem arises and the incumbent party experiments with its preferred
reform policy even if its outlook is not promising. On the other hand, when the election
frequency is too high, in equilibrium the incumbent stops experimentation too early because
the imminent election increases the incumbent’s potential loss of power if it undertakes risky
reform. The degree of ineﬃciency is large enough that too frequent elections are worse for
the median voter than a dictatorship. There is an optimal frequency of elections (from the
voter’s perspective) that trades oﬀ the two types of ineﬃciencies.
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Chapter IV
Appendix to Chapter 1
A Preliminaries
In this section I provide basic results which help to prove the results of the paper. First,
I state diﬀerential equations which describe the dynamics of the buyers’ beliefs and the
reservation prices of the seller. Then I provide a detailed construction method for the
equilibria described in Section 3. Proofs for the propositions of the paper are given in
Section B.
A.1 Belief Dynamics
Let mz(t)(z = g, u, b) be the probability that the seller is type z and he is still available
at time t. Then the buyers’ beliefs about the seller’s type  z(t) can be written as  z(t) =
mz(t)
mg(t)+mu(t)+mb(t)
. Similarly, the beliefs about the quality q(t) and the confidence  (t) can
be written as functions of mz(t), which are given by
q(t) =
mg(t) +mu(t)q0
mg(t) +mu(t) +mb(t)
,
 (t) =
mu(t)
mu(t) +mb(t)
.
Later it is shown that the evolution of mz(t) is given by a simple form of diﬀerential equa-
tions, which makes the equilibrium analysis easier.
By Lemma 2 the equilibrium oﬀer of the buyer at time t is either Rz(t)(z = g, u, b) or a
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losing oﬀer. Suppose the buyer at time t oﬀers Rz(t) with probability  Bz(t), and submits
a losing oﬀer with probability  B (t) = 1   ( Bg(t) +  Bu(t) +  Bb(t)). Then each mz(t)
satisfies
mg(t+ dt) = (mg(t) + ⇢qomu(t)dt)(1    Bg(t)dt),
mu(t+ dt) = mu(t)(1  ⇢dt)(1   ( Bg(t) +  Bu(t))dt),
mb(t+ dt) = (mb(t) + ⇢(1  qo)mu(t)dt)(1   ( Bg(t) +  Bu(t) +  Bb(t))dt).
Letting dt! 0 and arranging yield
m0g(t) = ⇢q0mu(t)    Bg(t)mg(t), (15)
m0u(t) =  (⇢+  ( Bg(t) +  Bu(t)))mu(t), (16)
m0b(t) = (1  q0)⇢mu(t)   ( Bg(t) +  Bu(t) +  Bb(t))mb(t). (17)
Solving (15)-(17), combined with boundary conditions mu(0) = 1 and mg(0) = mb(0) = 0,
gives the value of mz(t) at each t. Moreover, the evolution of the confidence  (t) is given by
 0(t) =
mb(t)m0u(t) mu(t)m0b(t)
(mu(t) +mb(t))2
=  (t) · [ ⇢(1  q0 (t)) +   Bb(t)(1   (t))] . (18)
A.2 Price Dynamics
Suppose the buyer oﬀers Rz(t) with probability  z, and oﬀers pl with complementary prob-
ability. Then Ru(t) and Rb(t) satisfy the following recursions:
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Ru(t) = rdt↵v(q0) + (1  rdt)[⇢dt(q0↵vH + (1  q0)Rb(t+ dt))+
(1  ⇢dt)(  Bg(t)dt↵vH + (1    Bg(t)dt)Ru(t+ dt)],
Rb(t) = rdt↵v(q0) + (1  rdt)[  Bg(t)dt↵vH +   Bu(t)dtRu(t+ dt)+
(1   ( Bg(t) +  Bu(t))dt)Rb(t+ dt)].
Letting dt! 0 and rearranging yield
R0u(t) = r(Ru(t)  ↵v(q0))  ⇢BI(t)    Bg(t)(↵vH  Ru(t)), (19)
R0b(t) = r(Rb(t)  ↵vL)    Bg(t)(↵vH  Rb(t))    Bu(t)(Ru(t) Rb(t)), (20)
where BI(t) = q0↵vH + (1   q0)Rb(t)   Ru(t) is the seller’s value of information. Solving
(19) and (20) jointly with the boundary conditions yields the reservation price functions of
each type.
Recall that B(t) = Ru(t) Rb(t)v(q0) Rb(t) is the function used to determine the optimality of the
buyer between targeting the uninformed and the bad type (equation 3). Then the evolution
of B(t) is given by
B0(t) =
v(q0)(R0u(t) R0b(t)) Rb(t)R0u(t) +Ru(t)R0b(t)
(v(q0) Rb(t))2 ,
= B(t) · [⇢F⇢(t) + rFr(t) +   Bu(t)(1 B(t))] , (21)
where F⇢(t) = Ru(t) q0↵vH (1 q0)Rb(t)Ru(t) Rb(t)  0 and Fr(t) =
B(t)(v(q0) ↵vL) ↵q0(vH vL)
Ru(t) Rb(t) .
99
A.3 Equilibrium Construction
In this subsection, I provide a complete description of the equilibrium profile in Section 3.
In the Section B I prove the existence of the equilibrium as well as characterization result.
A.3.1 Slow-learning Case
The equilibrium behavior in the second phase is analyzed in the main text (Subsection 3.1).
Belief dynamics in the first phase is as follows. Since the buyers target the uninformed
with probability one for any time between zero and t, each mz(t) is given by
mg(t) =
⇢
 + ⇢
q0(1  e ( +⇢)t)
mu(t) = e
 ( +⇢)t
mb(t) = (1  q0)e  t(1  e ⇢t),
therefore q(tˆ) and  (tˆ) are
q(t) =
⇢
 +⇢q0 +
 
 +⇢q0e
 ( +⇢)t
⇢
 +⇢q0 +
 
 +⇢q0e
 ( +⇢)t + (1  q0)e  t
, (22)
 (t) =
e ⇢t
q0e ⇢t + (1  q0) . (23)
It remains to analyze the price dynamics in the first phase. This can be done by solving
(1) and (2) jointly, which yields
0BB@ Ru(t)
Rb(t)
1CCA = C1
0BB@ D1
2 
1CCA e 1t + C2
0BB@ D2
2 
1CCA e 2t +
0BB@ Z1
Z2
1CCA , (24)
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where C1, C2 are integration constants,X = ( +⇢)2 4 ⇢q0,  1 = 2r+ +⇢+
p
X
2 ,  2 =  1 
p
X,
and
0BB@ Z1
Z2
1CCA = 1r(r +  + ⇢) + ⇢ q0
0BB@ r(r +  + ⇢)↵v(q0) + ⇢ q0↵vH
r(r +  + ⇢)↵v(q0) + ⇢ q0↵vH   r(r + ⇢)q0↵(vH   vL)
1CCA .
Note that  1 >  2 > 0, and D1 =    ⇢ 
p
X < 0, D2 =    ⇢+
p
X > 0.
The equilibrium is constructed by the following steps:
1. From the condition q(t⇤) = q⇤, the threshold time t⇤ is uniquely determined from (22),
which is
⇢
⇢+  
e t
⇤
+
 
⇢+  
e ⇢t
⇤
= C, (25)
where C = q
⇤
1 q⇤ · 1 q0q0 > 1.
2. Calculate  (t⇤) from equation (23) and calculate R⇤u =  (t⇤)v(q0) + (1   (t⇤))vL.
3. Determine unique value of  ˆ from equations (4) and (5),
 ˆ =
r
 
· R
⇤
b   ↵vL
↵vH   vL .
4. Determine Ru(t) and Rb(t) in the first phase, by putting boundary conditions
Ru(t
⇤) = R⇤u, Rb(t
⇤) = R⇤b ,
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into (24) to get integration constants, which are given by
4 
p
X
0BB@ e 1t
⇤
C1
e 2t
⇤
C2
1CCA =
0BB@  2 
2 
1CCA (R⇤u   Z1) +
0BB@ D2
 D1
1CCA (R⇤b   Z2).
A.3.2 Fast-Learning Case
Belief evolution in the first phase is same as the slow-learning case, which is summarized by
equations (22) and (23). In the second phase, each mz(t) satisfies
m0g(t) = ⇢q0mu(t),
m0u(t) =  ⇢mu(t),
m0b(t) =   mb(t) + ⇢(1  q0)mu(t).
Solving with the boundary condition at t⇤1, we have
mg(t) = q0

⇢
 + ⇢
+
 
 + ⇢
e ( +⇢)t
⇤
1   e ( t⇤1+⇢t)
 
,
mu(t) = e
 ( t⇤1+⇢t),
mb(t) = (1  q0)

(1   
   ⇢e
 ⇢t⇤1)e  t +
⇢
   ⇢e
 ( t⇤1+⇢t)
 
,
hence
q(t) =
q0
⇣
⇢
 +⇢ +
 
 +⇢e
 ( +⇢)t⇤1
⌘
q0
⇣
⇢
 +⇢ +
 
 +⇢e
 ( +⇢)t⇤1
⌘
+ (1  q0)
⇣
e  t +    ⇢(e
 ( t⇤1+⇢t)   e ( t+⇢t⇤1))
⌘ , (26)
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and
 (t) =
e ( t⇤1+⇢t)
e ( t⇤1+⇢t) + (1  q0)
⇣
(1     ⇢e ⇢t
⇤
1)e  t + ⇢  ⇢e
 ( t⇤1+⇢t)
⌘ . (27)
Price dynamics are as follows. In the third (and final) phase, the reservation price is
determined by (4) and (5), same as the slow-learning case. In the second phase, reservation
prices satisfy
R0u(t) = r(Ru(t)  ↵v(q0)) + ⇢(Ru(t)  q0↵vH   (1  q0)Rb(t)),
R0b(t) = r(Rb(t)  ↵vL).
Solving with the boundary conditions Ru(t⇤2) = R⇤u, Rb(t⇤2) = R⇤b yields
Rb(t) = ↵vL + (R
⇤
b   ↵vL)er(t t
⇤
2), (28)
Ru(t) = q0↵vH + (1  q0)Rb(t). (29)
Note that the reservation value of the uninformed is the expectation of those of the good
type and the bad type, as the buyer’s equilibrium oﬀer Rb(t) gives the seller zero value
of information. Last, in the first phase, the reservation values satisfy the same diﬀerential
equations in the slow-learning case, hence their functional forms are given by (24), but the
boundary conditions are diﬀerent (Rb(t⇤1) and Ru(t⇤1) from the above equations (28) and
(29)).
Then the equilibrium is constructed by the following steps:
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1. The condition q(t⇤2) = q⇤, yields
⇢
 +⇢ +
 
 +⇢e
 ( +⇢)t⇤1
e  t⇤2 +    ⇢e
 ( +⇢)t⇤1(e ⇢(t⇤2 t⇤1)   e  (t⇤2 t⇤1)) = C, (30)
where C = q
⇤
1 q⇤ · 1 q0q0 > 1.
2. From the equations (23), (28) and (29), the buyer’s indiﬀerence condition at t⇤1,  (t⇤1) =
B(t⇤1), is given by
e r(t
⇤
2 t⇤1) =
(1  ↵)
n
q0
1 q0 vH + vL
o
+ ↵(vH   vL)q0(1  e⇢t⇤1)
(1  ↵)vL(1 + q0(1  e⇢t⇤1)) . (31)
Equations (30) and (31) jointly give the unique values of t⇤1 and t⇤2.
3. From the optimality condition R⇤b = vL, R
⇤
u and  ˆ are given by
R⇤u = q0↵vH + (1  q0)vL.
 ˆ =
r
 
· (1  ↵)vL
↵vH   vL .
4. Determine Ru(t) and Rb(t) in the second phase, from (28)-(29) and the boundary
conditions at t⇤2. They are given by
Rb(t) = ↵vL + (1  ↵)vLer(t t⇤2), (32)
Ru(t) = q0↵vH + (1  q0)Rb(t). (33)
5. Determine Ru(t) and Rb(t) in the first phase, from (24) and the boundary conditions
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at t⇤1.
A.4 Calculation of the Trade Surplus
Recall that f✓(t) is the probability distribution of trade of the quality-✓ good over time. Let
F✓(t) be the cdf of f✓(t). Then
FH(t) = 1  mg(t) + q0mu(t)
q0
,
FL(t) = 1  (1  q0)mu(t) +mb(t)
1  q0 ,
hence
fH(t) =  
m0g(t) + q0m0u(t)
q0
,
fL(t) =  (1  q0)m
0
u(t) +m
0
b(t)
1  q0 .
Recall that S✓ is the trade surplus when the quality of the good is ✓. Since S✓ = (1  
↵)v✓
´1
0 e
 rtf✓(t)dt, the following can be shown using the results in the previous subsection:
. In the equilibrium under the slow-learning case,
SH
(1  ↵)vH =
 
r + ⇢+  
(1  e (r+⇢+ )t⇤) +   
r +   
e rt
⇤
 
⇢+  e (⇢+ )t⇤
⇢+  
!
,
SL
(1  ↵)vL =
 
r +  
(1  e (r+ )t⇤) +   
r +   
e (r+ )t
⇤
.
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. In the equilibrium under the fast-learning case,
SH
(1  ↵)vH =
 
r + ⇢+  
(1  e (r+⇢+ )t⇤1) +   
r +   
e rt
⇤
2
 
⇢+  e (⇢+ )t⇤1
⇢+  
!
,
SL
(1  ↵)vL =
 
r +  
(1  e (r+ )t⇤1)
+  
✓
1   
   ⇢e
 ⇢t⇤1
◆
1
r +  
⇣
e (r+ )t
⇤
1   e (r+ )t⇤2
⌘
+  
⇢
   ⇢e
  t⇤1 1
r + ⇢
⇣
e (r+⇢)t
⇤
1   e (r+⇢)t⇤2
⌘
+
  
r +   
e rt
⇤
2

e  t
⇤
2 +
 
   ⇢
⇣
e ( t
⇤
1+⇢t
⇤
2)   e ( t⇤2+⇢t⇤1)
⌘ 
.
B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Propositions 1-4
Here I prove the optimality of the two-phase and three-phase equilibria, and provide the
characterization result for both slow- and fast-learning case. I start with the characterization
of the final phase, which is common for both cases. Then I analyze characterization for the
cases with slow and fast learning, respectively.
B.1.1 Equilibrium Behavior in the Final Phase
Recall that  (t) =  u(t) u(t)+ b(t) is the buyers’ confidence at time t. The following lemma
summarizes the results derived in this subsection:
Lemma 5. In equilibrium, there exists t⇤ < 1 and   : {t : t   t⇤} ! [0, 1] such that the
equilibrium behavior after t⇤ is the following:
. the buyer at time t submits the trade-ending oﬀer ↵vH with probability  (t) and submits
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a losing oﬀer p`  Rb(t) with probability 1   (t).
. the seller’s reservation value:
Rb(t) = ↵vL + ↵(vH   vL)
ˆ 1
t
e r(t˜ t)d(1  e 
´ t˜
t   (s)ds),
Ru(t) = q0↵vH + (1  q0)Rb(t);
. the belief q(t) = q⇤ for t   t⇤;
. the buyer’s oﬀer  (t) must satisfy
Rb(t)   vL, (34)
Ru(t)    (t)v(q0) + (1   (t))vL, (35)
for any t   t⇤; at least one of the above conditions binds at t = t⇤.
Fix an equilibrium. Let t⇤ = inf{t : q(t)   q⇤} be the time when the buyer’s uncondi-
tional belief reaches q⇤ for the first time.
Step 1 t⇤ is finite.
Proof. Suppose not, i.e., q(t) < q⇤ for any t. Then the buyers never oﬀer ↵vH as it yields a
negative payoﬀ. Then the similar argument as Lemma 3 shows that the buyers never oﬀer
more than ↵v(q0), and hence Ru(t) = ↵v(q0) for all t.
There must exist finite t¯ such that for all t > t¯, oﬀering Ru(t) gives negative payoﬀ (if
not, there must be a lots of agreement with type-B seller, hence q(t) > q⇤ for t large). Then
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after t¯, trade is occurred only with type-B seller, so Rb(t) = ↵vL for any t > t¯. Since this is
profitable for the buyer, the trade will occur and eventually q(t) > q⇤, contradiction.
Step 2 For any t   t⇤, trade occurs only at R⇤g = ↵vH . Therefore, q(t) = q⇤ for any
t   t⇤.
Proof. Suppose not, then there exists t1 and t2 such that t⇤  t1 < t2 < 1 and the trade
happens at p 6= ↵vH only if t 2 [t1, t2].31
Then for any t > t1, the buyers’ belief q(t) is greater than q⇤, so oﬀering ↵vH yields
positive payoﬀ. Hence the buyer after t1 never submits a losing oﬀer. That implies the
buyer after t2 oﬀers ↵vH for sure. Then Ru(t) and Rb(t) as t approaches to t2 are given by
lim
t!t2
Ru(t)! r
 + r
↵v(q0) +
 
 + r
↵vH ,
lim
t!t2
Rb(t)! r + r↵vL +
 
 + r
↵vH .
However, submitting either oﬀer is suboptimal for the buyer, since under Assumption 1,
vL  
✓
r
 + r
↵vL +
 
 + r
↵vH
◆
< 0,
 u(t)

v(q0) 
✓
r
 + r
↵v(q0) +
 
 + r
↵vH
◆ 
+  b(t)

vL  
✓
r
 + r
↵v(q0) +
 
 + r
↵vH
◆ 
< 0.
So if t is arbitrarily close to t2, trade must happen only at ↵vH , which contradicts to the
definition of t2.
31It must be the case that there exists finite t2: suppose not. Then q(t) converges to one as t goes to
infinity, since no buyer submits a losing oﬀer after t1. Furthermore, since the speed of learning ⇢ > 0 is
positive, the probability of the good type  g(t) converges to one as t!1. However, if  g(t) is suﬃciently
close to one, expected payoﬀ from targeting the uninformed or the bad type is arbitrarily small because
there exist lower bounds for Ru(t) and Rb(t). Therefore, there exists tˆ <1 such that it is strictly optimal
to oﬀer Rg(t) = ↵vH for t > tˆ, contradiction.
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Step 3 Ru(t) and Rb(t) satisfy (34) and (35) for any t   t⇤; at least one of the conditions
binds at t = t⇤.
Proof. By step 2, the buyers arrive at t   t⇤ receives zero payoﬀ. If either (34) or (35) is
violated, then the buyer has a profitable deviation to target the low type or the uninformed,
respectively.
Suppose that both (34) and (35) are strict at t = t⇤. Then since Rz(t) and  z(t) are
continuous in t, there exists ✏ > 0 such that oﬀering Rb(t) or Ru(t) yields negative payoﬀ to
the buyer for all t 2 (t⇤   ✏, t⇤). But it contradicts to the definition of t⇤.
B.1.2 Equilibrium Before the Final Phase: Preliminary Observations
By the definition of t⇤, oﬀering p = ↵vH at any t < t⇤ yields negative payoﬀ to the buyer,
hence it is suboptimal. So the buyer either oﬀers Ru(t) to target the uninformed or oﬀers
Rb(t) to target the bad type. Recall that the buyer receives more payoﬀ by oﬀering Ru(t)
than Rb(t) if and only if
 (t) > B(t),
where B(t) = Ru(t) Rb(t)v(q0) Rb(t) .
The result in Step 3 implies that there are three cases at t = t⇤:
1. (35) is binding, but (34) is not: if this is the case, then Ru(t⇤) =  (t⇤)v(q0) + (1  
 (t⇤))vL and Rb(t⇤) > vL. Moreover, Ru(t⇤) = q0↵vH + (1  q0)Rb(t⇤) since the value
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of information is zero in the final phase. Hence
 (t⇤) =
Ru(t⇤)  vL
v(q0)  vL
=
q0↵vH + (1  q0)Rb(t⇤)  vL
v(q0)  vL > q
⇤.
Similar calculation shows that B(t⇤) > q⇤. On the other hand, B(t⇤) <  (t⇤) since
targeting the bad type is worse than targeting the uninformed. As a result,  (t⇤) >
B(t⇤) > q⇤.
2. both (34) and (35) are binding: then Ru(t⇤) =  (t⇤)v(q0)+(1  (t⇤))vL and Rb(t⇤) =
vL. Similar calculation shows that  (t⇤) = B(t⇤) = q⇤.
3. (34) is binding, but (35) is not: in this case, we have  (t⇤) < B(t⇤) = q⇤.
B.1.3 Slow-learning Case: Proof of Propositions 1 and 2
Lemma 6. Fix an equilibrium. Suppose at time t⇤, (35) is binding, but (34) is not. Then
the buyers at any t < t⇤ oﬀer Ru(t) for sure.
Proof. First I show that the buyers at any t < t⇤ do not target the bad type, that is
 Bb(t) = 0 for any t < t⇤. Suppose to the contrary that  Bb(t) > 0 for some t < t⇤. Let
t† = sup{t < t⇤ :  Bb(t) > 0}. Then t† < t⇤ because (34) does not bind at t⇤. Since
Rb(t†)  vL and Ru(t)  q0↵vH + (1  q0)Rb(t) for all t,
B(t†) =
Ru(t) Rb(t)
v(q0) Rb(t) 
q0(↵vH  Rb(t))
v(q0) Rb(t)  q
⇤,
so it must be the case that  (t†)  q⇤. On the other hand,  (t⇤) > q⇤ since (35) binds at t⇤
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while (34) does not bind. Moreover, since  Bb(t) = 0 for t 2 (t†, t⇤], (18) implies that  (t)
is decreasing for t 2 (t†, t⇤], leading to a contradiction.
Now it remains to show that any buyer at t < t⇤ has no incentive to submit a losing oﬀer.
Define p˜(t) =  (t)v(q0)+ (1   (t))vL be a expected value of traded good to the buyer then
he targets the uninformed seller . Then submitting a losing oﬀer is no worse than targeting
the uninformed at time t if and only if Ru(t)   p˜(t). I claim that Ru(t) < p˜(t) for any
t < t⇤. From the previous argument,
Ru(t
⇤) = p˜(t⇤)   q0↵vH + (1  q0)vL = q⇤v(q0) + (1  q⇤)vL.
Since  0(t) =  ⇢ (t)(1  q0 (t)) and  (t⇤)   q⇤ from the above equation,
p˜0(t) =  ⇢ (t)(1  q0 (t)) · q0(vH   vL)
  ⇢q0(vH   vL)min{1  q0, q⇤(1  q0q⇤)},
and p˜(t) > q⇤v(q0)+(1 q⇤)vL. On the other hand, since R0u(t) =  ⇢(q0↵vH+(1 q0)Rb(t) 
Ru(t)), So either Ru(t)  q⇤v(q0) + (1  q⇤)vL or
R0u(t)    ⇢q0(↵vH  Ru(t))
>  ⇢q0(1  q0)(↵vH   vL) =  ⇢q0(vH   vL)q⇤(1  q0).
Therefore, whenever Ru(t)   q⇤v(q0) + (1  q⇤)vL it must be that R0u(t) > p˜0(t), leading to
the desired result.
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Let z(t) = e ⇢t and z⇤ = z(t⇤). Let  =  ⇢ =
1
⌘ be the inverse of the seller’s eﬀective
learning speed. Consider a strategy profile in which the buyers target the uninformed for
any t < t⇤. Then the condition (25) can be rewritten as
z⇤+ (z⇤)  = C(1 + ), (36)
where C = q
⇤
1 q⇤
1 q0
q0
> 1. By the implicit function theorem, @z⇤@ > 0.
32 Moreover, it can be
shown that lim!0 z⇤ = 0 and lim!1 z⇤ = 1.
On the other hand, equation (23) can be rewritten as
 (t) =
z(t)
q0z(t) + (1  q0) , (37)
so  (t⇤) = z⇤q0z⇤+(1 q0) ⌘  ⇤. Since  ⇤ is increasing in z⇤, there exists ¯ such that    ¯ if
and only if  (t⇤)   q⇤.
Lemma 7. (1)    ¯ if and only if there exists an equilibrium of the game where the buyers
at t < t⇤ target the uninformed for sure, and hence t⇤ is uniquely determined by equation
(36).
(2) There exists r¯ > 0 such that if    ¯ and r < r¯, then in any equilibrium of the game,
32Let F (z⇤,) = z⇤+ (z⇤)    C(1 + ). Then
@z⇤
@
=  
@F
@
@F
@z⇤
=
z⇤ + (z⇤)  log 1z⇤   C
((z⇤)  1   1)
=
z ⇤ + (z⇤)  log(z⇤)    C
2((z⇤)  1   1)
=
 (z⇤) (1  log(z⇤) ) + C
2((z⇤)  1   1)
Since x(1  log x) < 1 if x 2 (0, 1), @z⇤@ > 0.
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buyers at t < t⇤ target the uninformed for sure, and hence t⇤ is determined by equation (36).
Proof. (1) Consider a strategy profile in which the buyers at any t < t⇤ target the uninformed
seller. Then (35) must binds at t⇤, that is,
Ru(t
⇤) =  (t⇤)v(q0) + (1   (t⇤))vL.
On the other hand, by Lemma 5, Ru(t⇤) = q0↵vH+(1 q0)Rb(t⇤). Then a simple calculation
shows that Rb(t⇤)   vL if and only if  (t⇤)   q⇤. Therefore, the incentive constraint for the
bad type (34) is satisfied if and only if    ¯.
(2) Suppose to the contrary that there exists an equilibrium where  Bu(t) < 1 for some
t < t⇤. Then Step 3 in Subsection B.1.1 and Lemma 6 imply that (34) must bind at t = t⇤,
and hence B(t⇤) = q⇤. Moreover, proof of Lemma 6 implies that  Bb(t) > 0 for t < t⇤. Let
tˆ = inf{t < t⇤ :  Bb(t) > 0}. Then since Rb(tˆ)  vL and Ru(t)  q0↵vH + (1  q0)Rb(t) for
all t,
B(tˆ) =
Ru(tˆ) Rb(tˆ)
v(q0) Rb(tˆ)
 q0(↵vH  Rb(tˆ))
v(q0) Rb(tˆ)
 q⇤,
and hence  (tˆ)  B(tˆ)  q⇤. Furthermore,  (tˆ) = B(tˆ) by the following argument: Suppose
to the contrary that  (tˆ) < B(tˆ). Then there exists ✏ > 0 such that  B (t) = 1 for any
t 2 [tˆ  ✏, tˆ). However, then from (20) Rb(t) is strictly increasing t 2 [tˆ  ✏, tˆ), so the buyer
at tˆ  ✏ has a profitable deviation to oﬀer Rb(t), contradiction.
Therefore, it must be that there exists a time before tˆ where the buyer submits a losing
oﬀer with positive probability, that is,  B (t) > 0 for some t < tˆ (if not, q(tˆ) > q⇤ because
   ¯, so it contradicts to the definition of t⇤). Let t˜ = sup{t  tˆ :  B (t) > 0}. Then
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the buyer at time t˜ must be indiﬀerent between submitting a losing oﬀer and targeting the
uninformed seller, that is, Ru(t˜) = p˜(t˜) =  (t)v(q0)+(1  (t))vL33. Moreover, the definition
of t˜ implies that p˜0(t)   R0u(t). From the equation (18),
p˜0(t˜) = qo(vH   vL) 0(t˜)
=  ⇢q0(vH   vL) (t˜)(1  q0 (t˜)).
On the other hand, using equation (19) and the condition Ru(t˜) = p˜(t˜), lower bound on
R0u(t˜) is given by
R0u(t˜) >  ⇢(q0↵vH + (1  q0)Rb(t˜) Ru(t˜))
>  ⇢q0(↵vH  Ru(t˜))
=  ⇢q0(↵vH   p˜(t˜))
=  ⇢q0(vH   vL)(q⇤    (t˜)q0).
Simple calculation gives that p˜0(t˜)   R0u(t˜) only if
 (t˜)   † ⌘ 1 + q0  
p
(1 + q0)2   4q⇤q0
2q0
2 (0, q⇤).
Note that  † is independent of the seller’s discount rate r. Since  (t) is decreasing for
t 2 [0, tˆ), it follows that B(tˆ) =  (tˆ)   †. However, the price dynamics described in
33Suppose the contrary that Ru(t˜) < p˜(t˜). Then at t˜ the buyer must be indiﬀerent between submitting
a losing oﬀer and targeting the bad type, that is, Rb(t˜) = vL. Moreover, it must be that  B (t) = 1 at
t 2 (t˜   ✏, t˜) for suﬃciently small ✏ > 0. But then the price dynamics described in Subsection A.2 implies
that Rb(t) < Rb(t˜) = vL for t 2 (t˜   ✏, t˜), so the buyers at t 2 (t˜   ✏, t˜) are better oﬀ by targeting the bad
type, a contradiction.
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Subsection A.2 implies that there exists r¯ > 0 such that if r < r¯, then the value of tˆ   t⇤
must be suﬃciently large to satisfy B(tˆ)   †, so that the condition q(t⇤) = q⇤ is violated,
leading to a contradiction.
B.1.4 Fast-learning Case: Proof of Propositions 3 and 4
Now consider the case in which   ¯.
Lemma 8. In equilibrium, there exists t < t⇤ such that  Bb(t) > 0.
Proof. Suppose not; that is,  Bb(t) = 0 for any t < t⇤. Then from (18),  (t) is given by
 (t) =
z(t)
q0z(t) + (1  q0) .
Then by the definition of ¯,  (t⇤) < q⇤. Since Ru(t⇤) =  (t⇤)v(q0) + (1    (t⇤))vL =
q0↵vH + (1  q0)Rb(t⇤), it must be that Rb(t⇤) < vL, which contradicts to Step 3.
Let tˆ < t⇤ be the first time in which the buyer oﬀers Rb(tˆ) with positive probability, that
is, tˆ = inf{t < t⇤ :  Bb(t) > 0}. Then the proof of Lemma 7 implies that  (tˆ) = B(tˆ)  q⇤,
and hence that tˆ > 0.
Lemma 9. There exists  > 0 such that if  < , for any fixed x > 0, if a strategy profile
with t⇤   tˆ = x is an equilibrium, then
(1) the buyers at t 2 (tˆ, t⇤) oﬀer Rb(t) with probability one and the buyers at t 2 [0, tˆ)
oﬀer Ru(t) with probability one;
(3) the value of tˆ (hence t⇤) is uniquely determined.
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Proof. (1) Let q˜ = q0 ↵vH ↵vLv(q0) ↵vL 2 (q0, q⇤). I claim that if  <
1 q˜q0
1 q˜ , the buyers at t 2 (tˆ, t⇤)
oﬀer Rb(t) with probability one. Suppose to the contrary that  Bb(t) < 1 for some t 2
(tˆ, t⇤). Let t˜ = sup{t :  Bb(t) < 1}. To derive contradiction, it is suﬃcient to show that
 0(t˜ ) < B0(t˜ ).
From (18),
 0(t˜ )   ⇢ (t˜) · ⇥(1  q0 (t˜))  (1   (t˜))⇤ .
Since the value of information at t˜ is zero (that is, Ru(t˜) = q0↵vH + (1   q0)Rb(t˜)), and
Rb(t˜)   ↵vL, hence B(t˜)   q˜. Since  < 1 q˜q01 q˜ , it is easy to verify that  0(t˜ ) < 0. On the
other hand, from (21),
B0(t˜ )   B(t˜) · ⇥⇢F⇢(t˜) + rFr(t˜)⇤ .
Since Ru(t˜) = q0↵vH + (1   q0)Rb(t˜), F⇢(t˜) = 0 and Fr(t˜)   0. Therefore, B0(t˜ )   0 >
 0(t˜ ), leading to the contradiction.
On the other hand, Since the buyers oﬀer Rb(t) with probability one for all t 2 (tˆ, t⇤),
from Subsection A.3.2 the reservation prices of the uninformed and the bad type at tˆ are
given by (since t⇤   tˆ = x)
Rb(tˆ) = ↵vL + (vL   ↵vL)e rx,
Ru(tˆ) = q0↵vH + (1  q0)Rb(tˆ).
From equations (24) with the above boundary conditions at time tˆ, it is easy to show that
there exists † > 0 such that for any  < †, Ru(t) < p˜(t) for any t < tˆ. Then defining
 = min{1 q˜q01 q˜ ,†} leads to the desired result.
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(2) Since the buyer at time tˆ is indiﬀerent between targeting the uninformed and tar-
geting the bad type, it must be that B(tˆ) =  (tˆ). The value of Ru(tˆ) and Rb(tˆ) calculated
above imply that B(tˆ) =  (tˆ) = q0 ↵vH (↵vL+(vL ↵vL)e
 rx)
v(q0) (↵vL+(vL ↵vL)e rx) . Then from the belief evolution
equation (23), the value of tˆ is uniquely determined. Note that B(tˆ) =  (tˆ) is decreasing in
the value of x, so tˆ is increasing in x.
Lemma 10. Suppose  <  where  is determined in Lemma 9. Then there exists unique
x such that the strategy profile in the previous lemma with t⇤   tˆ = x is an equilibrium.
Proof. Let q˜(t1, t ) be the value of q(t1+ t ) under the strategy profile in which the buyers
at any t 2 [0, t1) oﬀer Ru(t) for sure and the buyers at any t 2 [t1, t1 + t ) oﬀer Rb(t) for
sure. Then it is suﬃcient to show that q˜(t1, t ) is strictly increasing in t1 and t . From
equation (26),
q˜(t1, t )
1  q˜(t1, t ) =
q0
1  q0 ·
⇢
 +⇢e
( +⇢)t1 +   +⇢
e⇢t1  t  +    ⇢(e ⇢t    e  t )
=
q0
1  q0 ·
e( +⇢)t1 +  ⇢
e⇢t1 +    ⇢(e(  ⇢)t    1)
·
⇢
 +⇢
e  t 
.
Since
@
✓
e( +⇢)t1+ ⇢
e⇢t1+    ⇢ (e
(  ⇢)t  1)
◆
@t1
=
 
n
(e( +⇢)t1   1) + ( + ⇢)e( +⇢)t1 e(  ⇢)t  1  ⇢
o
n
e⇢t1 +    ⇢(e(  ⇢)t    1)
o2 > 0,
and
@
⇣n
e⇢t1 +    ⇢(e
(  ⇢)t    1)
o
e  t 
⌘
@t1
=    ⇢
   ⇢(e
 ⇢t    e  t ) < 0,
@q˜(t1,t )
@t1
> 0 and @q˜(t1,t )@t  > 0.
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B.2 Proof of Proposition 5
It is suﬃcient to show that if q0 is close to q⇤, z⇤ = e ⇢t
⇤ calculated when  = 1 q˜q01 q˜ satisfies
z⇤
q0z⇤+(1 q0) > q
⇤, or z⇤ > q
⇤ q⇤q0
1 q⇤q0 . It can be shown from equation (36) that z
⇤ is increasing
in q0, and that z⇤ converges to one as q0 converges to q⇤. Moreover, q
⇤ q⇤q0
1 q⇤q0 is decreasing in
q0, and converges to q
⇤
1+q⇤ < 1 as q0 converges to q
⇤, completing the proof.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 6
Suppose  > ¯. Then by equation (22), t⇤ is determined by
⇢e t
⇤
+  e ⇢t
⇤
= C(⇢+  ), (38)
where C = q
⇤
1 q⇤ · 1 q0q0 > 1. Let Y (⇢, t⇤) = ⇢e t
⇤
+  e ⇢t⇤   C(⇢+  ), then
@t⇤
@⇢
=  
@Y
@⇢
@Y
@t⇤
=
1
 ⇢
· C + t
⇤ e ⇢t⇤   e  t⇤
e t⇤   e ⇢t⇤ .
Since e t⇤   e ⇢t⇤ > 0, it remains to show that   ⌘ C + t⇤ e ⇢t⇤   e  t⇤ < 0. Let w⇤ = ⇢t⇤.
Then by (25),
  = C + w⇤e w
⇤   C(1 + ) + e w⇤
= (e w
⇤
(1 + w⇤)  C).
Since (1  a)e a < 1 < C for any a > 0, we have   < 0.
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Now suppose that  < ¯. Let t⇤  = t⇤2   t⇤1, and define
g1(t
⇤
1, t
⇤
 ; ⇢) ⌘
⇢
 +⇢e
( +⇢)t⇤1 +   +⇢
e⇢t
⇤
1  t⇤  +    ⇢(e
 ⇢t⇤    e  t⇤ )   C,
g2(t
⇤
1, t
⇤
 ; ⇢) ⌘ e rt
⇤
   
(1  ↵)
n
q0
1 q0 vH + vL
o
+ ↵q0(vH   vL)(1  e⇢t⇤1)
(1  ↵)vL(1 + q0   q0e⇢t⇤1) ,
Then by the implicit function theorem,
@t⇤1
@⇢
=
 A22B1 +A12B2
A11A22  A12A21 ,
@t⇤ 
@⇢
=
A21B1  A11B2
A11A22  A12A21 ,
where
A11 ⌘ @g1(t
⇤
1, t
⇤
 ; ⇢)
@t⇤1
=
1
⇤2
· e  t⇤   ⇢
 + ⇢
(
(e( +⇢)t
⇤
1   1) + ( + ⇢)e( +⇢)t⇤1 e
(  ⇢)t⇤    1
   ⇢
)
> 0,
A12 ⌘ @g1(t
⇤
1, t
⇤
 ; ⇢)
@t⇤ 
=
1
⇤2
·
⇢
⇢
 + ⇢
e( +⇢)t
⇤
1 +
 
 + ⇢
 
 ⇢(e ⇢t
⇤
    e  t⇤ )
   ⇢ > 0,
B1 ⌘ @g1(t
⇤
1, t
⇤
 ; ⇢)
@⇢
=
1
⇤2
·
(
e⇢t
⇤
1  t⇤  +
 (e ⇢t
⇤
    e  t⇤ )
   ⇢
)
· ( + ⇢)t
⇤
1⇢e
( +⇢)t⇤1 +  (e( +⇢)t
⇤
1   1)
( + ⇢)2
  1
⇤2
·
(
t⇤1e
⇢t⇤1  t⇤  +
 ( (   ⇢)t⇤ e ⇢t
⇤
  +  (e ⇢t
⇤
    e  t⇤ ))
(   ⇢)2
)
· ⇢e
( +⇢)t⇤1 +  
 + ⇢
> 0,
A21 ⌘ @g2(t
⇤
1, t
⇤
 ; ⇢)
@t⇤1
=
⇢q0(↵vH   v(q0))e⇢t⇤1
(1  q0)(1  ↵)vL(1 + q0   q0e⇢t⇤1 )2 > 0,
A22 ⌘ @g2(t
⇤
1, t
⇤
 ; ⇢)
@t⇤ 
=  re rt⇤  < 0,
B2 ⌘ @g2(t
⇤
1, t
⇤
 ; ⇢)
@⇢
= A21 · t
⇤
1
⇢
> 0,
and ⇤ = e⇢t⇤1  t⇤  +    ⇢(e
 ⇢t⇤    e  t⇤ ). Then it is easy to check that @t⇤1@⇢ < 0.
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Chapter V
Appendix to Chapter 2
C Proofs
C.1 Proof of Proposition 7
It is suﬃcient to show that in any equilibrium, after any history the buyer never oﬀers a
price p greater than v⇤✓ . First, observe that the buyer never makes an oﬀer above u✓, since
his equilibrium payoﬀ must be nonnegative. Given that, the seller’s expected payoﬀ after
the rejection is no more than
z1 ⌘ max{ u✓, ⇠v✓ +  (1  ⇠)u✓} < u✓.
Note that the first (second) term in the bracket denotes the seller’s maximum expected
payoﬀ when it is optimal for him to reject (accept) an outside option. So the seller accepts
any oﬀer p > z1 after any history; hence, such oﬀer is suboptimal for the buyer, since he
can always make a lower oﬀer p  ✏ > z1 and buy the product.
Proceeding with the same argument, given that the buyer’s oﬀer is bounded by zm, the
seller always accepts any oﬀer above
zm+1 ⌘ max{ zm, ⇠v✓ +  (1  ⇠)zm} < zm,
so any oﬀer greater than zm+1 is suboptimal for the buyer. Since {zm} is decreasing and
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converges to v⇤✓ , for any ✏ > 0 the buyer’s oﬀer v
⇤
✓ + ✏ is accepted by the seller, and hence is
suboptimal.
C.2 Proof of Lemma 4
It is clear that p  uH after any history. Now I claim that if the buyer never oﬀers more
than zm > v⇤H in the equilibrium, both types surely accept any oﬀer greater than
zm+1 = max{ zm, ⇠vH +  (1  ⇠)zm} < zm.
The low type accepts pn for sure, since his maximum payoﬀ after the rejection is no more
than max{ zm, ⇠vL +  (1   ⇠)zm}, which is less than zm+1. Since {zm} is decreasing and
converges to v⇤H , making an oﬀer v⇤H + ✏ for any ✏ > 0 is suboptimal for the buyer.
C.3 Proof of Proposition 8
Equilibrium Behavior at ⇡ < ⇡⇤
In this subsection, I construct sequences of prices {p†k} and cutoﬀ beliefs {⇡†k} that describe
the equilibrium behavior when the posterior is less than the deadlock belief ⇡⇤. In the
deadlock equilibrium, at ⇡ < ⇡⇤ the buyer oﬀers a price less than or equal to vL and the
low type uses a mixed acceptance strategy, and the bargaining reaches the deadlock phase
in a finite number of periods.
Let p†0 = vL, and let p
†
k be the equilibrium price when there are k periods until the
bargaining reaches the deadlock phase. The low type is indiﬀerent between accepting p†k
and waiting k periods to accept p†0 = vL. Since p
†
k must be strictly lower than vL, opting out
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(when the option is available) is strictly optimal for the low-type seller in these k periods.
Then the low type’s indiﬀerence condition, which gives a recursive equation for {p†k}, is given
by
p†k = ⇠vL +  (1  ⇠)p†k 1. (39)
For the construction of {⇡†k}, I define notions that make the analysis easier. Let  (⇡,⇡0)
be the low-type seller’s acceptance probability, which changes the posterior belief from ⇡ to
⇡0, given that both types of sellers opt out. That is,  (⇡,⇡0) satisfies
⇡0
1  ⇡0 =
⇡
1  ⇡ ·
1
1   (⇡,⇡0) ,
so  (⇡,⇡0) = 1   ⇡1 ⇡ · 1 ⇡
0
⇡0 . On the other hand, let  ˜(⇡,⇡
0) be the low type’s acceptance
probability, which changes the posterior belief from ⇡ to ⇡0, given that only the high type
takes the outside option. So  ˜(⇡,⇡0) satisfies
⇡0
1  ⇡0 =
⇡
1  ⇡ ·
1  ⇠
1   ˜(⇡,⇡0) ,
so  ˜(⇡,⇡0) = 1  ⇡1 ⇡ · 1 ⇡
0
⇡0 (1  ⇠).
Let ⇡†0 = ⇡⇤, and let ⇡
†
k be the maximum belief where the buyer oﬀers p
†
k. That is, the
buyer oﬀers p†k if ⇡ 2 (⇡†k+1,⇡†k]. Then when the belief is ⇡†1, the buyer is indiﬀerent between
oﬀering p†0 = vL and p
†
1. Either price leads to the posterior belief equal to ⇡
†
0 = ⇡
⇤, but the
low type’s acceptance probability is diﬀerent. If the buyer oﬀers p†1, both types of sellers
opt out, and the low type accepts with probability  (⇡†1,⇡⇤). On the other hand, if the
buyer oﬀers p†0 = vL, only the high type opts out, and the low type accepts with probability
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 ˜(⇡†1,⇡⇤).
Therefore, the payoﬀ to the buyer when he oﬀers p†1 is
 
1  ⇡
†
1
⇡⇤
!
(uL   p†1) +
⇡†1
⇡⇤
 (1  ⇠)U⇤F ,
where U⇤F ⌘ (1 ⇡⇤)(uL v⇤H)+⇡⇤(uH v⇤H) is defined in (9), and the payoﬀ when he oﬀers
p†0 = vL is
 
1  ⇡
†
1
⇡⇤
!
(uL   p†0) +
⇡†1
⇡⇤
⇠(1  ⇡⇤)(uL   p†0) +
⇡†1
⇡⇤
 (1  ⇠)U⇤F .
The indiﬀerence condition gives
(1  ⇡
†
1
⇡⇤
)(p†0   p†1) =
⇡†1
⇡⇤
⇠(1  ⇡⇤)(uL   p†0).
Note that the left-hand side of the equation above is the benefit of screening the low type
at a lower price, while the right-hand side is the cost of the low type’s opting-out. Hence ⇡†1
is given by
⇡†1
⇡⇤
=
(1   )(1  ⇠)vL
(1   )(1  ⇠)vL + ⇠(1  ⇡⇤)(uL   vL) .
For k > 1, when the posterior is ⇡†k the buyer is indiﬀerent between oﬀering p
†
k, which the
low type accepts with probability  (⇡†k,⇡
†
k 1), and oﬀering p
†
k 1, which the low type accepts
with probability  (⇡†k,⇡
†
k 2). Let W (⇡) be the buyer’s expected payoﬀ in the equilibrium
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when the posterior is ⇡. Then
W (⇡†k) = (1   k)(uL   p†k) +   k(1  ⇠)W (⇡†k 1) (40)
= (1   k)(uL   p†k 1) +  kW (⇡†k 1), (41)
where  k =
⇡†k
⇡†k 1
. Note that (40) and (41) are the buyer’s expected payoﬀ when he oﬀers p†k
and p†k 1, respectively. The indiﬀerence condition gives
 kW (⇡
†
k 1) = (1   k)(p†k 1   v⇤L) (42)
Then plugging (42) into (41) gives
W (⇡†k) = (1   k)(uL   v⇤L).
Finally, plugging the equation above into (42) leads to
1
 k
= 1 + (1   k 1) uL   v
⇤
L
p†k 1   v⇤L
. (43)
Note that since limk!1 p†k = vL,  k converges to zero as k goes to infinity. Therefore, for
any ⇡0 2 (0,⇡⇤), there exists N 2 N such that ⇡†N  ⇡0 < ⇡†N 1. Here I consider the generic
case that ⇡†N+1 < ⇡0.
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Strategy Profile
. Buyer:
pn(h
n) = pn(⇡n, pn 1) =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
v⇤H if ⇡n > ⇡⇤,
q(pn 1)   v⇤H + (1  q(pn 1))   vL if ⇡n = ⇡⇤,
p†k 1 if ⇡n 2 [⇡†k,⇡†k 1),
where ⇡†0 = ⇡⇤ and q(pn 1) = max{pn 1/  vLv⇤H vL , 0}.
. The low type:
 Ln(h
n
S) =  Ln(⇡n, pn) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
1 if pn    v⇤H ,
max{0,  ˜(⇡n,⇡⇤)} if pn 2 [vL,  v⇤H),
max{0, (⇡n,⇡†k)} if pn 2 [p†k, p†k 1),
0 if pn < v⇤L,
cLn(hˆ
n
S) = cLn(⇡ˆn) =
8>>>><>>>>:
1 if ⇡ˆn < ⇡ˆ⇤,
max{0,  ˜(⇡ˆn,⇡⇤)/⇠} if ⇡ˆn   ⇡ˆ⇤,
where ⇡ˆ⇤ = ⇡⇤⇡⇤+(1 ⇡⇤)(1 ⇠) .
Optimality of Profile
The following lemma states that if (A1) holds, then oﬀering any price p 2 [ v⇤H , v⇤H) at the
deadlock belief is suboptimal for the buyer.
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Lemma 11. Suppose (A1) holds. Then at ⇡ = ⇡⇤, the buyer is better oﬀ by oﬀering v⇤H
than by oﬀering a price p 2 [ v⇤H , v⇤H).
Proof. Let UF (⇡) = (1   ⇡)(uL   v⇤H) + ⇡(uH   v⇤H) be the payoﬀ to the buyer when he
oﬀers v⇤H to finish the bargaining at a posterior belief ⇡. Then U⇤F = UF (⇡⇤), where U⇤F is
defined in (9).
Corollary 1 implies that oﬀering a price p 2 ( v⇤H , v⇤H) is dominated by oﬀering  v⇤H . If
the buyer oﬀers  v⇤H , the low type accepts it for sure. The high type opts out when the
option is available, then the buyer oﬀers v⇤H in the next period and bargaining ends. In this
case the buyer’s expected payoﬀ is
(1  ⇡)(uL    v⇤H) + ⇡ (1  ⇠)(uH   v⇤H).
If the buyer instead oﬀers v⇤H and finishes the bargaining immediately, he obtains UF (⇡).
Then the diﬀerence is
(1  ⇡)(1   )v⇤H| {z }
benefit of screening
  ⇡⇠(uH   v⇤H)| {z }
cost of breakdown
 ⇡(1  ⇠)(1   )(uH   v⇤H)| {z }
cost of delay
.
Therefore oﬀering v⇤H yields greater payoﬀ if and only if
⇡ > ⇡˜ ⌘ (1   )v
⇤
H
(1   (1  ⇠))(uH   v⇤H) + (1   )v⇤H
.
A simple calculation shows that ⇡⇤ > ⇡˜ if and only if (A1) holds.
The optimality of each action is as follows:
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1. cLn :
(a) If ⇡ˆn < ⇡⇤, then for any value of cLn 2 [0, 1], ⇡n+1 < ⇡⇤ so pn+1  vL. Therefore
the continuation payoﬀ is no greater than vL, so taking an outside option is
optimal for the low type.
(b) If ⇡ˆn 2 [⇡⇤, ⇡ˆ⇤], the only consistent strategy is to use a mixed strategy to induce
⇡n+1 = ⇡⇤.
(c) If ⇡ˆn > ⇡ˆ⇤, then for any value of cLn 2 [0, 1], ⇡n+1 > ⇡⇤ so the buyer oﬀers v⇤H in
the next period. Therefore, the low type strictly prefers not to take an outside
option.
2.  Ln :
(a) By Corollary 1, the low type accepts any pn    v⇤H for sure.
(b) pn 2 [vL,  v⇤H): If ⇡n  ⇡ˆ⇤, accepting the oﬀer with probability  Ln =  ˜(⇡n,⇡⇤)
that, combined with cLn = max{0,  ˜(⇡ˆn,⇡⇤)/⇠}, induces ⇡n+1 = ⇡⇤ is the only
consistent strategy of the low-type seller. if ⇡ > ⇡ˆ⇤, the low type is strictly better
oﬀ by rejecting pn, not taking outside option and accepting pn+1 = v⇤H .
(c) pn < vL: The construction of the sequences {(⇡†k, p†k)}1k=0 implies that the low
type is indiﬀerent between acceptance and rejection by following the above strat-
egy profile.
3. pn : Lemma 11 and the construction of the sequences {(⇡†k, p†k)}1k=0 imply that oﬀer
strategy pn is the best response to the seller’s strategy ( ✓t, c✓t).
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C.4 Proof of Proposition 9
Let {pˆ†k} and {⇡ˆ†k} be the limit of sequences {p†k} and {⇡†k} when  ! 0. Then the recursive
equation (39) implies that pˆ†k = vL for any k. Therefore, the recursive equation (43) for
 k =
⇡†k
⇡†k 1
becomes
 k =
1
1 + (1   k 1)uL ⌘vLvL ⌘vL
,
where ⌘ =  r+  . Since a function g(x) =
1
1+(1 x)uL ⌘vLvL ⌘vL
is convex and has fixed points of one
and vL ⌘vLuL ⌘vL < 1,  k converges to
vL ⌘vL
uL ⌘vL . Therefore, for any prior ⇡0 2 (0,⇡⇤) there exists
a finite K such that ⇡ˆ†K  ⇡0. Therefore, as   goes to zero, the equilibrium oﬀer at ⇡0
converges to vL, and the real-time length of the pre-deadlock phase, K , shrinks to zero.
In the deadlock phase, in each period the bargaining ends by 1) agreement at p = v⇤H
with probability q, 2) agreement at p = vL with probability (1  q)(1  ⇡⇤)⇠, and 3) opting-
out with probability (1   q)⇡⇤⇠. Therefore, the resolution period of the deadlock phase is
a geometric distribution with parameter q + (1   q)⇠. As   ! 0, the limit distribution
becomes Poisson arrival process with a finite arrival rate, so the deadlock phase does not
shrink.
C.5 Proof of Corollaries 2 and 3
The probability of agreement at t = 0 is (1 ⇡0) (⇡0,⇡⇤) = 1  ⇡0⇡⇤ . The proof of Proposition
9 implies that Tˆd =  q+(1 q)⇠ , and letting  ! 0 provides the desired result.
The probability of a breakdown conditional on the bargaining reaching the deadlock
phase is
(1  q)⇡⇤⇠
q + (1  q)⇠ ,
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so letting  ! 0 provides the desired result..
C.6 Proof of Proposition 11
Suboptimality of Two-Period Screening
Lemma 12. Suppose (A2) holds. Then in equilibrium, pn 2 [ v⇤H , v⇤H) is never oﬀered after
any history.
Proof. Recall from Lemma 11 that oﬀering v⇤H yields a greater payoﬀ than oﬀering a sequence
of prices  v⇤H , v⇤H if and only if
⇡ > ⇡˜ ⌘ (1   )v
⇤
H
(1   (1  ⇠))(uH   v⇤H) + (1   )v⇤H
.
On the other hand, from the inequality
(1  ⇡)(uL    v⇤H) + ⇡ (1  ⇠)(uH   v⇤H) < 0,
the oﬀer sequence  v⇤H , v⇤H yields a negative payoﬀ if and only if
⇡ < ⇡ ⌘  v
⇤
H   uL
 (1  ⇠)(uH   v⇤H) + ( v⇤H   uL)
.
Suppose (A2) holds. Then a simple calculation shows that (A2) implies ⇡ > ⇡˜. Then
for any ⇡ 2 [0, 1], pn 2 [ v⇤H , v⇤H) is not oﬀered in equilibrium, since either p = v⇤H or p = 0
is a profitable deviation.
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Upper Bound on the Equilibrium Posterior
Lemma 13. In any equilibrium, there exists ⇡¯ 2 (0, 1) such that if ⇡n > ⇡¯ after any history,
the buyer oﬀers pn = v⇤H .
Proof. The maximum payoﬀ of the buyer by screening the low type is
(1  ⇡) · (uL   v⇤L) + ⇡(1  ⇠) ·  (uH   v⇤H). (44)
If instead the buyer oﬀers v⇤H , then his payoﬀ is UF (⇡). Therefore, if
⇡ >
v⇤H   v⇤L
(1   (1  ⇠))(uH   v⇤H) + v⇤H   v⇤L
then the buyer strictly prefers to oﬀer v⇤H regardless of the history.
Lemma 14. If ⇡n  ⇡¯ and pn < v⇤H , ⇡n+1  ⇡¯.
Proof. Suppose not; that is, there exists a history hn where ⇡n  ⇡¯, pn < v⇤H , and  Ln +
(1    Ln)⇠cLn >  ˜(⇡n, ⇡¯). By Lemma 12, pn <  v⇤H . Moreover, by Lemma 13, pn+1 = v⇤H .
Then it is optimal for the low type to reject both pn and an outside option and wait for the
next period oﬀer, which leads to a contradiction.
Lemma 15. (1) If ⇡n  ⇡¯ and pn 2 (vL,  v⇤H), then cLn = 0.
(2) If ⇡n = ⇡¯ and pn < vL, then  Ln = 0.
Proof. (1) Suppose not; that is, there exists a history hn where ⇡n  ⇡¯, pn 2 (vL,  v⇤H), and
cLn > 0. Then opting-out must be at least as good as waiting, so uL(hn+1)  vL/ . Then
it is strictly optimal to accept pn, contradicting Lemma 14.
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(2) Suppose that there exists a history hn where ⇡n = ⇡¯ and pn < vL, and  Ln > 0.
Then by Lemma 14 cLn < 1, which implies uL(hn+1)   vL/ . But then accepting pn is
suboptimal. Contradiction.
Lemma 16. ⇡¯  ⇡⇤.
Proof. Suppose the contrary that there exists an equilibrium with ⇡¯ > ⇡⇤. Then it suﬃces
to show that for all history with a belief smaller than but suﬃciently close to ⇡¯, oﬀering v⇤H
is optimal for the buyer.
Define
U˜(⇡¯) = (1  ⇡¯)⇠(uL   vL) +  (1  ⇠)UF (⇡¯),
and let Uˆ(hn) be the supremum of the buyer’s expected payoﬀ at hn, given that the buyer
oﬀers p < v⇤H at hn. I claim that for any history hn with a belief ⇡¯, Uˆ(hn) < U˜(⇡¯). Suppose
the bargaining ends after k periods. Then by Lemma 14, the probability of an agreement
between the low-type seller before bargaining ends is no more than 1 ⇠
k
1 ⇠ . Since the low type
never accepts any oﬀer less than vL,34 making an agreement at vL with the least delay yields
the highest possible payoﬀ to the buyer. Therefore the buyer’s payoﬀ is bounded by
U˜k(⇡¯) = (1  ⇡¯)⇠(1   
k(1  ⇠)k)
1   (1  ⇠) (uL   vL) +  
k(1  ⇠)kUF (⇡¯).
Since ⇡¯ > ⇡⇤, (1   (1  ⇠))UF (⇡¯) > (1  ⇡¯)⇠(uL   vL), so k = 1 is optimal.
Now consider histories with beliefs less than ⇡¯. Then the continuity of the previous
argument implies that for any   > 0, there exists ✏ > 0 such that for any history hn with
34Suppose not; that is, there exists a history hˆm where the buyer oﬀers a price less than vL and the low
type accepts it with positive probability. Then, the low type must take the outside option for sure (if it is
available) at every history between hn and hˆm. Then at hˆm the posterior is ⇡¯, which contradicts Lemma 15.
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a belief ⇡(hn) 2 (⇡¯   ✏, ⇡¯), if the buyer oﬀers p < v⇤H with positive probability at hn, then
U(hn) < U˜(⇡¯) +  .
Equations (9) and (10) imply that ⇡¯ > ⇡⇤ if and only if U˜(⇡¯) < UF (⇡¯). Then since UF (⇡)
are continuous, for suﬃciently small   > 0, there exists ✏ > 0 such that for any history hn
with a belief ⇡(hn) 2 (⇡¯   ✏, ⇡¯), if the buyer oﬀers p < v⇤H with positive probability at hn,
U(hn) < U˜(⇡¯) +   < UF (⇡¯   ✏). So the buyer’s optimal oﬀer is v⇤H for any history with
⇡ 2 (⇡¯   ✏, ⇡¯), which contradicts the definition of ⇡¯.
C.7 Proof of Proposition 10
Fix a perfect Bayesian equilibrium that satisfies nondecreasing oﬀers.
Step 1 For any history hn, ⇡n   ⇡n 1.
Proof. Suppose not; that is, there exists a history hn such that ⇡n < ⇡n 1. Then in order to
make the low type indiﬀerent, the buyer’s oﬀer at hn satisfies E[pn] = pn 1/ . Therefore, the
seller oﬀers pn > pn 1 with positive probability, which violates the nondecreasing oﬀers.
In the proof of Proposition 11, I show that there exists ⇡¯  ⇡⇤ that bounds the posterior
belief along the bargaining process. Then Step 1 implies that if ⇡n = ⇡¯ at some history hn,
then ⇡n+1 = ⇡¯ after any pn <  v⇤H , which implies that  Ln(⇡¯, x) = ⇠ for any p 2 (vL,  v⇤H).
Step 2 At ⇡ = ⇡¯, the buyer’s equilibrium oﬀer is either vL or v⇤H .
Proof. It is clear that oﬀering p < vL is suboptimal for the buyer. Moreover, Lemma 12
says that any oﬀer p 2 [ v⇤H , v⇤H) is suboptimal. Then it is suﬃcient to show that if any
p 2 (p˜, v⇤H) is not oﬀered, the same goes for any p 2 (max{ p˜, vL}, p˜). Suppose at some
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history hn, the buyer oﬀers pn 2 (max{ p˜, vL}, p˜). Then in the next period, to make the low
type indiﬀerent, the buyer must use mixed oﬀer between v⇤H and some (possibly multiple)
p  p˜. Therefore the buyer’s expected payoﬀ at history hn is
(1  ⇡¯)⇠(1  pn) +  (1  ⇠)(1  v⇤H).
Now consider the deviation of the buyer to oﬀer p0 = pn   ✏, where ✏ is small enough
such that p0 > max{ p˜, vL}. Then the buyer can make an agreement with the low type at
a lower oﬀer with the same probability and still use a mixed oﬀer in the next period. So
oﬀering p0 is a profitable deviation, which proves that any p 2 (vL, v⇤H) cannot be oﬀered in
equilibrium.
Step 3 ⇡¯ = ⇡⇤.
Proof. Suppose ⇡¯ < ⇡⇤. First, I claim that if ⇡n = ⇡¯, the buyer’s oﬀer must be v⇤H . Suppose
vL is oﬀered in some history hn. Then in the next period the buyer must use a mixed
strategy between v⇤H and some p  vL. Therefore, the buyer’s expected payoﬀ at history hn
is
(1  ⇡¯)⇠(1  vL) +  (1  ⇠)(1  v⇤H),
which is greater than 1  v⇤H since ⇡¯ < ⇡⇤. So oﬀering vL at hn+1 is strictly better than v⇤H ,
contradictory to the fact that the buyer uses a mixed strategy.
Since the equilibrium satisfies nondecreasing oﬀers, it must be that for all history hn
with ⇡n < ⇡¯, the buyer never oﬀers v⇤H . Let p¯ be a supremum of the buyer’s oﬀer at history
hn with ⇡n < ⇡¯. Then by Lemma 12, p¯   v⇤H . Fix ✏ suﬃciently small that p¯   ✏ >  p¯.
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Then there exists a history hn with ⇡n < ⇡¯ where the buyer oﬀers p > p¯   ✏ with positive
probability. Suppose that ⇡n+1   ⇡¯; then pn+1 = v⇤H and the low type is strictly better oﬀ
by rejecting pn. If ⇡n+1 < ⇡¯, then accepting pn is a strict best response of the low type,
violating consistency.
Step 4 Behavior at ⇡  ⇡⇤ is determined uniquely.
Proof. By step 1, the equilibrium belief is nondecreasing. Therefore, the backward induction
method in the proof of Proposition 8 yields unique equilibrium behavior.
C.8 Proof of Proposition 12
The buyer’s indiﬀerence condition at the deadlock belief ⇡⇤ is given by
(1   (1  ⇠)){(1  ⇡⇤)uL + ⇡⇤uH   (cH + v⇤H)} = (1  ⇡⇤)⇠(uL   (cL + vL)),
so
⇡⇤ =
(cH + v⇤H   uL) + ⇠1  (1 ⇠)(uL   (cL + vL))
(uH   uL) + ⇠1  (1 ⇠)(uL   (cL + vL))
.
The buyer can conduct a two-period screening by oﬀering (1   )cL +  (cH   v⇤H) to the
low type then oﬀering cH + v⇤H to the remaining high type. In this case, his payoﬀ is
(1  ⇡)[uL   (1   )cL +  (cH   v⇤H)] + ⇡ (1  ⇠)[uH   (cH + v⇤H)].
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Hence the two-period screening yields a higher payoﬀ than oﬀering cH + v⇤H if
⇡ < ⇡˜ ⌘ (1   )[(cH + v
⇤
H)  cL]
(1   )[(cH + v⇤H)  cL] + (1   (1  ⇠))[uH   (cH + v⇤H)]
.
It can be shown that (A1’) is satisfied if and only if ⇡⇤ > ⇡˜.
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Chapter VI
Appendix to Chapter 3
D Preliminaries
D.1 Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations
Given a Markov strategy of party 2 and the median voter ( 2, M ), standard arguments
imply that on any open interval where  2 and  M are constant, party 1’s payoﬀ functions
(V1,W1) from playing a best response are once continuously diﬀerentiable and solve the
system of Bellman equations
V1(p) =s  (1   M (p)) · ⌧1(p;V1,W1) + max
k12[0,1]
k1(b1(p;V1)  c1(p)), (45)
W1(p) =s+  M (p) · ⌧1(p;V1,W1) + k2(p)( 1(p;W1)  s), (46)
where
. ⌧1(p;V1,W1) =
r
⇠ (V1(p) W1(p)): value change from loss of control
. b1(p;V1) =
p 
r {V1(1)  V1(p)  (1  p)V 01(p)}: value of party 1’s experimentation
.  1(p;W1) =
(1 p) 
r {W1(0) W1(p) + pW 01(p)}: value of opponent’s experimentation
. c1(p) = s  pg: opportunity cost of experimentation
Party 2’s value functions V2(p) and W2(p) satisfy a similar Bellman equation, with 1   p
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replacing p.
Before we analyze the equilibrium, let us remember the important notations and define
several new ones:
. µ = r/  : inverse of the eﬀective success rate of the reform policy
.   = ⇠⇠+r : relative frequency of elections
. µˆ = µ1   .
. ⌦(p) = 1 pp : (inverse) odds ratio
. f(p) ⌘ (1  p)⌦(p)µ = (1  p)µ+1p µ.
. fˆ(p) ⌘ (1  p)⌦(p)µˆ.
D.2 Explicit solution to HJB equations
For a range of beliefs where the Markov profile (k1, k2, M ) is constant, we solve (45) and
(46) to get the explicit solutions of V1(p) and W1(p), with integration constants. Table 1
shows the explicit solutions for each set of values (k1, k2, M ). Integration constants Ck are
determined by boundary conditions, such as value-matching conditions and smooth-pasting
conditions.
E Equilibrium Characterization: Proof of Propositions 14-17
First, I will prove lemmas, which makes the analysis simpler. The first lemma states that in
the belief range where there is no chance of losing power, each party will play as if it were
a single decision-maker.
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 M (p) = 1  M (p) = 0
(0, 0)
V1(p) s s
W1(p) s s
(0, 1)
V1(p) s (1   )s+  C5f(1  p)
W1(p)
µˆ s
µˆ+1 +
 s
µˆ+1p+ C1fˆ(1  p) C5f(1  p)
(1, 0)
V1(p) gp+ C2f(p)  s+
g  s
µˆ+1 p+ C4fˆ(p)
W1(p) (1   )s+  (gp+ C2f(p)) s
(1, 1)
V1(p) gp+ C2f(p)
µ+1
µˆ+1gp+
µˆ 
µˆ+µ+1C5f(1  p) + C6fˆ(p)
W1(p)  gp+
µˆ 
µˆ+µ+1C2f(p) + C3fˆ(1  p) C5f(1  p)
Table 1
Explicit solutions to HJB equations
Lemma 17. In any MPE in ⌃⇤, the action of party 1 (resp. party 2) at p > 12 (resp. p <
1
2)
is the same as that of the optimal decision rule of the single decision-maker problem.
Proof. First, consider party 1. Since  ⇤M (p) = 1 for p >
1
2 , party 1’s HJB equations in
this range of beliefs given  ⇤M are equal to those of the single decision-maker problem (12).
Therefore, the corresponding value functions and the boundary conditions are also the same,
which leads to the same optimal decision rule in the equilibrium. A similar argument can
be applied to party 2.
The next lemma shows that each party has the dominant strategy when the belief is
close to certainty.
Lemma 18. In any MPE in ⌃⇤, 1) party 1 (resp. party 2) chooses R1 (resp. R2) at a belief
close to one (resp. zero), and 2) chooses S at a belief close to zero (resp. one).
Proof. The first part is straightforward from Lemma 17. Suppose to the contrary that there
exists an MPE where party 1 chooses R1 for any p > 0. Then by the first part of the proof,
there exists p 2 (0, 12) such that k2(p) = 1. Since  M (p) = 0 for p < p, we can derive the
functional form of value function V1(p) for p 2 (0, p). Then a simple calculation shows that
138
limp!0 V (p) = 0 (it is suﬃcient to show that C6 = 0), but then party 1 can deviate to S to
get the payoﬀ of (1   )s. Contradiction.
Lemma 18 implies that in any MPE, there exists at least one cutoﬀ point p1 2 (0, 1)
on the belief space where party 1 switches action from R1 to S, that is, there exists ✏ > 0
such that k1(p) =
8>>>><>>>>:
1 if p 2 (p1, p1 + ✏)
0 if p = p1
. Let p⇤1 be the greatest belief point of such p1’s,
and let p⇤2 be the smallest such cutoﬀ of p2. Then Lemma 17 implies that for
g
s < ↵0,
p⇤1 = 1  p⇤2 = p0 > 12 . This proves Theorem 1.
Now consider the case where gs   ↵0. Then by Lemma 17, p⇤1  12 and p⇤2   12 in any
MPE in ⌃⇤. Therefore, we have four cases to consider:
1. p⇤1 = p⇤2 = 12 ,
2. p⇤1 < 12 and p
⇤
2 >
1
2 ,
3. p⇤1 = 12 and p
⇤
2 >
1
2 ,
4. p⇤1 < 12 and p
⇤
2 =
1
2 .
In the following subsections, we characterize the equilibria in each case.
E.1 Case 1: Propositions 15 and 16
Suppose p⇤1 = p⇤2 = 12 . Then by definition of p
⇤
i , k1(p) = 1 for p >
1
2 , k2(p) = 1 for p <
1
2 ,
and k1(12) = k2(
1
2) = 0. Since both parties play the safe action at p =
1
2 when in control,
Vi(
1
2) = Wi(
1
2) = s for all i = 1, 2. These boundary conditions give us the value of the
integration constants C2 = 2s  g and C5 = 2s; hence, the payoﬀ functions are given by (for
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party 1)
V1(p) = gp+ (2s  g)f(p), p   1
2
,
W1(p) = 2sf(1  p), p  1
2
.
Note that V1(p) for p < 12 does not depend on party 2’s behavior for p >
1
2 . The intuition
is that given that the prior is less than 12 , the posterior never reaches p 2 (12 , 1). Therefore,
the question is essentially getting the best response of party 1 to k2(p) = 1 and  M (p) = 0.
By symmetry, if k1(p) is a best response of party 1 for p < 12 , then k2(p) = k1(1 p) is a best
response of party 2 for p > 12 , which constitutes an equilibrium. Therefore, it is suﬃcient to
analyze party 1’s best response.
We consider the following two subcases:
Subcase 1 Suppose p⇤1 = 12 is party 1’s only cutoﬀ point. Then  1(p) = S for all p <
1
2 ,
and by Table 1,
V (p) = (1   )s+ 2 sf(1  p).
This is party 1’s best response if and only if b(p;V1)  c(p) for any p 2 (0, 12), or
(1 + µ)2 sf(1  p)    µs+ ( (1   )s+ (1 + µ)g)p, (47)
for any p 2 (0, 12), which gives the upper bound ↵1(µ, ) for the value of gs 35.
35More precisely,
↵1(µ, ) ⌘ inf
p2(0, 12 )
µ+ (1   )p  2 (1 + µ)f(1  p)
(1 + µ)p
.
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Subcase 2 Suppose that there exist additional cutoﬀ points other than p⇤1 = 12 . Let pˆ1 be
the smallest such cutoﬀ point. Then since the value of ( 2, M ) is constant in the neighbor
of pˆ1, by Table 1, V (p) solves the value-matching condition at p = pˆ1
(1   )s+ 2 sf(1  pˆ1) = µ+ 1
µˆ+ 1
gpˆ1 +
2µˆ s
µˆ+ µ+ 1
f(1  pˆ1) + C˜6fˆ(pˆ1), (48)
and the smooth-pasting condition at p = pˆ1
2 sf 0(1  pˆ1) = µ+ 1
µˆ+ 1
g +
2µˆ s
µˆ+ µ+ 1
f 0(1  pˆ1)  C˜6fˆ 0(pˆ1),
where C˜6 is an integration constant. Combining the above two equations, we have
(1 + µ)2 sf(1  pˆ1) =  µs+ ( (1   )s+ (1 + µ)g)pˆ1, (49)
Notice that both sides of the above equation are identical to both sides of inequality (47)
with p = pˆ1. Therefore, the solution of equation (47) exists if and only if gs   ↵1(µ, ).
Note that there exist at most two solutions of equation (49), since the left-hand side of
(49) is convex in p, while the right-hand side is linear in p. It turns out that the smaller
solution must be pˆ1. To see this, suppose the contrary: that pˆ1 is the greater solution of
(49), and let p† be the smaller solution. Then for any p 2 (p†, pˆ1), it must be
(1 + µ)2 sf(1  p) <  µs+ ( (1   )s+ (1 + µ)g)p.
Therefore, b(p;V1) > c(p) for p 2 (p†, pˆ1), which contradicts to the definition of pˆ1.
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Plugging in pˆ1 to (48), we have the integration constant
C˜6(pˆ1) =
1
f(pˆ1)
⇢
(1   )s  µ+ 1
µˆ+ 1
gpˆ1 + 2 s
µ+ 1
µˆ+ µ+ 1
f(1  pˆ1)
 
,
then a function
V˜1(p) ⌘ µ+ 1
µˆ+ 1
gp+
2µˆ s
µˆ+ µ+ 1
f(1  p) + C˜6fˆ(p),
is party 1’s payoﬀ function at p0 < 1/2 if party 1 plays R1 for p 2 [pˆ1, p0). If party 1 plays a
safe action at p0, it receives the payoﬀ of (1  )s+2 sf(1  p). Therefore playing R1 is its
best response at p0 < 1/2 if and only if V˜1(p) > (1   )s+ 2 sf(1  p) for all p 2 [pˆ1, p0).
Define ↵2(µ, ) be the value such that gs < ↵2(µ, ) if and only if V˜1(
1
2) =
µ+1
µˆ+1 · g2 +
µˆ 
µˆ+µ+1s+
C˜6
2  s. Then a simple calculation proves the following lemma:
Lemma 19. 1) If gs 2 (↵1,↵2), then there exists a unique p˜1 2 (pˆ1, 12) such that
V˜1(p) > (1   )s+ 2 sf(1  p)if p 2 (pˆ1, p˜1),
V˜1(p) < (1   )s+ 2 sf(1  p)if p 2 (p˜1, 1
2
).
2) For gs > ↵2, V˜1(p) > (1   )s+ 2 sf(1  p) for all p 2 (pˆ1, 12).
Using this, we prove the main result:
Proposition 19. For gs 2 (↵1,↵2), there is a unique MPE of the game where k 11 (o) =
[0, pˆ1] [ (p˜1, 12 ] and k 12 (o) = [12 , 1  p˜1] [ [1  pˆ1, 1].
Proof. It suﬃces to prove that the above k1(p) for p 2 (0, 12 ] is the unique best response to
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k2(p) = 1 for p 2 (0, 12 ]. There must exist some p˜ such that k1(p) switches from 0 to 1. We
claim that p˜ = p˜1. If p˜ < p˜1, then V1(p˜ ) > V1(p˜+), so party 1 has a profitable deviation
to play R1. If p˜ > p˜1, then for p 2 (p˜, p˜1) playing S is profitable deviation for party 1. (we
show by comparing b(p) and c(p).)
E.2 Case 2: Proposition 14
Suppose p⇤1 < 12 and p
⇤
2 >
1
2 . First we show that for any p
⇤
2 >
1
2 , party 1’s best response
cutoﬀ p⇤1 is uniquely determined. The intuition is as follows. Observe that if the prior belief
were less than p⇤2, the posterior never falls into p 2 (p⇤2, 1). Therefore, the party 1’s optimal
response does not depend on party 2’s action for p 2 (p⇤2, 1). Using the fact that party 2
plays the safe action for all p  p⇤2, party 1’s best response is determined.
Fix any p⇤2 > 12 . Then the following five boundary conditions determine the unique p
⇤
1:
1. value-matching condition of V1 at p = p⇤1:
(1   )s+  C5 · f(1  p⇤1) = Bgp⇤ +A C5 · f(1  p⇤1) + C6 · fˆ(p⇤1),
2. smooth-pasting condition of V1 at p = p⇤1:
 C5 · f 0(1  p⇤1) = Bg +A C5 · f 0(1  p⇤1) + C6 · fˆ 0(p⇤1),
3. value-matching condition of V1 at p = 12 :
Bg +A C5 + C6 = g + C2,
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4. value-matching condition of W1 at p = 12 :
C5 =  g +A C2 + C3,
5. value-matching condition of W1 at p = p⇤2:
 g(p⇤2) +A C2 · f(p⇤2) + C3 · fˆ(1  p⇤2) = (1   )s+  g(p⇤2) +  C2 · f(p⇤2).
The above boundary conditions jointly determine the unique p⇤1. Therefore, there exists a
unique pair of (p⇤1, p⇤2) such that each cutoﬀ belief is the best response to the other cutoﬀ.
Furthermore, p⇤2 = 1  p⇤1. In the best response cutoﬀ (p⇤1, p⇤2), there is no other cutoﬀ belief
of the party. That is, party 1 chooses the safe policy for any p 2 (0, p⇤1) and vice versa.
There exists ↵3( , µ) such that the profile with (p⇤1, p⇤2) is an MPE if and only if
g
s > ↵3.
E.3 Cases 3 and 4: Proposition 17
Finally, consider the case where p⇤1 = 12 and p
⇤
2 >
1
2 . Suppose that the median voter’s
election rule at p = 12 is to elect the ncumbent. Combining with p
⇤
1 =
1
2 , party 1’s payoﬀ at
p = 12 with power is V1(
1
2) = s.
First analyze party 2’s best response. Since W2(12) = s and W2 is continuous at
1
2 , we
have
W2(p) = 2sf(p),
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for all p   12 . Then as in Case 2, there exists a cutoﬀ p⇤2 > 12 only if it satisfies
(1 + µ)2 sf(p⇤2) =  µs+ ( (1   )s+ (1 + µ)g)(1  p⇤2).
Using this p⇤2, we can derive V2(p) (again similar to Case 2) for p 2 [12 , p⇤2). Since p⇤2 > 12 , it
must be the case that V2(12) > s, which is equivalent to
g
s > ↵2.
Now let us consider party 1’s best response. Having fixed p⇤2, the value matching con-
dition of W1(p) at p = p⇤2 and p⇤ = 12 gives a complete specification of W1(p). Using
this, we can compute another cutoﬀ pˆ1, which finishes the construction of the asymmetric
equilibrium in Theorem 5.
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